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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CURTIS ADRIAN WALK
Appellant No. 1202 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered July 11, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-07-CR-0001314-2008
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: May 26, 2021
Appellant Curtis Adrian Walk pro se appeals from the July 11, 2019 order
of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County (“PCRA court”), which dismissed
for want of jurisdiction his self-styled “Application to Suspend Act 84
Deductions During Litigation of PCRA Petition Due to Material Change in
Defendant’s Financial Circumstances Since Sentencing” (the “Petition”). Upon
review, we vacate and remand with instructions.
The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. Briefly,
while imprisoned for sexually abusing a minor and committing multiple drug
offenses, Appellant, on March 27, 2019, pro se filed the Petition in the trial
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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court, requesting the cessation of Act 841 deductions by the DOC based on an
alleged material change in his financial condition. On July 11, 2019, the trial
court denied the Petition, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction and that
jurisdiction exclusively was vested in the Commonwealth Court. Appellant pro
se appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant presents three issues for our review.
I. Does this Honorable Court have jurisdiction over this
appeal?
II. Did the lower court have jurisdiction to entertain a request
to stay collection of fines and costs it had ordered in one
case where those deductions are now adversely affecting
and substantially impeding the indigent prisoner’s ability to
litigate his PCRA petition pro se and present the merits of
his claims to the lower court in another?
III. Should the lower court hold a hearing to determine whether
there has in fact been a material change in the pro se PCRA
petitioner’s financial condition since sentencing in this
matter?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalizations omitted).
The crux of this appeal is whether the trial court had jurisdiction over
the Petition.2 This Court addressed the issue of subject matter jurisdiction as
raised here in Commonwealth v. Danysh, 833 A.2d 151 (Pa. Super. 2003).
There, the trial court denied an inmate’s petition to cease Act 84 deductions
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1 “Act 84 deductions” refers to those made by the Department of Corrections
(the “DOC”) pursuant to Section 9728(b)(5) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.
C.S.A. § 9728(b)(5).
2Given our disposition below, we need not address Appellant’s specific issues
on appeal.
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from his inmate account, finding the 20% deduction a “reasonable amount.”
Id. at 152. On appeal, we raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte, recognizing that the Commonwealth Court has original jurisdiction
over various classes of cases, including civil suits against government actors.
Id. Danysh’s action was a civil action “against the Commonwealth
government, as DOC falls within the jurisdictional statute’s definition of that
term.” Id. at 153 (citation omitted). Therefore, “Danysh should have brought
his petition as a petition for review of a governmental determination under
the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction.” Id. (citation omitted).
“Because Commonwealth Court had exclusive original jurisdiction, the court
of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction and its order was void.”
Id. at 154. See also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 858 A.2d 627 (Pa. Super.
2004) (en banc) (trial court properly determined it lacked jurisdiction over a
prisoner’s petition to stop Act 84 deductions). Thus, we agree with the trial
court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the Petition.3
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3We agree with Appellant that we may exercise jurisdiction over this appeal.
As we explained in Danysh,
Although the court of common pleas lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, we have appellate jurisdiction since this is an appeal
from a final order. Our appellate jurisdiction is properly from final
orders, see Pa.R.A.P. 341(a), and even though the common pleas
court lacked jurisdiction, its order was still final because it
“dispose[d] of all claims and of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1).
Id. at 152 n.1.
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Despite our conclusion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, we still are
constrained to vacate its order because it failed to transfer the Petition to the
Commonwealth Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter raised
in the Petition.4 Section 5103 of the Judicial Code provides in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.--If an appeal or other matter is taken to or
brought in a court or magisterial district of this Commonwealth
which does not have jurisdiction of the appeal or other matter, the
court or magisterial district judge shall not quash such appeal or
dismiss the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the
proper tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the appeal or other
matter shall be treated as if originally filed in the transferee
tribunal on the date when the appeal or other matter was first
filed in a court or magisterial district of this Commonwealth. A
matter which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or
magisterial district judge of this Commonwealth but which is
commenced in any other tribunal of this Commonwealth shall be
transferred by the other tribunal to the proper court or
magisterial district of this Commonwealth where it shall be treated
as if originally filed in the transferee court or magisterial district
of this Commonwealth on the date when first filed in the other
tribunal.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(a) (emphasis added). In McNair v. Owens, 576 A.2d
95 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990),5 the Commonwealth Court held that where a prisoner
seeks relief for a claim of incorrect calculation by the DOC, it is an action in
the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction and thus, the trial court should
not have dismissed the petition, but rather transferred the matter to the
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4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 761(a) (granting the Commonwealth Court original
jurisdiction over civil suits against statewide government actors).
5We are not bound by the decisions of our sister Commonwealth Court, but
such decisions may furnish persuasive authority. Petow v. Warehime, 996
A.2d 1083, 1088 n. 1 (Pa. Super. 2010).
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Commonwealth Court. McNair, 576 A.2d at 98. Accordingly, we vacate the
trial court’s order and remand the matter to the trial court with instruction to
transfer the Petition to the Commonwealth Court.
Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/26/2021
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