UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4357
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER JAMES REDDEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Greenville. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge. (6:17-cr-00933-TMC-1)
Submitted: May 25, 2021 Decided: May 27, 2021
Before DIAZ and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John M. Ervin, III, ERVIN LAW OFFICE, Darlington, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Sloan Price Ellis, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher James Redden pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to one
count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Redden to 180 months’ imprisonment
and 4 years of supervised release. His attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal,
but questioning the court’s compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 when accepting Redden’s
guilty plea, and the reasonableness of Redden’s sentence. Redden has filed a pro se
supplemental brief challenging the propriety of the career offender sentencing
enhancement. The Government declined to file a brief. We affirm.
Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a court must conduct a plea colloquy in which it
informs the defendant of, and ensures that the defendant understands, the nature of the
charge to which he is pleading guilty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the
various rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United
States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). The court also must ensure that the
defendant’s plea is voluntary, supported by a sufficient factual basis, and not the result of
force, threats, or extrinsic promises. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2)-(3); Williams, 811 F.3d
at 622; see also United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991). A guilty
plea is valid if the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pleads guilty “with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” United States
v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2
Because Redden did not move to withdraw his guilty plea, we review the adequacy
of the Rule 11 hearing for plain error. United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir.
2014). To prevail under the plain error standard, Redden “must demonstrate not only that
the district court plainly erred, but also that this error affected his substantial rights.” Id.
at 816. “In the Rule 11 context, this inquiry means that [Redden] must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have pleaded guilty.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the district court complied with Rule
11. Moreover, the court ensured that Redden entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily
and that sufficient facts supported the plea. See Fisher, 711 F.3d at 464 (summarizing
standard as to the voluntariness of guilty pleas). Accordingly, we affirm Redden’s
conviction.
Redden also questions the reasonableness of the sentence imposed. We review a
sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Under this standard, a sentence is reviewed for both procedural and
substantive reasonableness. Id. at 51. In determining procedural reasonableness, we
consider, among other things, whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s
Sentencing Guidelines range. Id. If a sentence is free of “significant procedural error,”
then we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the
circumstances . . . .” Id. “Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated
Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295,
306 (4th Cir. 2014).
3
At sentencing, the district court adopted Redden’s correctly calculated Guidelines
range of 267 to 327 months’ imprisonment, resulting from the career offender enhancement
and a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The court adopted the presentence
report’s findings, which correctly stated that two of Redden’s prior convictions constituted
felony convictions of controlled substance offenses under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 4B1.1 (2016). The court afforded counsel an opportunity to argue regarding an
appropriate sentence, and afforded Redden an opportunity to allocute. In explaining its
partial grant of Redden’s motion for a downward variance, the court reasoned that Redden
had a difficult childhood, suffered from medical issues, and sought to improve his life.
Finally, the court weighed the 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) factors it deemed most relevant,
particularly Redden’s prior criminal history, the serious nature of the offense, promoting
respect for the law, and protecting the public from further crimes. We conclude that
Redden has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness that we afford his below-
Guidelines sentence. Thus, Redden’s sentence is procedurally and substantively
reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Redden, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Redden requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state
that a copy thereof was served on Redden.
4
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5