RENDERED: MAY 28, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-1032-MR
RANDALL BUFORD APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE CHARLES L. CUNNINGHAM, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 17-CR-002936-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; K. THOMPSON AND L. THOMPSON,
JUDGES.
CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE: Randall Buford appeals from the Jefferson Circuit
Court’s decision to revoke his probation and impose an eleven-year sentence.
Based upon our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 2, 2017, Buford was driving a vehicle with another
individual as his passenger. Buford struck another vehicle occupied by a family of
four and did not stop his vehicle. The driver of the vehicle that was struck
followed Buford to obtain his license plate number. Buford ultimately stopped his
vehicle and his passenger fired an AR-15 assault rifle into the other vehicle. All
four members of the family, including two young children, were injured.
The Jefferson County grand jury indicted Buford for four counts of
attempted murder, four counts of assault in the first degree, and one count of
failure to stop and render aid. On September 7, 2018, Buford entered an Alford1
plea to four amended counts of facilitation to commit assault in the first degree and
the one count of failure to stop and render aid. The remaining charges were
dismissed in exchange for his plea.
On October 30, 2018, the circuit court accepted Buford’s plea. In its
judgment of conviction and sentence, the circuit court noted that Buford had been
released to the home incarceration program pending his sentencing but disappeared
soon after. He thereafter pled guilty to one count of escape in the second degree
and one count of tampering with a prisoner monitoring device and received a one-
year sentence. Further, the Commonwealth revoked its previous offer of an eight-
1
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
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year sentence and the circuit court ultimately sentenced Buford to eleven years’
imprisonment.
On May 15, 2019, Buford filed a motion for shock probation. The
circuit court granted the motion and placed Buford on probation for a period of
five years. The conditions of Buford’s probation required that he not commit
another offense, avoid injurious or vicious habits, avoid persons or places of
disreputable or harmful character, maintain suitable employment, report to his
probation officer as directed, promptly notify his probation officer of any change in
address, and complete the day reporting center (“DRC”) program.
On August 8, 2019, Buford filed a motion for bond reduction, stating
in such motion that while he was in custody in Kentucky, he received a bench
warrant from a pending Indiana case for theft of an automobile that predated the
Kentucky indictment. The motion indicated that Buford could not begin DRC
because of the Indiana hold and requested that the court release him to the custody
of Indiana on the condition that once his case there was resolved or the warrant
was lifted he would report to the jail to begin the DRC program. The circuit court
entered an order releasing Buford on his own recognizance on August 12, 2019, to
resolve the Indiana case.
Buford was later referred to Our Lady of Peace to complete an
intensive outpatient program (“IOP”) and then participate in the DRC program.
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On September 27, 2019, the Commonwealth moved to revoke Buford’s probation.
As grounds for the motion, the Commonwealth attached a special supervision
report prepared by Buford’s probation officer. The officer stated that Buford had
failed to report as directed, failed to begin treatment with IOP, and absconded from
supervision. Based on the special supervision report, on October 10, 2019, the
circuit court issued an arrest warrant.
On January 24, 2020, Buford was arrested in Indiana and charged
with identity deception – a felony – as well as falsely informing or hindering the
law enforcement process. Buford was also served with the outstanding probation
violation warrant and transferred to the custody of the Louisville Metro
Department of Corrections (“LMDC”). While in the LMDC’s custody, on April
20, 2020, Buford was charged with tampering with physical evidence, first-degree
promoting contraband, and possession of marijuana when he was found with a
bundle of marijuana wrapped in a sock in his waistband.
The circuit court held a revocation hearing on July 14, 2020.
Samantha Stone, Buford’s probation officer, testified on behalf of the
Commonwealth and Buford testified on his own behalf. Officer Stone detailed
Buford’s numerous probation violations, as well as his commission of multiple
new offenses, three of which were felonies and three of which occurred while he
was in custody. Officer Stone also testified that Buford lied about his home
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address and did not have permission to be in Indiana. Buford did not dispute the
violations, but blamed them on his lack of transportation, housing, and a cell
phone. Buford admitted that at some point he “quit trying to report” and conceded
that he was able to find transportation to Indiana where he also committed new
offenses.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court revoked Buford’s
probation and offered a lengthy explanation for its decision:
Well, let me explain the standard by which I am
supposed to make this decision and there are two things I
have to decide. Number one, can you be rehabilitated in
a community setting, which would translate to your ears,
as not in prison or not in jail. And B, are you likely to
commit a new offense if you’re out?
The challenge here is that if I ever had a case where the
paper record screams out at me “he’s going to commit
another offense?” In your case – I normally say unless
we have you behind bars – you found a way to get in
trouble even being in custody. And I find myself
sometimes saying to people “you know if we let him out
he’s going to,” like you’re asking me, it’s an opportunity
to get in trouble. You find ways to get in trouble even
when you’re in custody. But I digress. You also got in
trouble over in Indiana.
And then secondly are you likely to re-offend, well you
found a way to get charged with felony offenses on two
occasions since you were probated less than a year ago,
shock probated less than a year ago. So, by all objective
standards you have a miserable record for the two things
that I am supposed to use to make this decision. The two
criteria by which I am to make that assessment.
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....
I have literally played every card I have been given to try
to help you through this and at this point I feel like I need
to grant the motion to revoke you. And hope that your
mother hangs tough with you and for you and that when
you see the parole board that they see fit to let you go to
Kansas and try to start your life over again. But I am
greatly concerned that right now you simply don’t have
the tools.
....
So I am sorry, but I have to grant this motion.
The circuit court entered a written revocation order on July 16, 2020,
imposing Buford’s original eleven-year sentence. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
A trial court has discretion in probation revocation matters but must
exercise its discretion “consistent with statutory criteria.” Commonwealth v.
Andrews, 448 S.W.3d 773, 780 (Ky. 2014). Specifically, before revoking
probation a trial court must make two findings under Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 439.3106(1): (1) whether the alleged probation violation “constitutes a
significant risk to prior victims of the supervised individual or the community at
large” and (2) whether the defendant “cannot be appropriately managed in the
community[.]” Further:
KRS 439.3106 permits, but does not require, a trial court
to employ lesser sanctions[.] The elective language of
the statute as a whole creates an alternative employed and
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imposed at the discretion of the trial court—discretion
the Supreme Court insisted the trial court retained in light
of the new statute. Nothing in the statute or in the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of it requires the trial
court to impose lesser sanctions prior to revoking
probation.
McClure v. Commonwealth, 457 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Ky. App. 2015) (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted).
We review a trial court’s revocation decision for abuse of discretion.
Andrews, 448 S.W.3d at 780. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s
decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations
omitted).
Buford argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in revoking
his probation because the revocation order lacked the required statutory findings.
The specific findings of fact addressing the statutory criteria of KRS 439.3106(1)
may be either written or oral. Lainhart v. Commonwealth, 534 S.W.3d 234, 238
(Ky. App. 2017). Further, in Commonwealth v. Gilmore, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky stated:
[E]ven though the statute requires a trial court to consider
whether a probationer’s failure to abide by a condition
poses a significant risk to prior victims or the community
at large, neither KRS 439.3106 nor Andrews require
anything more than a finding to this effect supported by
the evidence of record.
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587 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Ky. 2019). Therefore, a trial court is not required to provide
explanations for the statutory findings; instead, it must only make the findings,
which must be “supported by the evidence of record.” McClure, 457 S.W.3d at
733.
In this case, the circuit court discussed the statutory language
contained in KRS 439.3106(1) as applied to this specific case. The circuit court
indicated to Buford that it was required to consider whether he could be
rehabilitated in a community setting and whether he was likely to commit a new
offense if he was out of custody. The circuit court went on to find that Buford had
a “miserable” record for both, and such finding was supported by the evidence of
record.
In this case, not only did Buford abscond from supervision, he
committed five new offenses, three of which were felonies. Buford’s arrest on any
one of the five offenses alone was evidence that he posed a risk to the community
and that he could not be effectively managed there. Particularly, in Lucas v.
Commonwealth, a separate panel of this Court stated that “[g]enerally, a trial
court’s decision revoking probation is not an abuse of discretion if there is
evidence to support at least one probation violation.” 258 S.W.3d 806, 807-08
(Ky. App. 2008) (citing Messer v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Ky. App.
1988)). Moreover, three of Buford’s five new offenses occurred while he was in
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custody, indicating both a risk to the community and an inability to be managed in
the community.
Additionally, Buford argues that a sanction, not revocation, was
appropriate. As previously discussed, however, “[n]othing in [KRS 439.3106(1)]
or in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it requires the trial court to impose
lesser sanctions prior to revoking probation.” McClure, 457 S.W.3d at 732
(emphasis in original). The purpose of KRS 439.3106 is to avoid incarcerating
probationers for minor violations. Andrews, 448 S.W.3d at 779 (citation omitted).
Buford’s missteps do not qualify as “minor violations.” The circuit court properly
exercised its discretion consistent with KRS 439.3106(1) and Andrews, and no
abuse of discretion occurred.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the probation revocation order entered by
the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christopher B. Thurman Daniel Cameron
Assistant Appellate Defender Attorney General of Kentucky
Louisville, Kentucky
Aspen Roberts
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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