[Cite as In re C.R., 2021-Ohio-1969.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
In re C.R. Court of Appeals No. L-20-1195
Trial Court No. JC 19276873
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Decided: June 10, 2021
*****
Michael H. Stahl, for appellant.
Janna E. Waltz, for appellee.
*****
ZMUDA, P.J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellant, S.R. (“mother”), appeals the judgment of the Lucas County
Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting a motion for permanent custody
filed by appellee, Lucas County Children Services (“LCCS”), thereby terminating her
parental rights with respect to her minor child, C.R.1 Finding no error below, we affirm.
A. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} In September 2019, LCCS received a referral alleging that mother had
missed several medical appointments for C.R. The matter was assigned to a caseworker,
Samantha Troiano, who investigated the allegations. Troiano visited mother’s residence
on September 18, 2019, at which point she interviewed mother to determine the validity
of the allegations that mother was not caring for C.R.’s medical needs. Ultimately, LCCS
determined that mother had, in fact, taken C.R. to her medical appointments. However,
during Troiano’s September 18, 2019 visit, mother refused to answer questions, and
became hostile. According to Troiano, mother told her and her supervisor that “she was
going to blow up our agency so it would burn so we could die a slow death.” Because of
this threat, mother was arrested and charged with one count of making terroristic threats
in violation of R.C. 2909.23(A)(1)(b).2
{¶ 3} One week later, on September 25, 2019, the juvenile court held a shelter
care hearing, at which mother consented to C.R.’s placement in the interim temporary
1
C.R.’s father did not file a notice of appeal challenging the judgment of the juvenile
court, and he is therefore not a party to this appeal.
2
On November 8, 2019, mother entered a plea of no contest to the amended charge of
inducing panic in violation of R.C. 2917.31. The trial court accepted mother’s plea,
found her guilty, and immediately sentenced her to 180 days in jail, 180 days suspended.
Mother was then placed on probation for a period of one year.
2.
custody of LCCS. Thereafter, on November 4, 2019, the matter proceeded to a
disposition hearing.
{¶ 4} During the disposition hearing, Troiano testified that LCCS has a history
with mother. Troiano explained that mother had two children prior to C.R., one of whom
was placed into LCCS’s permanent custody due to mother’s mental health and parenting
issues. Troiano also indicated that mother threatened her during her initial visit to
mother’s home. According to Troiano,
{¶ 5} At the conclusion of the disposition hearing, the juvenile court found C.R.
to be dependent. As a result of its dependency determination, the court granted
temporary custody of C.R. to LCCS. Mother did not appeal the juvenile court’s
dependency determination or its grant of temporary custody to LCCS.
{¶ 6} Eight months later, on July 6, 2020, LCCS filed a motion for permanent
custody, in which it argued that C.R. could not be placed with mother within a reasonable
time or should not be placed with mother under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), and the
permanent custody is in C.R.’s best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). LCCS further
contended that mother continuously and repeatedly failed to remedy the condition,
namely her chronic mental health illness, which led to C.R.’s removal from the home,
and noted that mother previously had her parental rights involuntarily terminated with
respect to C.R.’s older sibling.
3.
{¶ 7} The matter proceeded to trial on LCCS’s motion for permanent custody on
October 30, 2020. During the trial, the LCCS caseworker assigned to this case, Da’Nelle
Flowers, testified that LCCS established case plan services for mother upon the removal
of C.R. from mother’s custody. The initial goal of the case plan was reunification of C.R.
with mother. The services offered to mother under the case plan consisted of a diagnostic
assessment and parenting services.
{¶ 8} According to Flowers, mother completed her first assessment at Unison
Behavioral Health. Following the assessment, Unison diagnosed mother with
oppositional defiant disorder, mixed obsessional thoughts and acts, unspecified
personality disorder, and unspecified bipolar and related disorder. Given this diagnosis,
mother was referred to adult day treatment at LCCS in order to improve her interpersonal
and social skills, improve her problem solving skills, and learn positive coping and self-
management skills. She was also offered psychiatric services. While she agreed to
attend adult day treatment classes, mother declined psychiatric services, insisting that she
did not need them.
{¶ 9} After a follow-up assessment, mother signed a release to enable LCCS to
receive limited information from Unison, but later revoked the release, making it difficult
for LCCS to obtain information relevant to mother’s case. Mother consistently
participated over the course of several months participated in adult day treatment
services, but failed to progress in such services. She maintained that she no longer had
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custody of C.R. due to animosity from LCCS and she refused to acknowledge any
concerns with her parenting. At trial, Flowers testified that mother refused to accept
responsibility for the reasons surrounding C.R.’s removal.
{¶ 10} On September 26, 2019, within days of completing her first assessment at
Unison, mother underwent a second diagnostic assessment at the Zepf Center. Mother
was reportedly “guarded and vague regarding her responses” to questions. Following the
assessment, mother was diagnosed with unspecified depressive disorder and referred for
mental health services and a psychiatric evaluation. Flowers testified that mother did not
complete mental health services, but she returned one month later for the recommended
psychiatric evaluation. Mother did not sign a release to enable LCCS to receive the result
of the evaluation, which included a diagnosis of unspecified depressive disorder and a
statement that mother did not believe she needed any medications, declined therapy,
wanted her case closed, and did not plan to make any other appointments.
{¶ 11} During the course of her assessment, mother reported that she was living
with three daughters and a “significant other.” Flowers expressed concern about
mother’s representations. First, Flowers pointed out that mother was not living with any
of her children at the time of the assessment, and noted that mother’s two prior children
had not lived with mother “for many years” at that point. Second, Flowers indicated that
LCCS was concerned about mother residing with someone else, because mother did not
provide any information on this person.
5.
{¶ 12} One day after her second assessment, mother underwent a third assessment,
this time at Harbor Behavioral Health. Like the second assessment, this assessment was
not sanctioned by LCCS, and Flowers testified at trial that the agency had no knowledge
of the assessment because mother did not sign a release for LCCS to receive the results
from the assessment. In her third assessment, mother was diagnosed with obsessive
compulsive personality disorder and referred for counseling services. Mother did not
engage in the recommended counseling services.
{¶ 13} At trial, Flowers expressed concerns with the fact that mother reported
conflicting and inaccurate information in each of her three assessments. For example,
mother told Harbor that she needed an assessment in order to prove her mental fitness in
a custody dispute with her children’s fathers. Mother also reported concerns that her
children would be placed into the custody of their fathers at the psychiatric evaluation she
underwent at the Zepf Center, and made the same statements during a psychiatric
evaluation at Unison. However, no such custody proceedings were pending at the time of
her assessment, and mother failed to inform her mental health provider that all three of
her children had already been removed from her custody at the time of the evaluation.
Moreover, mother stated at the evaluation that she never lost custody of her children, and
indicated that she “lives with her children in her own house.” Additionally, mother
informed the Zepf Center that she had no history of mental health issues and was never
prescribed medications for said mental health issues, neither of which was accurate.
6.
{¶ 14} Asked about any reservations regarding C.R.’s reunification with mother,
Flowers voiced her concerns with mother’s ongoing mental health issues. She testified
that mother was still struggling with the same significant mental health issues that
necessitated the termination of her parental rights over one of her prior children in 2012.
Consequently, Flowers opined that mother is unable to presently provide C.R. with a
safe, stable, and permanent environment. Moreover, Flowers was doubtful as to mother’s
ability to improve her mental health situation given her sustained mental health issues
and her refusal to address such issues.
{¶ 15} During the pendency of these proceedings, mother began seeing a
psychologist, Dr. Robert Closs. During the trial, Closs relayed that he diagnosed mother
with Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder and Adjustment Disorder with
symptoms of mixed emotions and conduct, which he described as “a standard type of
disturbance that any normal individual might experience under stressful-like life
circumstances.” In Closs’s opinion, the custody issues surrounding C.R. led to mother’s
adjustment disorder.
{¶ 16} Closs expressed his concern that other mental health professionals might
have “overdiagnosed [mother] on the basis of her oppositional behavior and her defiance
as opposed to diagnosing her on mental health criteria.” Closs described mother as a
“very honest person,” and insisted that mother’s mental health diagnoses would not affect
her ability to effectively parent C.R. On cross-examination, Cross acknowledged that he
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did not review the representations made by mother during her mental health assessments
with Unison, Harbor, and the Zepf Center, and agreed that those representations were not
entirely truthful. Nonetheless, Closs persisted in his conclusion that mother’s mental
health issues were not serious enough to warrant a grant of permanent custody of C.R. to
LCCS. When asked about the contrary conclusions reached by the other mental health
professionals who assessed mother in connection with this case, Closs testified that such
contrary conclusions were the product of a failure to objectively test mother as he had
done.
{¶ 17} Concerning mother’s participation in parenting services under the case
plan, Flowers stated that LCCS was unable to refer her for the parenting services due to
the lack of progress she made in her mental health services. Nonetheless, mother
completed a parenting program on her own. Flowers testified that mother signed a
release for LCCS regarding her parenting program, but limited the release in such a way
that it made it difficult for LCCS to obtain the information they needed. Similarly, C.R.’s
guardian ad litem, John Wenzlick, testified of difficulties obtaining information related to
mother, and reported that mother rescinded some of the releases before he could get the
necessary information.
{¶ 18} While mother participated in parenting services generally, Flowers stated
that the parenting program completed by mother did not satisfy the parenting services
under the case plan, because the program did not include parent, child observations and it
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was not an interactive parenting program. During mother’s visitations with C.R., Flowers
observed mother’s “very rough” burping of C.R. following feedings, and expressed
general concerns about mother’s handling of C.R. at trial. Similarly, LCCS Visitation
Department supervisor, Linda Rosenbloom, described mother as “aggressive” and “very
forceful” toward C.R. during supervised visits. Wenzlick voiced the same concern
concerning mother’s handling of C.R., but was more tempered in his view and described
mother as “a little rough when she would handle [C.R.].”
{¶ 19} As Flowers continued in her testimony, she opined that C.R. was doing
“really well” in foster care, and she stated that C.R. appears to be bonding well to her
foster family. According to Flowers, the foster parents are willing to adopt C.R.
{¶ 20} At the conclusion of her testimony, Flowers explained that LCCS sought
permanent custody of C.R. due to mother’s lack of progress toward improving her mental
health, mother’s failure to complete her case plan services, and C.R.’s success in foster
care. Relatedly, Wenzlick testified that he does not believe that mother is capable of
providing a safe, stable, and permanent home for C.R. due to mother’s ongoing mental
health issues and her apparent reluctance to continue with the mental health treatment
that is required to address such issues. Asked whether he believed mother could make
enough progress in her case plan to change his recommendation if she were given enough
time to do so, Wenzlick responded, “unfortunately, no.” Therefore, Wenzlick concluded
that an award of permanent custody of C.R. to LCCS was in C.R.’s best interest.
9.
{¶ 21} Upon hearing the evidence presented by the parties at the trial, the juvenile
court permitted the parties to make closing statements. During mother’s closing
statement, her counsel asked the juvenile court for a six-month extension during which
mother would be “given the ability to prove herself that she has changed.” The court
denied mother’s request for an extension, stating:
I would actually consider the extension if I had a little more faith in
Dr. Closs – * * * in his familiarity with the whole case. Mom’s had long-
term mental health issues that go back – I think I read since she was 12. * *
* When I read the exhibits, when I hear the testimony, the recurring theme
is that it’s more important for her to be right than to make a change. And it
even seems more important for her to be right than to change for her child
and for reunification.
{¶ 22} Following the trial, the juvenile court issued an 11-page judgment entry, in
which it found that C.R. could not be placed with mother within a reasonable time or
should not be placed with mother under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and permanent custody
to LCCS was in C.R.’s best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).
{¶ 23} In support of its finding that C.R. could not be placed with mother within a
reasonable time or should not be placed with mother, the juvenile court examined the
relevant evidence and found several factors under R.C. 2151.414(E) to be applicable.
Under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), the court found that mother failed to make significant
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progress in her case plan services despite reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by
LCCS to assist mother in remedying the problems that caused C.R.’s initial placement
outside mother’s home. The court also concluded that mother’s chronic mental illness,
which she has refused to address, renders her unable to provide a permanent home for
C.R. within one year, as set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(2). Under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4),
the juvenile court found that mother has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward C.R.
by choosing “to ‘be right’ over making the necessary changes to reunite with her child.”
Finally, the court noted that mother has previously had her parental rights involuntarily
terminated with respect to C.R.’s older sister, and found that mother has failed to prove
that she can provide a legally secure permanent placement for C.R. notwithstanding the
prior termination under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11).
{¶ 24} In support of its best interests determination under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1),
the juvenile court found that C.R. is presently placed with foster parents who are meeting
her needs and wish to adopt her. The court found that C.R. has been in the temporary
custody of one or more public children services agencies for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two-month period, noting that C.R. had been in LCCS’s temporary
custody for approximately 14 months at the time of its decision. The court went on to
conclude that C.R. needed a legally secure permanent placement, and also found that the
best interest factor under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) was applicable since mother previously
had her parental rights involuntarily terminated.
11.
{¶ 25} Based upon these findings, the juvenile court granted LCCS’s motion for
permanent custody, and awarded permanent custody of C.R. to the agency. Thereafter,
mother filed her timely notice of appeal.
B. Assignments of Error
{¶ 26} On appeal, mother assigns the following errors for our review:
I. The ruling that C.R. was a dependent child was not supported by
competent, credible evidence and was contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence.
II. As the mother was under the care of a psychologist, and was
engaged in treatment at the time of trial, and because the case plan was
disrupted due to the Covid-19 precautions, it was prejudicial error for the
Court not to extend time so that a full and fair determination could be made
and the failure to do so is a violation of the mother’s rights to due process
under the Ohio and United States Constitutions.
III. The severing of parental custody in this case is predicated on the
words, rather than acts, of the mother; the mother is presently under the
care of a licensed psychologist, who was the only witness qualified to
evaluate the mother’s mental health and who testified to the mother’s
fitness as a parent, no competent and credible evidence exists to support the
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trial court’s mental health determinations, making those determinations
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
IV. The child was adjudicated “dependent” and expressly not
neglected, predicated on the anticipated abuse and neglect due to mental
health concerns; the mother’s licensed psychologist not only testified on the
mother’s behalf, but attended the entire trial and all hearings, as such, the
mother presented clear and convincing proof that she would be able to
provide permanent and adequate care and the court’s ruling to the contrary
was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and such a ruling and
standard imposed was a denial of the mother’s due process rights.
As mother’s second, third, and fourth assignments of error are interrelated, we will
address them together.
II. Analysis
A. Dependency Determination
{¶ 27} In her first assignment of error, mother argues that the juvenile court’s
determination that C.R. is a dependent child was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶ 28} Relevant to the issue raised by mother in her first assignment of error, the
Supreme Court of Ohio has held:
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An adjudication by a juvenile court that a child is “neglected” or
“dependent” as defined in R.C. Chapter 2151 followed by a disposition
awarding temporary custody to a public children services agency pursuant
to R.C. 2151.353(A)(2) constitutes a “final order” within the meaning of
R.C. 2505.02 and is appealable to the court of appeals pursuant to R.C.
2501.02.
In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990), syllabus. Moreover, “an
appeal of an adjudication order of abuse, dependency, or neglect of a child and the award
of temporary custody to a children services agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(2) must
be filed within 30 days from the judgment entry pursuant to App.R. 4.” In re H.F., 120
Ohio St.3d 499, 2008-Ohio-6810, 900 N.E.2d 607, ¶ 18.
{¶ 29} Here, the juvenile court found C.R. dependent and filed its dispositional
order granting temporary custody of C.R. to LCCS on November 4, 2019. The court’s
entry was a final order that had to be appealed within 30 days. Id. However, mother
failed to timely appeal the juvenile court’s dispositional order. Therefore, the court’s
decision on dependency became the law of the case, and we lack jurisdiction to consider
mother’s first assignment of error challenging that decision. Matter of L.B.J., 4th Dist.
Lawrence Nos. 17CA2, 17CA3, 2017-Ohio-4416, ¶ 23, citing In re S.C., 189 Ohio
App.3d 308, 2010-Ohio-3394, 938 N.E.2d 390, ¶ 35 (4th Dist.), and In re J.K., 4th Dist.
Athens No. 09CA20, 2009-Ohio-5391, ¶ 19-20; see also In re T.K.M., 1st Dist. Hamilton
14.
No. C-190020, 2019-Ohio-5076, ¶ 25 (“Once the time for the filing of an appeal had
passed, the [dependency] issue was res judicata and father could not challenge the court’s
finding that the child was dependent and abused.”). Accordingly, we dismiss mother’s
first assignment of error.
B. Grant of Permanent Custody
{¶ 30} In mother’s remaining assignments of error, she argues that the trial court
erred in awarding permanent custody of C.R. to LCCS.
{¶ 31} “A trial court’s determination in a permanent custody case will not be
reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re A.H.,
6th Dist. Lucas No. L-11-1057, 2011-Ohio-4857, ¶ 11, citing In re Andy-Jones, 10th
Dist. Franklin Nos. 03AP-1167, 03AP-1231, 2004-Ohio-3312, ¶ 28. In conducting a
review on manifest weight, the reviewing court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and determines whether in resolving
conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997); Eastley v. Volkman,
132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 17.
{¶ 32} As the trier of fact, the trial court is in the best position to weigh the
evidence and evaluate the testimony. In re Brown, 98 Ohio App.3d 337, 342, 648 N.E.2d
576 (3d Dist.1994). Thus, “[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly
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against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every reasonable
presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts.” Eastley at
¶ 21, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, fn. 3, 461
N.E.2d 1273 (1984).
{¶ 33} “R.C. 2151.414 sets out specific findings a juvenile court must make before
granting an agency’s motion for permanent custody of a child.” In re A.M., Slip Opinion
No. 2020-Ohio-5102, ¶ 18. Relevant here, the juvenile court “must find by clear and
convincing evidence (1) that one or more of the conditions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)
through (e) applies and (2) that a grant of permanent custody is in the child’s best
interest.” Id.
{¶ 34} Here, the juvenile court concluded that permanent custody to LCCS was
warranted based on its finding that C.R. could not be placed with mother within a
reasonable time or should not be placed with appellants under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a),
which provides:
(B)(1) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, the court
may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines
at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section, by clear and
convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant
permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for
permanent custody and that any of the following apply:
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(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive
twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one
or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies
for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as
described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the
child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in
another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s
parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s
parents.
{¶ 35} Concerning the determination as to whether a child cannot be placed with
either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the
child’s parents, R.C. 2151.414(E) provides, in relevant part:
If the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a
hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of
division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code that one or more
of the following exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter
a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a
reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent:
17.
(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home
and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the
child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and
repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be
placed outside the child’s home. In determining whether the parents have
substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental
utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and
rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to
the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to
resume and maintain parental duties.
(2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, intellectual
disability, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent that is
so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent
home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year
after the court holds the hearing pursuant to division (A) of this section or
for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised
Code;
***
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(4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the
child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child
when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide
an adequate permanent home for the child.
***
(11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with
respect to a sibling of the child pursuant to this section or section 2151.353
or 2151.415 of the Revised Code, or under an existing or former law of this
state, any other state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent to
those sections, and the parent has failed to provide clear and convincing
evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, the parent can
provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the
health, welfare, and safety of the child.
{¶ 36} In the case sub judice, the juvenile court found that all of the above-
referenced factors under R.C. 2151.414(E) were applicable in this case. Under R.C.
2151.414(E)(1), the court found that mother failed to substantially remedy the conditions,
namely her mental health issues, that caused C.R. to be placed outside the home, despite
reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by LCCS to help mother to address those
conditions. The court also concluded that mother suffers from a chronic mental illness
that renders her unable to provide a permanent home for C.R. within one year under R.C.
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2151.414(E)(2). Under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4), the juvenile court found that mother has
demonstrated a lack of commitment toward C.R. by choosing “to ‘be right’ over making
the necessary changes to reunite with her child.”
{¶ 37} At trial on LCCS’s motion for permanent custody, Flowers testified that
mother has a long history of mental health issues, dating back to mother’s prior
termination case several years ago. During the pendency of this case, services were
offered to mother to address her mental health issues, but mother was evasive in her
engagement in those services. According to Flowers, mother routinely withheld or
revoked her consent for mental health providers to discuss their findings with LCCS,
making it difficult for LCCS caseworkers to determine whether she was compliant with
her case plan services. Flowers also explained that mother circumvented LCCS and
obtained several mental health assessments that were not approved by the agency.
During these assessments, mother was untruthful with mental health professionals, stating
that she was engaging mental health services in connection with a custody dispute with
the fathers of her three children rather than honestly reporting the pending termination
proceedings as the basis for her assessments.
{¶ 38} According to the evidence presented by LCCS at trial, mother repeatedly
denied suffering from mental health issues despite multiple mental health diagnoses from
the professionals she engaged. For her part, mother introduced testimony from Closs,
who testified that mother was capable of parenting C.R. and was overdiagnosed by other
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mental health professionals. However, LCCS’s cross-examination of Closs revealed that
Closs’s assessment of mother was based upon mother’s false statements or omissions,
and thus the reliability of Closs’s testimony was significantly diminished.
{¶ 39} The evidence introduced by LCCS at trial establishes that mother suffers
from longstanding mental health issues that she refuses to acknowledge and address.
Flowers testified that mother failed to complete the mental health component of her case
plan services, and was not likely to do so within one year of trial. Moreover, LCCS
introduced testimony establishing that mother previously had her parental rights
involuntarily terminated with respect to C.R.’s older sister, and both Flowers and
Wenzlick testified that mother could not provide a legally secure permanent placement
for C.R. under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). The juvenile court agreed. In light of the record
before us, we do not find that the trial court lost its way in making its findings under R.C.
2151.414(E)(1), (2), (4), and (11). Having made those findings, the juvenile court was
required to make the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) finding that C.R. cannot be placed with
mother within a reasonable time or should not be placed with mother. R.C. 2151.414(E).
{¶ 40} In her second assignment of error in this appeal, mother argues that the
juvenile court should have granted her request for a six month extension so that she could
address her mental health issues, rather than prematurely awarding permanent custody of
C.R. to LCCS. According to mother, “while there was a case plan in place, the
confluence of the coronavirus restrictions and the mother’s legitimate mental health
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issues delayed the progress significantly. * * * The pervasive effect of the coronavirus
pandemic had an impact upon the mother’s efforts in seeking treatment.”
{¶ 41} Construing mother’s verbal request for a six-month extension as a formal
motion to extend temporary custody, we review the juvenile court’s decision denying that
motion for an abuse of discretion as well. In re C.K., 5th Dist. Muskingham No.
CT2020-0027, 2020-Ohio-5437, ¶ 21, citing In re E.T., 9th Dist. Summit No. 22720,
2005-Ohio-6087, ¶ 9. An abuse of discretion implies an arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unconscionable attitude on the part of the trial court. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio
St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶ 42} Having reviewed the record in its entirety, we find that the coronavirus
argument raised by mother on appeal is a red herring, as mother’s mental health issues
predate the coronavirus pandemic by several years and mother did not articulate how the
coronavirus impeded her from addressing her mental illness before the juvenile court.
Mother fails to articulate how additional time would have made a difference concerning
her mental health issues, and we find that she was provided with an ample amount of
time during which she should have remedied those issues.
{¶ 43} Further, mother’s oral motion was untimely, as a motion to extend
temporary custody “implies that the hearing on permanent custody would not go
forward.” In re C.K. at ¶ 37. Here, mother made her request for an extension of time
during closing arguments at the conclusion of the permanent custody trial. Given the
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untimeliness of the motion and mother’s failure to establish that additional time would
have resulted in her completion of case plan services and eventual reunification with
C.R., we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s motion
to extend temporary custody. Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is not
well-taken.
{¶ 44} In addition to its determination that C.R. could not be placed with mother
within a reasonable time or should not be placed with mother, the juvenile court also
found that an award of permanent custody to LCCS was in C.R.’s best interests under
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), which provides, in relevant part:
(D)(1) In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held
pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division
(A)(4) or (5) of section 2151.353 or division (C) of section 2151.415 of the
Revised Code, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but
not limited to, the following:
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and
any other person who may significantly affect the child;
***
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child
has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
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agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive
twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section
2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary
custody of an equivalent agency in another state;
(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this
section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶ 45} In considering the child’s best interest, the juvenile court is not required to
discuss each of the factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e), and the factors
outlined therein are not exhaustive. In re A.M., supra, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5102,
at ¶ 31. Indeed, “[c]onsideration is all the statute requires.” Id.
{¶ 46} In support of its best interests determination under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a),
the juvenile court found that C.R. is presently placed with foster parents who are meeting
her needs and wish to adopt her. This finding was based upon Flowers’ testimony that
C.R. is doing well in foster care, where she is bonded to her caregivers and foster family.
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Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c), the court noted that C.R. had been in LCCS’s temporary
custody for more than 12 months at the time of its decision, a finding that is confirmed by
the record. Specifically, C.R. was placed in LCCS’s interim temporary custody in
September 2019, and remained in LCCS custody for more than a year before the trial on
LCCS’s motion for permanent custody was held in October 2020. The court went on to
conclude under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) that C.R. deserves a legally secure permanent
placement, which it found mother could not provide in light of the mental health issues
already addressed above. Finally, the court found that the best interest factor under R.C.
2151.414(D)(1)(e) was applicable since mother previously had her parental rights
involuntarily terminated, thus triggering the application of R.C. 2151.414(E)(11).
{¶ 47} Given the evidence introduced by LCCS in the trial below, we find that
clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that an award
of permanent custody to LCCS was in C.R.’s best interests under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).
Having already concluded that the juvenile court did not lose its way in finding that C.R.
cannot be placed with mother within a reasonable time or should not be placed with
mother under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), we find that the juvenile court’s award of
permanent custody to LCCS in this case was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶ 48} Accordingly, mother’s third and fourth assignments of error are not well-
taken.
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III. Conclusion
{¶ 49} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Mother is ordered to pay the costs of this
appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, P.J.
____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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