NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 14 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GRANT VALENCIA, No. 20-55245
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00471-GW-GJS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 9, 2021**
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER, CALLAHAN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Grant Valencia (“Valencia” or “Plaintiff”) appeals from the district court’s
order granting the County of Los Angeles’ (“the County” or “Defendant”) motion
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
for summary judgment.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Furnace v.
Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013).
1. The district court correctly held that former sheriff’s deputy Kenneth
Collins was not “act[ing] within the scope of his employment when he recruited
Plaintiff to his scheme and engaged in the illegal transport of controlled
substances.” Valencia asserts that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether he agreed to participate in the scheme because he trusted Collins due to
the relationship they fostered when Collins mentored him at the Emerging Leaders
Academy (the “ELA”), the significance being that Collins may have been acting in
the scope of his employment when he taught and mentored students as a sheriff’s
deputy at the ELA. However, such a factual dispute is not material. See Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Only disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude
the entry of summary judgment.”). The issue is whether Collins was acting within
the scope of his employment when committing the act that allegedly caused an
injury to Valencia. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2. Here, the relevant act occurred
when Collins asked Valencia to participate in the illegal scheme that led to
1
Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we restate only those
necessary to explain our decision.
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Valencia’s arrest. Collins was not acting within the scope of his employment as a
sheriff’s deputy when he asked Valencia to be a part of the illegal scheme, years
after both he and Valencia were no longer involved in the ELA, and where Collins
initially re-established contact with Valencia on a personal basis by asking
Valencia to get involved with Collins’ life-coaching business, a private business
endeavor.
2. The district court correctly held that “the undisputed facts are
insufficient as a matter of law to establish a claim for negligent supervision or
retention.” No genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether the County
adequately investigated civilian theft complaints against Collins. Out of six
complaints lodged against Collins, Valencia alleges that the County inadequately
investigated two. For a 2008 complaint, Valencia simply points out that it resulted
in no determination, but does not explain why the investigation was inadequate.
For the other investigation into a 2014 complaint, the record shows that the
sheriff’s department contacted the complainant and his attorney multiple times to
collect evidence, but neither followed through to provide it. On this record, there
is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the adequacy of either
investigation.
We also agree with the district court that “Collins’ alleged propensity for
stealing money from civilians has little relation to his ultimate act of recruiting
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Plaintiff for an illegal drug transportation operation.” We see no reason why the
County should have foreseen, due to the theft complaints, that Collins would one
day recruit someone like Valencia for a drug-running scheme and therefore should
not have retained Collins. As the district court explained, “[l]iability is based upon
the facts that the employer knew or should have known that hiring the employee
created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes,” quoting
Doe v. Capital Cities, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1038, 1054 (1996) (emphases added and
citation omitted). The district court correctly concluded that “the hazard that
Defendant[] [is] charged to have had reason to suspect [its] employment of Collins
created—the risk of theft—is not similar to the harm that actually occurred—
Collins’ recruitment of Plaintiff into his illegal scheme to transport drugs.”
3. Finally, the district court properly rejected the Monell claim. As
noted, there is neither a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the adequacy of
the investigations into Collins, nor the requisite connection between Collins’
alleged propensity to steal money and his involvement in the transportation of
drugs. Because the County did not injure Valencia by its investigations of the
complaints against Collins, or by its retention of Collins, Valencia was not injured
by the “execution of a government’s policy or custom.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
AFFIRMED.
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