IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0912
Filed June 16, 2021
CITY OF TIFFIN, IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
TAT, LLC; DERS, LLC; and DUMONT INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants,
and
JOHN POWELL RARICK and ROBERT RARICK, Trustees of the Trust under
Last Will and Testament of RUTH E. RARICK, DECEASED,
Defendants-Appellants.
______________________________________
JOHN POWELL RARICK and ROBERT RARICK, Trustees of the Trust under
Last Will and Testament of RUTH E. RARICK, DECEASED,
Counterclaim and Cross-Claim Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF TIFFIN, IOWA; TAT, LLC; DERS, LLC; and DUMONT
INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Counterclaim and Cross-Claim Defendants.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Chad Kepros,
Judge.
Trustees of a trust appeal an adverse grant of summary judgment in a
condemnation-related proceeding. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED.
2
Charles A. Meardon, Robert N. Downer, and Peter J. Gardner of Meardon,
Sueppel & Downer P.L.C., Iowa City, for appellants.
Robert W. Goodwin of Goodwin Law Office, P.C., Ames, for appellees.
Heard by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins and May, JJ.
3
MULLINS, Judge.
Trustees of a trust appeal adverse rulings in a condemnation-related
proceeding. They challenge the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor
of the City of Tiffin (the City), denial of their renewed motion to compel discovery,
and invalidation of a conveyance made by the trust.
I. Background
A portion of Forevergreen Road existed in the City prior to the events
precipitating this litigation. In 2016 and 2017, the City adopted an urban renewal
plan and entered into development agreements with Scott Andersen and his
business entities, TAT, LLC (TAT) and DERS, LLC (DERS). The plan
contemplated development of the Park Place mixed-use renewal project, was
“anticipated to include the extension of Forevergreen Road,” and would include
tax-increment financing. The city council concluded the development would “add
diversity and generate new opportunities for the Tiffin and Iowa economies” as well
as “generate public gains and benefits, particularly in the creation of new jobs.”
According to a June 2017 amendment to the urban renewal plan, “corresponding
improvements to . . . Forevergreen Road” would be “necessary for such
commercial development.” The resolution adopting an agreement with one of
Andersen’s entities confirmed the same. The resolution also noted the “economic
development is a public purpose for which a City may provide grants, loans, tax
incentives, guarantees and other financial assistance to or for the benefit of private
persons.” The “master preliminary development agreement” between the City and
Andersen’s businesses, signed in September, called for the businesses to
undertake the extension of Forevergreen Road.
4
At some point, the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) acquired
nearby property for the purpose of constructing an interchange on Interstate 380
(I-380) and a new portion of Forevergreen Road in neighboring North Liberty. The
original and ongoing plan for the Park Place development was to construct the
City’s portion of Forevergreen Road further across private tracts of land—
separately owned by the trust, TAT, and DERS1—to connect to the new portion of
the road and interchange constructed by the DOT, which was slightly to the north
of where Forevergreen road was located in Tiffin. Andersen and his agents made
various offers to purchase the trust property or otherwise receive a right of way for
the road extension, all of which were declined. Andersen turned to the City to
either purchase or condemn the portion of the trust property it required for the
extension. It appears that, in or about September 2018, the development
agreement was amended to relieve Andersen and his businesses of the obligation
to construct the Forevergreen Road extension, thus leaving the obligation to the
City. In November 2018, the City held a public hearing, after which the City’s
construction of the Forevergreen Road extension, “which could include the use of
condemnation,” was approved.
The road was ultimately constructed from Tiffin’s Forevergreen Road up to
the property owned by the trust, which the trust continued to refuse to grant access
to. The purple portion of the road in the following image depicts the portion of the
planned road that does not fall on trust property, while the yellow area is trust
property.
1Dumont Investments, LLC (Dumont) held a right of first refusal as to the land
owned by DERS.
5
Because access to the trust property could not be obtained, a temporary road not
running across the trust property was constructed to provide access to the road
connecting to the new portion of Forevergreen Road, as the following image
depicts.
The temporary road was opened to traffic in November 2019.
In January 2019, the City filed a petition for determination and declaration
of public use or purpose, naming the trust, TAT, DERS, and Dumont as
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defendants. See Iowa Code § 6A.24(2) (2019). The trustees counter- and cross-
claimed, disputing the public nature of the improvement and claiming its purpose
was to foster private development. See id. § 6A.24(1). They pointed out that
DERS and TAT had a common owner, Andersen, and he began obtaining property
in Tiffin for the purpose of establishing the mixed-use development. The trustees
alleged that, pursuant to agreements between Andersen and the City, Andersen
was originally responsible for constructing the improvement. So the trustees
claimed the improvement was an economic development activity within the
meaning of Iowa Code section 6A.22(2)(b) and was not public in nature, as
required by section 6A.22(1). The City generally admitted the allegations but
claimed it was responsible for constructing the improvement, adding it offered to
purchase a right of way from the trust. The City denied the improvement was for
the purpose of economic development activities.
In August 2019, the city council passed a resolution to condemn the trust
property. A few days later, the trust deeded the property to the City of Coralville.
The deed conveyed a portion of the property to Coralville for the purpose of
constructing the extension of Forevergreen Road, with any parts of the property
not encumbered by the road being conveyed back to the trust upon completion.
In January 2020, the City dismissed its claims and moved for summary
judgment on the trust’s counter-claim. The City claimed the trust’s conveyance of
the land to be condemned to Coralville divested the trust of standing to challenge
condemnation. The City also filed an application for condemnation against
Coralville in a separate action.
7
The court denied the motion for summary judgment in February 2020,
concluding the trust’s reversionary interest in the property was sufficient to confer
standing. By this point in time, the City had applied for condemnation against
Coralville, a compensation commission had been appointed for the purpose of
appraising damages resulting from the taking, and the commission had been
scheduled to convene in March. The trust had also applied for a stay or temporary
enjoinment of the compensation commission’s proceedings. The court issued a
stay of those proceedings in its summary judgment ruling. The court also granted
the trust’s motion to compel.
In March, the City filed a second motion for summary judgment. The City
argued Iowa Code chapter 306 granted it authority to connect the new portion of
the road to that constructed by the DOT. For this proposition, the City relied on
our decision in Hickman v. Ringgold County, No. 19-0123, 2019 WL 5791027
(Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2019). In his supporting affidavit, the City’s administrator
stated the City has a responsibility “to provide the motoring public with a means of
access to and from the new I-380 interchange and the newly constructed portion
of Forevergreen Road in North Liberty, Iowa.” He also claimed Coralville could not
build the road because it was not located in that city. The trust resisted and filed
a second motion to compel.
In April, the court entered a ruling granting summary judgment in favor of
the City. The court found that while there may have been reliance on economic
development as part of the basis for constructing Forevergreen Road, its
construction for connection to Forevergreen Road in North Liberty “has a public
use, serves a public purpose, and is a public improvement.” The court also found
8
the conveyance to Coralville was invalid. The court denied the trust’s motion to
compel as moot. The court denied the trust’s subsequent motion to reconsider,
enlarge, or amend.
The trust appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“The standard of review for district court rulings on summary judgment is for
correction of errors at law.” Kunde v. Estate of Bowman, 920 N.W.2d 803, 806
(Iowa 2018). Summary judgement is only appropriate when the moving party has
shown “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). “An
issue of fact is ‘material’ only when the dispute involves facts which might affect
the outcome of the suit, given the applicable governing law.” Nelson v. Lindaman,
867 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2015) (quoting Wallace v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Dirs., 754 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Iowa 2008)). “In determining whether a
grant of summary judgment was appropriate, we examine the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all legitimate inferences that may
be drawn from the evidence in his or her favor.” Homan v. Branstad, 887 N.W.2d
153, 163–64 (Iowa 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the record reveals
only a conflict concerning the legal consequences of undisputed facts.” Nelson,
867 N.W.2d at 6 (quoting Wallace, 754 N.W.2d at 857). “To the extent we are
asked to engage in statutory interpretation, our review is [also] for correction of
errors at law.” DuTrac Cmty. Credit Union v. Hefel, 893 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Iowa
2017).
9
We review a ruling on a motion to compel discovery for discretionary abuse.
Keefe v. Bernard, 774 N.W.2d 663, 667 (Iowa 2009). A reversal is only warranted
when the grounds underlying a district court order are clearly unreasonable or
untenable. Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Am. Indus. Refrigeration, Inc., 690 N.W.2d 38, 43
(Iowa 2004).
III. Analysis
A. Summary Judgment
The trust first argues the court erred in granting the City summary judgment
on the trust’s claim that the purpose for which condemnation was being sought
was for “economic development activities,” within the meaning of Iowa Code
section 6A.22(2)(b), and the City therefore has no authority to condemn through
eminent domain because economic development activities do not amount to “a
public purpose, public use, or public improvement.” See Iowa Code § 6A.22(1).
First, the trust argues it generated questions of material fact and the court
inappropriately weighed evidence in granting summary judgment. The only
alleged question of material fact the trust points to is whether the DOT’s
construction plans changed at some point, which created a necessity that the trust
property be acquired for connection to the DOT’s portion of Forevergreen Road.
But, upon our review, we are unable to conclude this fact question was material to
the issue of whether condemnation was being sought impermissibly for “economic
development activities” or appropriately for “a public purpose, public use, or public
improvement,” which was the sole basis for the trust’s challenge to condemnation.
The question of whether the DOT changed its plans at some point has no bearing
10
on whether condemnation was being sought for a proper purpose, so this fact issue
is not a basis for reversing summary judgment. See Nelson, 867 N.W.2d at 6.
Next, the trust complains of the court’s purported reliance on our decision
in Hickman v. Ringgold County, which the trust claims we wrongly decided in the
first place, in granting summary judgment.2 In doing so, the trust wholly ignores a
separate important portion of the district court’s holding aside from the Hickman
issues. While the court agreed the road project fell within chapter 306 and was
2 In Hickman, Ringgold County sought to condemn private property “for the
construction of a new road for the future location of a new concrete batch plant.”
2019 WL 5791027, at *1. The property owners filed suit, arguing “condemnation
was ‘in violation of . . . section 6A.22(2)(a)(3)’ because it was ‘solely for the purpose
of facilitating the incidental private use of the” plant. Id. On appeal, we agreed
condemnation based on the county’s rationale, economic development, violated
section 6A.22(2)(b), which “categorically excludes ‘economic development
activities’ from the definition of public purpose.” Id. at *1–2. That being said, we
found the county had statutory authority to upgrade the road under section 306.27,
which provides a county board of supervisors “as to secondary roads on [its] own
motion may change the course of any part of any road . . . , to straighten a road,
or to cut off dangerous corners, turns or intersections on the highway, or to widen
a road above statutory width.” Id. at *2 (second alteration in original). So by virtue
of section 6A.21(2), which provides “[t]he limitation on the definition of public use,
public purpose, or public improvement does not apply to the establishment,
relocation, or improvement of a road pursuant to chapter 306,” condemnation was
statutorily permitted. Id.
The trust argues Hickman “glossed over” and did not address “whether the
agricultural ground exemptions to the limitations on the definition of public use,
purpose or improvement found in section 6A.21(2) were intended to apply to
property owner challenges based on section 6A.22.” It claims section 6A.21
“applies specifically and only to agricultural land,” while section 6A.22 “is not limited
to agricultural land” and provides additional limitations on the exercise of eminent
domain. So according to the trust, the chapter 306 exception contained in section
6A.21(2) only applies to the definition of public use, purpose, or improvement,
contained in section 6A.21(1)(d), which excludes “the authority to condemn
agricultural land for private development purposes,” while the chapter 306
exception does not apply to the additional prohibition against condemnation for
“economic development activities” contained in section 6A.22(2)(b). Based on our
disposition, we find it unnecessary to address the trust’s challenge to Hickman.
11
therefore a proper purpose under section 6A.21(2),3 the court found that, while
there is some economic development activity in the area, the road will have a public
use, serve a public purpose, and amount to a public improvement. We proceed to
assess that conclusion for legal error.
“[T]he authority of an acquiring agency to condemn any private property
through eminent domain may only be exercised for a public purpose, public use,
or public improvement.” Iowa Code § 6A.22(1). “Public use,” “public purpose,” or
“public improvement” means, among other things, “[p]rivate use that is incidental
to the public use of the property, provided that no property shall be condemned
solely for the purpose of facilitating such incidental private use.” Id.
§ 6A.22(2)(a)(3) (emphasis added).
Except as specifically included in the definition in paragraph
“a”, “public use” or “public purpose” or “public improvement” does not
mean economic development activities resulting in increased tax
revenues, increased employment opportunities, privately owned or
privately funded housing and residential development, privately
owned or privately funded commercial or industrial development, or
the lease of publicly owned property to a private party.
Id. § 6A.22(2)(b) (emphasis added). So unless the use, purpose, or improvement
is public within the meaning of section 6A.22(2)(a), it cannot be considered public
if it involves “economic development activities resulting in increased tax revenues,
increased employment opportunities, privately owned or privately funded housing
and residential development, privately owned or privately funded commercial or
industrial development, or the lease of publicly owned property to a private party.”
Id.
3 We find it unnecessary to decide whether chapter 306 rendered the project a
proper purpose under section 6A.21(2).
12
Below, the trust largely argued because the extension of the road was a
part of the larger mixed-use development project, it amounted to an economic
development activity. That would certainly be the case if trust property was to be
condemned and displaced with mixed-use activities. That is not what we have
here. It is being displaced with a road, leading to a newly constructed interchange
on I-380. The road in its entirety will border the outside of the development and
will become a public road upon its completion. And the road will not serve as an
access point to I-380 for only the new development; it will serve as an access point
to the entire motoring public in the area, including the public that was there and
located to the west prior to the existence of the development. While the site plans
indicate there will be roads from the development connecting to Forevergreen
Road from the south, we find such private use is merely incidental to the public
use of the property and reasonable minds could not draw different inferences or
reach different conclusions based on the facts before us. See id. § 6A.22(2)(a)(3);
Hedlund v. State, 930 N.W.2d 707, 717 (Iowa 2019). Because the private use will
only be incidental to the public use, and the condemnation is not purposed solely
on facilitating such incidental private use, we agree with the district court that the
road will have a public use, serve a public purpose, and amount to a public
improvement within the meaning of section 6A.22(2)(a)(3). Because the exercise
of eminent domain here is “specifically included in the definition of paragraph ‘a’”
of section 6A.22(2), the presence of the ancillary economic development activities
does not negate the public nature of the use, improvement, or purpose. See Iowa
Code § 6A.22(2)(b).
13
Having examined the record in the light most favorable to the trust and
drawn all legitimate inferences in its favor, the legal consequence of the undisputed
facts that we find material is the City’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
We affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of the City on the trust’s
section 6A.24(1) challenge to the City’s exercise of eminent domain authority.
B. Motion to Compel
The trust argues the court abused its discretion in denying its motion to
compel discovery in conjunction with granting summary judgment. On appeal, the
trust only appears to argue it should have been entitled to further discovery on the
issue of the DOT allegedly changing its construction plans, thus allegedly
necessitating the need for trust property by the City. As noted above, the question
of whether the DOT changed its plans at some point has no bearing on whether
condemnation was being sought for a proper purpose. So we agree discovery on
that issue was irrelevant, and we affirm the denial of the motion to compel.
C. Quit Claim Deed
Lastly, the trust argues the district court “erred in invalidating the quit claim
deed from the trust to Coralville.” While the court noted in its summary judgment
ruling its determination that the conveyance was invalid, the dispositive portion of
the ruling did not order invalidation of the conveyance. When the trust asked for
clarification in its motion to reconsider, enlarge, or amend, the court simply noted
it stood “by its findings and conclusions regarding the quit claim deed” in the
summary judgment ruling. To the extent the summary judgment ruling could be
read to invalidate the conveyance, we agree with the trust that the validity of the
conveyance was not germane to the claim before the court—that the City was not
14
exercising its eminent domain authority for a proper purpose. See, e.g., Eller v.
Newell, 141 N.W. 52, 55 (Iowa 1913) (noting relief allowed “must affect or be
affected by the subject-matter of the action” and not “new matter[s] not essential
to the determination of that put in litigation by the petition”). So we reverse the
district court to the extent its ruling invalidated the conveyance, and we remand
the matter to the district court to enter an order clarifying the same.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the entry of summary judgment and the denial of the trust’s
renewed motion to compel. We reverse the district court to the extent its ruling
invalidated the quit claim deed, and we remand the matter to the district court to
enter an order clarifying the same.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.