FILED: June 25, 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4249
( íFUíí5'%í)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DESMOND BABLOO SINGH,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
Defendant Desmond Singh, who is currently in pretrial detention after being
charged with two counts of Cyberstalking and two counts of Aggravated Identity Theft,
appeals from the district court’s denial of his Motion for Release Pending Trial. [J.A. 84–
90, 180] A district court’s order denying release on bail is reviewed for clear error. United
States v. Clark, 865 F.2d 1433, 1437 (4th Cir. 1989) (en banc). Based on our review of the
record, we conclude that the district court clearly erred in denying Singh’s motion. Thus,
we reverse the judgment below and order that Singh be released from detention.
Generally, for pretrial detention to be authorized, “the Government must convince a neutral
decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can
reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person.” United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). In determining whether any conditions
would reasonably assure the safety of the community, the district court must evaluate and
weigh four statutorily enumerated factors: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged”; (2) “the weight of the evidence against the [defendant]”; (3) “the history and
characteristics of the [defendant]”; and (4) “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any
person or the community that would be posed by the [defendant’s] release.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(g). Importantly, any fact that the district court “uses to support [its ultimate] finding
. . . [must] be supported by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 3142(f).
Here, however, it appears that the district court’s decision rested primarily on findings
unsupported by such evidence. In particular, we are troubled by the district court’s heavy
reliance on speculation that Singh suffered from a mental illness. [J.A. 137, 144, 150, 155,
162, 166] Notably, Singh has never been assessed for or diagnosed with any such illness.
Nor has the Government offered any evidence indicating Singh’s mental health condition.
Indeed, the district court admitted that Singh’s mental health condition was “an absolute
unknown.” Joint Appendix 162. In the absence of any clear and convincing evidence of
Singh’s possible mental illness, we hold that the district court’s reliance thereon was
contrary to the dictate of § 3142(f) and thus improper. And based on our review of the
record and consideration of the four § 3142(g) factors, we further conclude that the
Government failed to meet its high burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence
that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure the safety of the
community in this case.
2
Because the Government’s evidence was insufficient to overcome the statutory
presumption in favor of pretrial release, we hold that the district court clearly erred in
denying Singh’s Motion for Release Pending Trial. See United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d
880, 884 (1st Cir. 1990) (emphasizing “Congress’s clear intent that only a limited number
of defendants be subject to pretrial detention”). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment
below and remand with instructions to order Singh’s release, subject to appropriate
conditions to be prescribed by the district court.
Entered at the direction of Judge Wynn and Judge Harris. Judge Diaz dissents.
For the Court
/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk
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DIAZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
My colleagues have resolved to vacate the district court’s pretrial detention order
and direct that the defendant, Desmond Babloo Singh, be released pending trial. I cannot
agree. Though my colleagues may take issue with how the district court applied the
relevant factors to the case’s facts, our limited role in appeals from pretrial detention orders
prevents us from disturbing what was ultimately a reasonable decision by the district court.
Singh was arrested in New York City on suspicion of committing several crimes,
including cyberstalking, identity theft, and murder for hire. 1 The government contends that
Singh engaged in a months-long campaign to harass, bully, and physically injure two
victims: a childhood friend of his older sister (“Victim 1”), and the friend’s boyfriend
(“Victim 2”). According to the government, Singh became romantically obsessed with
Victim 1 and, after she rebuffed his online advances, channeled that obsession into a
destructive rage.
Singh allegedly hacked into Victim 1’s social media accounts to post racist and
derogatory content, created thousands of fake social media accounts to torment and smear
both victims, and arranged for someone else to call a SWAT team to Victim 1’s parents’
home. He also traveled to Baltimore, Maryland in the hopes of fighting Victim 2. The
confrontation never materialized, however, because Singh apparently went to an address
where Victim 2 no longer lived. During these escalating events, Victim 1 sought and
obtained a temporary restraining order against Singh, although law enforcement never
1
A grand jury ultimately indicted Singh on two counts of cyberstalking under 18
U.S.C. § 2261A(2) and two counts of aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.
located Singh or served him with court documents, and Singh never appeared for his
scheduled hearing. Victims 1 and 2 also warned Singh’s parents about his behavior and
asked them to intervene. When his parents didn’t (or couldn’t) stop Singh, Victims 1 and
2 called the police.
After Singh’s arrest, he was arraigned in the Southern District of New York. A
magistrate judge ordered Singh released pending trial, pursuant to certain conditions (such
as home confinement with GPS monitoring, restrictions on internet use, and a posted bond).
The government then filed in the District of Maryland an emergency motion for revocation
of the magistrate’s release order, which the district court granted. A few months later, the
district court denied Singh’s motion for pretrial release. Singh appeals from that ruling.
When deciding whether to grant pretrial release, a district court must consider four
factors: (1) the nature of the charged offenses; (2) the weight of the evidence against the
defendant; (3) the defendant’s history and characteristics; and (4) the defendant’s
dangerousness to the community. U.S.C. § 3142(g). To order a defendant detained before
trial, a district court must find by “clear and convincing evidence” that “no release
conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community.”
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987) (cleaned up).
Once the district court has made that determination, our review of its decision is
highly deferential. Under the applicable clear error standard, United States v. Clark, 865
F.2d 1433, 1437 (4th Cir. 1989), we may reverse only if we’re “left with the definite and
firm conviction that” the district court made a “mistake.” United States v. Charboneau,
914 F.3d 906, 912 (4th Cir. 2019). I have no such firm conviction here.
2
Singh argues that the district court decided to detain him using a more lenient
“preponderance of the evidence” standard, while improperly applying a presumption in
favor of detention. It’s true that, at times during the early portions of the detention hearing,
the district court misstated the government’s evidentiary burden. But the record
demonstrates that, at the end of the hearing, after weighing all the facts and before
announcing its ruling, the court recited and applied the correct evidentiary standard. It then
applied that standard again in the written order that it issued after the hearing.
Similarly, the court stated at one point that Singh “failed to rebut the presumption
as to danger” to his community, J.A. 165, when no such presumption applies here, see 18
U.S.C. § 3142(e). But that statement appears to be no more than a slip of the tongue: one
that the government immediately corrected during the hearing, one that contradicts the
court’s multiple other on-the-record statements that it applied no presumption against
Singh, and one that didn’t make it into the court’s subsequent written order. Accordingly,
I’m satisfied that the court applied the correct law in deciding that no combination of
conditions of release would reasonably assure Singh’s victims’ safety.
Singh also faults the district court for how it applied the § 3142(g) pretrial detention
factors. He contends that no hard evidence supported the district court’s decision and,
relatedly, that the district court gave too much credence to the government’s unsupported
arguments that Singh suffered from mental illness. But I see no reversible error in the
court’s analysis.
Singh is incorrect that the district court lacked any evidence to order him detained,
since at least some of the text messages and social media posts that underlie the charges
3
against Singh were, in fact, in the record before the court during the hearing. Moreover,
the government was entitled to make, and the court was entitled to rely upon, evidentiary
proffers at the detention hearing. See United States v. Williams, 753 F.2d 329, 331 n.7 (4th
Cir. 1985); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975) (approving of a judge
issuing a detention order based on “informal modes of proof” such as “hearsay and written
testimony”). Singh never objected to the government proceeding by way of attorney
proffer, perhaps because attorney proffers during detention hearings have long been
common practice in the District of Maryland. United States v. Hammond, 44 F. Supp. 2d
743, 745 (D. Md. 1999).
There’s no doubt that the district court concluded that the evidence weighed strongly
against Singh, based on the combination of the government’s proffer and the record at the
hearing. But there’s nothing wrong with that conclusion, given that the weight of the
evidence is a factor that federal law requires district courts to consider. 18 U.S.C. §
3142(g)(2). While Singh is certainly entitled to the presumption of innocence in pretrial
detention proceedings, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j), the veritable mountain of inculpatory evidence
that he faces weighs heavily in favor of pretrial detention.
The district court also focused at length on another factor that could reasonably
justify detention: the danger that Singh would pose if released before trial. Singh argues
that the court shouldn’t have viewed him as dangerous because the crimes alleged against
were nonviolent. But Singh is charged with creating social media posts and direct
messages that could be construed as threats of violence, and at least one of those messages
included a promise by Singh to his victims that he would never stop his harassment
4
campaign. Moreover, as the magistrate judge in New York noted, Singh’s actions easily
could have caused physical harm. In one instance, Singh allegedly initiated a “SWATing”
attack that could easily have ended violently, as others have. And in another, he traveled
to Baltimore for the purpose of fighting and (presumably) physically harming Victim 2.
In my view, Singh’s extraordinarily obsessive conduct supports the district court’s
reasonable conclusion that, if left to his own devices, Singh would continue his harassment
campaign and thus remain a danger to his alleged victims. The district court also
understandably questioned the ability of Singh’s parents—with whom Singh claims that he
would live during his period of pretrial release—to enforce the conditions that a court
would have to impose to keep Singh’s victims safe. After all, Singh’s parents knew about
his behavior as it was happening, and apparently made little to no effort to stop it.
As for Singh’s argument regarding the district court’s discussion of his mental state,
it isn’t clear to me that the court placed any significant weight on Singh’s purported mental
illness. The court stated that Singh’s “mental health [was] of great concern,” but it also
acknowledged that “it is an absolute unknown in terms of how serious [of a] mental
condition he has,” J.A. 162, and stated that it was “flying blind” and “dealing in a vacuum”
with respect to Singh’s mental health, J.A. 144. But even if the district court placed any
weight on Singh’s mental state, and even if doing so was error, that error was harmless
given the substantial evidence demonstrating Singh’s potential dangerousness. United
States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1488 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Montalvo–
Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 722 (1990) for the proposition that harmless error review applies to
§ 3142 analysis).
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* * *
Had I been in the district court’s shoes, weighing the facts in the first instance, it’s
possible I might have granted Singh’s motion for pretrial release on conditions similar to
those imposed by the magistrate judge. But my role, and the role of this court, is to defer
to the district court’s reasonable application of the § 3142(g) factors. Because I believe
this court’s decision breaches the boundaries of our limited role in this matter, I respectfully
dissent.
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