IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0965
Filed June 30, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAMANTHA A. WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County Linda M.
Fangman, Judge.
Samantha Wilson appeals the sentences imposed upon her criminal
convictions. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Rachel C. Regenold,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Scott, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2021).
2
SCOTT, Senior Judge.
Samantha Wilson appeals the sentences imposed, following guilty pleas,1
upon her convictions of intimidation with a dangerous weapon and going armed
with intent. She argues the court abused its sentencing discretion by employing a
fixed sentencing policy, relying only on the nature of the offenses, and relying on
unproven facts and uncharged conduct. She also argues implicit racial bias had
an impact on the sentences imposed.
I. Background
At the guilty plea hearing, as to count one, Wilson agreed she threatened
to shoot or discharge a dangerous weapon at an occupied vehicle thus placing the
vehicle’s occupant under a reasonable and actual fear of being seriously injured
and that the threat to shoot or discharge the dangerous weapon would be carried
out. As to count two, Wilson agreed she, without justification, went armed with a
dangerous weapon with specific intent to use it against another. Wilson agreed
the minutes of evidence and attachments were substantially true and the court
could consider them in developing factual bases for the pleas. Later, Wilson
agreed, in conjunction with the court’s interpretation of the minutes of evidence,
she fired a warning shot into the air and then pointed a firearm at the occupied
vehicle. The minutes of evidence disclosed Wilson fired one or two warning shots
into the air, and then pointed the firearm at the vehicle, and then fired an additional
shot at the vehicle.
1 The State agrees Wilson has good cause to appeal because she is challenging
the sentences imposed as opposed to her pleas. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3)
(2020); State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020).
3
The matter proceeded to sentencing. The State recommended the
imposition of consecutive sentences. Wilson requested a deferred judgment,
pointing to her lack of criminal history, her young age, her pregnancy, her taking
responsibility, and the recommendation for a deferred judgment contained in the
presentence investigation report. In her victim impact statement, the victim
requested Wilson be denied a deferred judgment but not be punished to the
maximum extent allowed by law.
In reaching its sentencing decision, the court stated as follows:
I am required to state on the record my reasons for selecting
a particular sentence. The Court is considering the factors set out in
Section 907.5 of the Code of Iowa. The Court is specifically
considering what sentence will provide a maximum opportunity for
rehabilitation for the defendant as well as providing maximum
protection for the community.
Ms. Wilson, I am considering the fact that you don’t have a
criminal history. I’m considering your age, your education, your
needs, and the needs of society. I am also considering the nature of
this offense. The Court has no tolerance for gun violence. Plain and
simple.
In this particular case you shot not once, but twice. You could
have seriously injured or killed [the victim]. I’m not saying the first
shot was appropriate, but at least the first shot was in the air, though
common sense tells you what goes up has to come down. But the
second shot you turned to her vehicle and fired in that direction.
You could have killed her. You could have killed some
innocent, uninvolved person. When you shot that second bullet,
where did you think it was going to go? It has to stop somewhere,
and you apparently did not care or consider that.
I’m also considering that you were not in danger. You were
not justified. You were mad. Plain and simple. You yourself
acknowledged that she was in her car in the street in front of your
house, and you clearly were able to retreat to your house because
you did retreat to your house to get a weapon.
The Court is considering all of those factors. The Court does
not believe that a deferred judgment is appropriate based on the
facts and circumstances of this case. In fact, a deferred judgment
lessens the seriousness of this entire situation. Based on your lack
of criminal history, I do not believe that the most severe or maximum
punishment is also necessary.
4
Pursuant to the foregoing factors and section 901.5, the court sentenced
Wilson to two indeterminate terms of incarceration not to exceed five years each,
to be served concurrently. Wilson appeals.
II. Standard of Review
When a defendant’s sentence is within the statutory limitations, we review
the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, our most deferential standard
of review. State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State v.
Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2015)). We will reverse the sentence only if
the court abused its discretion or considered improper sentencing factors. State
v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “When assessing a district court’s
decision for abuse of discretion, we only reverse if the district court’s decision
rested on grounds or reasoning that were clearly untenable or clearly
unreasonable.” State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 811 (Iowa 2017). “Grounds or
reasons are untenable if they are ‘based on an erroneous application of the law or
not supported by substantial evidence.’” Id. (quoting State v. Dudley, 856 N.W.2d
668, 675 (Iowa 2014)).
III. Analysis
A. Fixed Sentencing Policy
Wilson points to the court’s statement at sentencing that “it has no tolerance
for gun violence. Plain and simple.” She argues this “statement exhibited a fixed
policy to impose prison sentences for gun-related charges, despite its discretion to
grant probation.”
We agree with Wilson that sentencing courts are “not permitted to arbitrarily
establish a fixed policy to govern every case, as that is the exact antithesis of
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discretion.” State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979) (quoting State
v. Jackson, 204 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Iowa 1973)). Instead, “the punishment must fit
the particular person and circumstances under consideration; each decision must
be made on an individual basis, and no single factor, including the nature of the
offense, will be solely determinative.” Id. (quoting State v. McKeever, 276 N.W.2d
385, 387 (Iowa 1979)). The court is to consider “available options, to give due
consideration to all circumstances in the particular case, and to exercise that option
which will best accomplish justice both for society and for the individual defendant.”
Id. (quoting State v. Robbins, 257 N.W.2d 63, 70 (Iowa 1977)).
A fixed policy is one that creates a rule based upon one factor to the
exclusion of other factors that are required to be considered in sentencing. See
id. Upon our review, we agree with the State that the challenged statement did not
represent a fixed sentencing policy but was rather a communication of “the
serious[ness] of Wilson’s crimes in frank language.” This was not a categorical
policy that all defendants with gun-related convictions should be imprisoned, as
opposed to receiving a suspended sentence or deferred judgment, as has been
the case in other matters and requiring reversal. See, e.g., Hildebrand, 280
N.W.2d at 395–96 (finding court’s statement of its “policy that when there is an
accident involved, I do not and will not grant a deferred sentence” was a failure to
consider the minimal essential sentencing factors and impermissible selection of
“only one an attending circumstance which triggered the court’s previously-fixed
sentencing policy”); State v. Nasr, No. 19-0740, 2020 WL 824182, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Feb. 19, 2020) (finding policy of reserving deferred judgments for defendants
and court’s denial of the same for a “defendant who did not meet the categorical
6
criteria for individuals it granted deferred judgments” was an abuse of discretion);
State v. Kirk, No. 16-1930, 2017 WL 2875695, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 6, 2017)
(same) State v. Lachman, No. 09-0630, 2010 WL 200819, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Jan. 22, 2010) (same).
Here, the court did not announce a fixed rule based on one factor to the
exclusion of others. See Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d at 396. The court noted its
consideration of the pertinent sentencing factors contained in Iowa Code sections
901.5 and 907.5. While the court stated its reasonable lack of tolerance for gun
violence, it also went on to address the individualized circumstances of Wilson’s
conduct and why those circumstances are troublesome and weighed in favor of
imposing a prison sentence. The court fashioned its sentence to both the crime
and individual and therefore did not abuse its discretion. See id. We reject
Wilson’s sentencing challenge on this point. For the foregoing reasons, we also
reject Wilson’s claim the court improperly relied only on the nature of the offense,
and that even if the court did not specifically mention every single mitigating factor,
it was not “required to specifically acknowledge each claim of mitigation urged by
the defendant.” State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
B. Unproven Facts and Uncharged Conduct
Next, Wilson argues the court abused its discretion by relying on unproven
facts. “[A] sentencing court cannot consider unproven [facts] in fashioning a
defendant’s sentence unless the defendant admits them or facts are presented to
prove them.” State v. Fetner, 959 N.W.2d 129, 135 (Iowa 2021). As to this
argument, Wilson points to the court’s statements about Wilson being mad or
angry during her altercation with the victim.
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Upon our review of the facts before the district court, we conclude the
inference that Wilson was mad or angry was fair game. At the plea hearing, Wilson
admitted she took a firearm from her residence and took it outside with the specific
intent to threaten and use it against the victim. While, on appeal, Wilson takes the
position the record shows she was in fear of the victim, exiting the home to pursue
the victim leads to a different inference. And Wilson also agreed to take
responsibility for her actions and that she was not justified. Upon these
admissions, “it was completely reasonable for the court to presume [Wilson] was
‘angry,’” and they relate to the nature of the offense and were properly considered.
Cf. State v. Hildebrandt, No. 01-1581, 2003 WL 118251, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.
Jan. 15, 2003).
As to uncharged conduct, Wilson complains of the sentencing court’s
statements that her conduct could have resulted in the serious injury or death of
the victim or another involved person. She argues because she was charged with
intimidation with a dangerous weapon and going armed with intent as opposed to
a homicide offense or a felonious assault, these facts were out of play. But as the
State points out, “The district court did not consider that Wilson did seriously injure
or kill someone, but rather that she could have,” which is part of the nature of the
offense and was in no way inappropriate for the district court to consider.” These
facts also had a bearing on the court’s determination of the need for protection of
the community and deterrence of similar conduct. See Iowa Code § 901.5. We
reject Wilson’s sentencing challenge on this point as well.
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C. Implicit Bias
Wilson argues “a sentence motivated by any type of bias is unjust, including
a sentence impacted by implicit racial bias.” She provides an overview of implicit
bias and its effects, discusses evidence of disparate treatment based on race
across Iowa, and urges “changes are necessary.” However, she agrees, “In the
instant case, there is admittedly no evidence of explicit racial bias on the available
record.” But she claims, “That does not mean that implicit racial bias wasn’t
present in Wilson’s case from the inception.” She essentially goes on to ask us to
link together a chain of speculation based on circumstantial matters, some of which
appear to be outside the record on appeal, and rule her sentence unjust. Absent
an affirmative showing of implicit bias, we will not disturb the sentence imposed.
See State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 762 (Iowa 1998).
IV. Conclusion
Finding no cause for reversal on the issues presented for our review, we
affirm the sentences imposed.
AFFIRMED.