In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-21-00039-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF A.H.
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On Appeal from the 279th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. F-236,103
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mother 1 appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her
seven-month-old baby, A.H. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence,
that statutory grounds exist for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that
termination of her parental rights would be in the best interest of the child. See Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2). The order also terminated the
parental rights of the child’s unknown father. 2
1
We refer to the appellant as “Mother” and her child as “A.H.” to protect their
identities. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). Mother was sixteen years old when the suit
was filed. Mother was eighteen years old at the time the trial court entered its
termination order.
2
The father is not a party to this appeal.
1
Mother’s appointed counsel submitted a brief in which counsel contends that
there are no meritorious issues for appeal and that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In the Interest of L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 731
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (holding that Anders procedures apply in
parental-rights termination cases). The brief presents counsel’s professional
evaluation of the record and explains why no arguable grounds exist to overturn the
trial court’s judgment. Mother’s appellate counsel has represented to the Court that
he gave Mother a copy of the brief that was filed, notified Mother of her right to file
a pro se brief, and provided Mother a copy of the appellate record. The Court notified
Mother of her right to file a pro se response and the deadline for doing so. The
Court’s records show that Mother did not file a response.
We have independently evaluated the appellate record and counsel’s brief. See
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v.
State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d
618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). Based on our review of the record, we
conclude that no arguable grounds exist to support an appeal from the trial court’s
judgment, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See
Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827-28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating
in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record
for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of
2
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619.
Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief
this appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights. We
deny the motion to withdraw filed by Mother’s court-appointed appellate counsel
because an attorney’s duty extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals.
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex.
2016). Should Mother decide to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas,
counsel’s obligations to Mother can be met “by filing a petition for review that
satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27-28.
AFFIRMED.
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LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on June 28, 2021
Opinion Delivered July 15, 2021
Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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