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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-14405
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:00-cr-00281-WFJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MITCHELL MONTEVERDI,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(July 19, 2021)
Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Mitchell Monteverdi appeals his 24-month sentence, which was at the
statutory maximum, imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. He argues
that his sentence was (1) procedurally unreasonable because the court stated that
this was his “second time through” a supervised-release disciplinary process and
(2) substantively unreasonable because the court gave undue weight to his criminal
history and recidivism risk and insufficient weight to other factors, including the
guidelines range, his need for rehabilitative support, and the parties’ sentencing
recommendations.
We review a district court’s revocation of supervised release for an abuse of
discretion, and we review a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised
release for reasonableness. United States v. Velasquez Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248,
1252 (11th Cir. 2008). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of
showing that the sentence was unreasonable in light of the record and the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Alvarado, 808 F.3d 474, 496 (11th Cir.
2015).
A district court may, upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a
defendant has violated a condition of supervised release, revoke the term of
supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment after considering certain
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Section
3553(a) provides that district courts shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not
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greater than necessary, to fulfill the need for the sentence imposed to deter criminal
conduct; protect the public; and provide the defendant with needed educational,
vocational, medical, or other correctional treatment. Id. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e). In
addition, the district court must consider the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the applicable guidelines
range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to the
victim. Id. §§ 3553(a)(1), (4)-(7), 3583(e)(3).
We use a two-step process to review a sentence’s reasonableness. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). First, we must confirm that the sentence is
not procedurally unreasonable. Id. A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if a
district court commits an error such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors,
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence. Id. Further, the sentencing court should provide
sufficient reasoning to satisfy the appellate court that it has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decision-making
authority. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). But a lengthy
explanation is not required. Id.
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If the district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally reasonable, we
must then determine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable. Gall, 552
U.S. at 51. A sentence outside of the applicable Guidelines range does not trigger
a presumption of unreasonableness. Id. We consider the “totality of the facts and
circumstances” in substantive reasonableness review. United States v. Irey, 612
F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). We can vacate a district court’s
sentence only if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district
court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
at 1190. Nonetheless, a district court can still abuse its discretion when it: (1) fails
to consider all factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives an improper or
irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by
balancing the proper factors unreasonably. Id. at 1189. Unjustified reliance upon
any one of the § 3553(a) factors may also indicate an unreasonable sentence.
United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006) (vacating sentence
where the court “focused single-mindedly on the goal of restitution to the
detriment of all of the other sentencing factors”). But the district court is “not
required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the
§ 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 936 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).
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“A district court’s sentence need not be the most appropriate one, it need
only be a reasonable one.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1191. The combined effect of all
these principles is that “[s]ubstantively unreasonable sentences are rare.” United
States v. Kirby, 938 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court’s 24-month sentence was neither procedurally nor
substantively unreasonable. Monteverdi hasn’t established that the district court’s
reference to it being his “second time through” referenced anything besides his
undisputed earlier opportunity to resolve his supervised-release situation more
informally, which was unsuccessful, or why it would be inappropriate to mention
that opportunity. And in light of Monteverdi’s considerable criminal history,
multiple violations of supervised release, and the nature of his offense, the district
court’s sentence wasn’t substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
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