Case: 21-1393 Document: 35 Page: 1 Filed: 08/03/2021
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
GLADYS S. BLOUNT,
Petitioner
v.
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
Respondent
______________________
2021-1393
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. DC-1221-19-0766-W-1.
______________________
Decided: August 3, 2021
______________________
GLADYS S. BLOUNT, Fayetteville, NC, pro se.
CALVIN M. MORROW, Office of General Counsel, United
States Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC,
for respondent. Also represented by TRISTAN L. LEAVITT,
KATHERINE MICHELLE SMITH.
______________________
Before NEWMAN, PROST, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Case: 21-1393 Document: 35 Page: 2 Filed: 08/03/2021
2 BLOUNT v. MSPB
The Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) dis-
missed petitioner Gladys S. Blount’s whistleblower retali-
ation appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Blount v. Dep’t of
Def., No. DC-1221-19-0766-W-1, 2020 WL 1238058
(M.S.P.B. Mar. 11, 2020). She appeals. We affirm because
we agree with the Board that none of the actions that
Ms. Blount alleged are “personnel actions” under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(a)(2)(A).
***
Ms. Blount was an assistant principal at the federally
operated Gordon Elementary School in Fort Bragg, North
Carolina. In August 2019, she filed an individual-right-of-
action (“IRA”) appeal with the Board alleging that the De-
partment of Defense Education Activity (that is, the agency
that runs Gordon Elementary) engaged in a personnel ac-
tion in retaliation for Ms. Blount’s whistleblower activity.
See S.A. 16. 1 In that proceeding (and in the Office of Spe-
cial Counsel complaint leading to it), she alleged that the
agency retaliated with “disparate work assignment[s].”
S.A. 16 (IRA appeal form). Specifically, Ms. Blount pointed
to (1) an order for her to attend a single training session in
April 2019 to make up for one she allegedly missed (though
she disputes missing it), (2) a requirement by those con-
ducting the training for attendees to submit an “action
plan” (a curricular requirement for all attendees), and
(3) reminder emails from the same people that she needed
to complete that action plan (and offering to help). See
S.A. 4–5, 17–18. As the Board observed, “[i]t is undisputed
that [Ms. Blount] received no discipline of any kind” for
“failing to respond to emails . . . regarding her action plan,
or for failing to provide the plan itself.” S.A. 6.
1 “S.A.” refers to the supplemental appendix filed
with the respondent’s response brief.
Case: 21-1393 Document: 35 Page: 3 Filed: 08/03/2021
BLOUNT v. MSPB 3
The Board’s jurisdiction is strictly limited by law. See
Bolton v. MSPB, 154 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998). To
establish the Board’s jurisdiction in an IRA appeal, an ap-
pellant must raise nonfrivolous (i.e., legally adequate) alle-
gations not only (1) that she engaged in whistleblowing
activity but also (2) that the whistleblowing was a contrib-
uting factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take
a “personnel action,” as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).
Stoyanov v. Dep’t of the Navy, 474 F.3d 1377, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2007). This case concerns the second require-
ment: whether the allegedly retaliatory actions were “per-
sonnel actions” as § 2302(a)(2)(A) defines them.
The Board first concluded that Ms. Blount had not ad-
equately alleged that these actions were “disparate” as to
her. S.A. 6–7. The Board also determined that she had
“not identified any conduct by the agency” that “qualifies
as a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2).” S.A. 7.
Accordingly, it dismissed the appeal. See Willis v. Dep’t of
Agriculture, 141 F.3d 1139, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
We agree with the Board. A party seeking to bring an
IRA appeal has the burden to establish jurisdiction.
Ms. Blount has not identified which category of activity in
§ 2302(a)(2)(A) that the alleged actions would fall under.
Respondent suggests that the closest possible categories
are (1) “a decision . . . concerning education or training if
the education may reasonably be expected to lead to an ap-
pointment, promotion, performance evaluation, or other
[personnel] action” and (2) a “significant change of duties,
responsibilities, or working conditions.” See 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(a)(2)(A). Neither category conceivably fits the alle-
gations here—nor do any of the others.
We note that in addition to the allegations discussed
above, Ms. Blount has pointed to her reassignment from
one full-time to two part-time assistant principal positions,
arguing that this too was a retaliatory action. See
S.A. 17–18. That action, however, is beyond the scope of
Case: 21-1393 Document: 35 Page: 4 Filed: 08/03/2021
4 BLOUNT v. MSPB
this underlying IRA at the Board (and therefore beyond
this appeal in our court). Rather, it is at issue in a different
IRA appeal of Ms. Blount’s. See S.A. 4 n.2 (citing Blount v.
Dep’t of Def., No. DC-1221-19-0765-W-1 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 2,
2018)). The Board properly declined to address the reas-
signment in this case under the doctrine of adjudicatory ef-
ficiency. See Boyd v. Dep’t of Labor, 561 F. App’x 978, 982
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
***
In summary, even if we assume that everything
Ms. Blount says is true, none of the actions that the agency
took constituted a retaliatory “personnel action” under the
meaning of the whistleblower statute. Accordingly, the
Board correctly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction
to hear an IRA appeal that was based on these allegations.
We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.