FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
AUG 6 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHERIF A. PHILIPS, M.D.; Dr., No. 19-17313
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:18-cv-00046
v.
MEMORANDUM*
PITT COUNTY MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL, INC.; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Guam
Frances Tydingco-Gatewood, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 4, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Sherif Philips appeals the district court’s dismissal of his case for lack of
personal jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Because the parties are familiar with the history of this case, we need not recount it
here.
We review de novo a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff has the burden of making a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction,
“uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true”, and
“[c]onflicts between parties over statements contained in affidavits must be
resolved in the plaintiff's favor.” Id. However, a plaintiff cannot “simply rest on
the bare allegations of its complaint.” Amba Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Jobar Int'l, Inc.,
551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1977).
First, general personal jurisdiction does not exist. All defendants are
residents of North Carolina, and have no “substantial” or “continuous and
systematic” contacts with the forum territory. See Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006). Nor does specific personal
jurisdiction exist. Defendants’ main contacts with Guam were to enforce the
attorneys’ fee award that the Defendants received from a North Carolina state
court. But the district court properly concluded that this Guam Superior Court
action did not give rise to Philips’ claims, which instead primarily concern Philips’
hospital suspension and challenges to the North Carolina court proceedings, and
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that regardless “[t]he simple domestication of a foreign judgment… standing alone,
is unlikely sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on the judgment creditor.”
See Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007). We also agree with the
district court that Defendant Creech’s 2007 letter to Guam Memorial Hospital, sent
at Philips’ attorney’s request, does not constitute purposeful availment of the
forum. Finally, Philips’ claim that Defendants contacted a Guam newspaper to
libel Philips is a controverted bare allegation for which Philips does not provide
adequate support. Amba, 551 F.2d at 787 (“[Plaintiff] could not simply rest on the
bare allegations of its complaint, but rather was obligated to come forward with
facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting personal jurisdiction.”).
To the extent that Philips’ appeal and motions (Dkt. 22; 34; 38) seek review
or removal of the Defendant’s Guam Superior Court action, we deny the motions
and affirm dismissal of the case. The motions do not comply with the removal
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446, and this Court no longer has jurisdiction to review
judgments of the Guam Supreme Court, see Santos v. Guam, 436 F.3d 1051 (9th
Cir. 2006). The district court likewise properly denied removal as untimely and
barred by the forum defendant rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), even when generously
construing Philips’ motions and complaint as requesting removal.
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We deny Defendants’ motion for costs and damages under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38 (Dkt. 16).
AFFIRMED.
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