(concurring) — While I agree with the thorough and well-reasoned opinion of the majority in this case, I write separately to emphasize my growing dismay with the cavalier attitude taken by many lawyers and parties toward the mandate of RAP 10.3(e). RAP 10.3(e) requires a brief of an amicus curiae to conform to all of the provisions of our rules regarding the contents of a brief; additionally, the brief must “set forth a separate section regarding the identity and interest of amicus and be limited to the issues of concern to amicus.” In the present case, we received a brief from an organization styling itself the Foundation for Campaign Finance Compliance. The brief of this high-sounding organization fails to comply with RAP 10.3(e) *642because it contains no information identifying the organization or its interests in the present litigation. This violation of RAP 10.3(e) should have resulted in rejection of the brief. RAP 10.7.
On the larger question in this case, I approach the issues here with the certain sense of irony. An organization calling itself the Evergreen Freedom Foundation purports to utilize Washington’s public disclosure laws regarding the activities of the Washington Education Association and its affiliates. There is little mystery regarding the nature of the Washington Education Association or its affiliates: they are educational employee unions. On the other hand, we know nothing about the Evergreen Freedom Foundation. It chooses to utilize the courts for what may be a political agenda, and yet we know nothing regarding the individuals or organizations who make up the Evergreen Freedom Foundation or provide financial support to it. Just as we know nothing regarding the organization or funding of the “Foundation for Campaign Finance Compliance,” we know nothing of the organization or funding of the Evergreen Freedom Foundation. Perhaps a healthy dose of “public disclosure” so vigorously sought by these organizations would be usefully applied to their own activities as well, so the public will know who supports and funds them when they purport to be acting in the public interest.
I have previously expressed an extreme reluctance to see Washington’s judiciary dragged into the mire of political questions. See Philip A. Talmadge, Understanding the Limits of Power: Judicial Restraint in General Jurisdiction Court Systems, 22 Seattle U. L. Rev. 695 (1999). In many respects, being dragged into political battles such as may be present here ultimately diminishes the authority and dignity of the courts. But on a more practical level, presuming that we are in the midst of a political battle that must, in fact, be decided, it is anomalous that we should be asked to decide a question regarding public disclosure fraught with political implications by organizations who neither comply with our rules regarding the disclosure of their *643identity and interest as amicus curiae, or who have never provided the public with any clues regarding their organization or funding sources. Even my capacity for irony, tested over many years in the partisan political system, cannot withstand such an overwhelming onslaught as in this case.