NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0519-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM M. THOMPSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Argued July 27, 2021 – Decided August 13, 2021
Before Judges Sumners and Firko.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 16-12-2705.
James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; James K. Smith, Jr., of
counsel and on the briefs).
Kristen Pulkstenis, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (Damon G. Tyner, Atlantic
County Prosecutor, attorney; Melinda A. Harrigan,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant William M. Thompson pled guilty to third-degree distribution
of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), heroin, in a quantity of less than
one-half ounce, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1), and was sentenced to a three-year prison
term with one year of parole ineligibility. In a single-point argument, defendant
states:
THE JUDGE, WHO FOUND THAT IMPOSING A
PRISON SENTENCE WOULD BE "A GRAVE
INJUSTICE," COULD PROPERLY HAVE DENIED
THE STATE'S APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENDED
TERM AS BEING "AN ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS EXERCISE OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION" PURSUANT TO STATE V.
LAGARES.[1] BECAUSE THE JUDGE DID NOT
RECOGNIZE THAT OPTION, THE MATTER
SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR FURTHER
FINDINGS. (Not Raised Below).
We disagree and affirm.
To provide context for our decision, we provide a brief discussion of the
procedural history of this matter. Following an incident in August 2016,
defendant was indicted for third-degree possession of a CDS, heroin, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-10(a)(1), and third-degree distribution of a CDS, heroin, in a quantity of
less than one-half ounce. As documented in the pretrial memorandum,
defendant rejected the State's offer that he plead guilty to the distribution charge
1
127 N.J. 20 (1992).
2 A-0519-19
in exchange for the State's recommendation that he be sentenced to a seven-year
prison term with three and a half years of parole ineligibility. The proposed
sentence was within the extended term range under the Brimage 2 Guidelines due
to defendant's record as a repeat offender with two prior convictions for CDS
distribution.
On November 15, 2018, defendant entered into a non-negotiated plea
agreement and pled guilty to the distribution charge. The supplemental plea
form for non-negotiated pleas stated that the judge would impose a sentence of
five years of special probation in drug court, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, and directed
defendant to submit to a Treatment Assessment Services for the Courts interview
and evaluation and other conditions. The State opposed the sentence.
2
State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998). In Brimage, our Supreme Court directed
the Attorney General to promulgate uniform plea offer guidelines. 153 N.J. at
25. The guidelines are intended to provide standards for plea offers for
Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987 (CDRA), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1 to 36-1
offenses and reduce the chance of disparity in sentencing. Brimage, 153 N.J. at
13. Plea agreements under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 are governed by those guidelines,
153 N.J. at 24-25; see Revised Attorney General Guidelines for Negotiating
Cases Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (July 15, 2004); State v. Fowlkes, 169 N.J. 387,
389 (2001). Third-degree distribution of CDS charge is a Brimage-eligible
CDRA offense that subjected defendant to a mandatory extended term sentence
under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f).
3 A-0519-19
After complying with the conditions to enter into drug court, defendant
was sentenced on January 17, 2019. The State argued defendant was not eligible
for drug court and requested a stay of the sentence. The judge disagreed, finding
the record indicated he was a "good candidate" for the probationary treatment
afforded by drug court.
The State appealed the sentence to our excessive sentence oral argument
calendar. R. 2:9-11. We concluded the sentence was illegal because defendant
was ineligible for drug court and remanded the matter for resentencing.
About two weeks later, the trial judge granted defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. Thereafter, the judge accepted the parties' plea
agreement, whereby defendant pled guilty to the distribution charge in exchange
for the State's recommended sentence of a three-year prison term sentence
subject to one year of parole ineligibility and with "credit for all the time he
already served on special probation."
At sentencing, after defendant presented himself as a person who had
turned his life around––working two jobs, married, expecting a new child, living
a sober life—the judge weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors and
"conclude[d] that [] defendant should be admitted to probation." The judge,
however, ruled that "due to the requirements of Brimage and the mandatory
4 A-0519-19
sentencing requirements for repeat drug offenders, the [c]ourt is constrained to
impose a prison term." Adhering to the plea agreement, the judge sentenced
defendant to three years in prison subject to one year of parole ineligibility with
248 days of jail credit. The judge stayed the sentence and released him on his
own recognizance pending appeal.
We review sentences "in accordance with a deferential standard," State v.
Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014), and acknowledge "that appellate courts should
not 'substitute their judgment for those of our sentencing courts,'" State v. Cuff,
239 N.J. 321, 347 (2019) (quoting State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014)). Thus,
we will
affirm the sentence unless (1) the sentencing guidelines
were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating
factors found by the sentencing court were not based
upon competent and credible evidence in the record; or
(3) "the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the]
case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to
shock the judicial conscience."
[Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70 (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).]
"While the sentence imposed must be a lawful one, the court's decision to
impose a sentence in accordance with the plea agreement should be given great
respect, since a 'presumption of reasonableness . . . attaches to criminal
sentences imposed on plea bargain defendants.'" State v. S.C., 289 N.J. Super.
5 A-0519-19
61, 71 (App. Div. 1996) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Sainz, 107 N.J.
283, 294 (1987)). Moreover,
a negotiated agreement, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12,
that calls for any form of imprisonment, whether the
disposition be effected under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2b(2) or
2b(3), requires a sentencing judge to either strictly
enforce the agreement or reject it in the interest of
justice. The judge has no discretion, if the judge
accepts the agreement, to sentence below the terms of
the agreement which do not call for some "other
disposition."
[State v. Bridges, 252 N.J. Super. 286, 295 (App. Div.
1991)]
Before us, defendant argues his sentence equates to an extended term
because it includes a parole disqualifier, which is not required under N.J.S.A.
2C:35-(b)(3). He maintains his sentence was illegal because the State failed to
apply for an extended term due to defendant's prior convictions and did not set
forth any reasons why he deserved an extended term with the mandatory parole
disqualifier as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f). He emphasizes that without the
parole disqualifier he would have been eligible for probation based on his jail
credits. Thus, his sentence should be vacated, and the matter remanded so that
the State can present reasons to the trial judge why an extended term sentence
is not "arbitrary and capricious."
6 A-0519-19
We disagree with defendant and favor the State's position that the sentence
imposed in accordance with the plea agreement was consistent with our
sentencing guidelines. The agreement did not call for an extended term sentence
under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f). The statute provides. in pertinent part, that a person
convicted of distributing a CDS who has previously been convicted of that crime
"shall upon application of the prosecuting attorney be sentenced by the court to
an extended term as authorized by [N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(c)], notwithstanding that
extended terms are ordinarily discretionary with the court." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
6(f).
For a defendant to be subject to a mandatory extended term, any plea that
reduces his or her mandatory or minimum term must be entered under N.J.S.A.
2C:35-12 (Section 12). The statute provides that:
[w]henever an offense defined in this chapter specifies
a mandatory sentence of imprisonment which includes
a minimum term during which the defendant shall be
ineligible for parole, [or] a mandatory extended term
which includes a period of parole ineligibility . . . the
court upon conviction shall impose the mandatory
sentence . . . unless the defendant has pleaded guilty
pursuant to a negotiated agreement . . . which provides
for a lesser sentence [or] period of parole ineligibility .
. . . The negotiated plea . . . may provide for a specified
term of imprisonment within the range of ordinary or
extended sentences authorized by law [or] a specified
period of parole ineligibility . . . . In that event, the court
at sentencing shall not impose a lesser term of
7 A-0519-19
imprisonment [or a] lesser period of parole ineligibility
....
[N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (emphasis added).]
In accordance with a negotiated plea agreement under Section 12,
defendant pled guilty to distribution of heroin and was sentenced to a three-year
prison term with one year of parole ineligibility sentence that was not a
mandatory term under a Brimage-eligible CDRA offense. This was because the
State choose to exercise its discretion under Section 12 "to negotiate away its
right to seek mandatory sentences." State v. Courtney, 243 N.J. 77, 88 (2020).
The imposition of a one-year period of parole ineligibly did not make
defendant's sentence an extended term.
Applying our deferential standard of review, we are satisfied that the
judge's implementation of the plea agreement comports with our sentencing
guidelines, and that the sentence does not reflect an abuse of discretion or shock
our judicial conscience.
Affirmed.
8 A-0519-19