IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0461
Filed August 18, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JUSTIN HUNDLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Joel W. Barrows
(Plea) and John Telleen (Sentence), Judges.
Justin Hundley appeals from his guilty plea. APPEAL DISMISSED.
G. Brian Weiler, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and May and Ahlers, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Justin Hundley pleaded guilty to domestic
abuse assault by impeding breathing causing bodily injury, a class “D” felony, and
domestic abuse assault, third offense, a class “D” felony. Hundley entered the
guilty pleas in February 2020 and was sentenced the next month. He appeals,
contending there were defects in the plea proceedings because the potential
sentences were not adequately explained. He claims his trial counsel was
ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty in the face of the defects and for failing
to file a motion in arrest of judgment to challenge the defects.
We cannot address the merits of Hundley’s claims of defects in the plea
proceedings for three reasons. First, Hundley did not preserve error on this claim.
To preserve error in challenging a guilty plea, a motion in arrest of judgment must
be filed in the district court. Iowa Rs. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(d), 2.24(3)(a); see also State
v. Harrington, 893 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Iowa 2017) (noting that filing a motion in arrest
of judgment to challenge deficiencies in a plea proceeding is “an error preservation
requirement”). Hundley did not file a motion in arrest of judgment. As a result, we
cannot hear the claim because error was not properly preserved. Id.
The second reason is Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2020) precludes
Hundley’s ability to appeal from his guilty plea unless he can establish good cause.
It is Hundley’s burden to establish good cause to pursue an appeal of his conviction
following a guilty plea. State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 108 (Iowa 2021). “Good
cause” under section 814.6 means a “legally sufficient reason,” which is “a reason
that would allow a court to provide some relief.” Id. at 109. When a defendant
pleads guilty and does not file a motion in arrest of judgment—which is what
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happened here—there is no relief that the appellate court can grant, so there is no
good cause to allow the appeal. See id.
The third reason we cannot address the merits of Hundley’s claims is they
depend exclusively on assertions that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel, and we are prohibited by statute from addressing such claims on direct
appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.7. This reason relates to an exception to the second
reason. As mentioned, a defendant who pleads guilty and fails to file a motion in
arrest of judgment is precluded from being granted relief on appeal based on
claimed defects in the plea proceedings. Historically, there has been an exception
to this bar if the failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment resulted from ineffective
assistance of counsel. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109. However, this exception has
been eliminated by the legislature’s recent amendment to Iowa Code section
814.7, which prohibits defendants from raising ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims on direct appeal. Id.
Iowa Code section 814.7 was amended in 2019 so defendants can no
longer raise ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal. State v.
Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Iowa 2021). Rather, ineffective-assistance claims
must “be decided in the first instance in postconviction-relief proceedings rather
than on direct appeal.” Id. The amended statute applies to Hundley’s case
because his guilty plea and sentencing occurred after the effective date of the
statute—July 1, 2019. See id. Accordingly, we are precluded from hearing
Hundley’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal. See id.
As a final attempt to avoid operation of the above-stated principles, Hundley
asserts that, if Iowa Code section 814.7 prevents us from reaching the merits of
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his claim, the statute should be struck down as unconstitutional and we should
adopt the plain-error doctrine. We reject this argument for two reasons.
First, Hundley waived the argument by failing to sufficiently identify and brief
the issues.1 See Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 524 (Iowa 2018) (discussing
the specificity requirement); State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 166 n.14 (Iowa 2015)
(indicating a “passing reference” in a brief is insufficient); State v. Vaughan, 859
N.W.2d 492, 503 (Iowa 2015) (finding waiver where party presented “no argument
in support of his contention”); State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2014)
(declining to address the merits of arguments not made, “as under our rules and
our precedents they have been waived in this appeal”).
Second, our supreme court has denied constitutional challenges to
section 814.7 on separation-of-powers, equal-protection, and due-process
grounds. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 103–08. Our supreme court has also
“repeatedly rejected plain error review and will not adopt it now.” Id. at 109. We
are required to follow these holdings, as “[w]e are not at liberty to overrule
controlling supreme court precedent.” State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2014).
Because Hundley failed to establish good cause to pursue a direct appeal
of his guilty plea and our court is without authority to decide his ineffective-
1 Hundley does not identify which constitutional provisions he claims section 814.7
violates, nor does he develop any arguments about them or the plain-error
doctrine. The entirety of Hundley’s briefing on this point consists of these two
sentences: “To the extent that [section] 814.7 purports to deny Mr. Hundley a
timely remedy for violations of his constitutional rights, it is unconstitutional and
should be struck down. In the alternative, Iowa should adopt the ‘plain error’
doctrine, applying it here instead of the construct of ineffective assistance.” This
is insufficient to avoid waiver.
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assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal, Hundley’s appeal must be
dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED.