United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT February 22, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-50198
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL J. KEARNS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. SA-95-CR-201-2
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Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Michael J. Kearns appeals the revocation of his supervised
release and the sentence imposed following revocation. He argues
that the sentence imposed was plainly unreasonable and that the
district court did not consider the sentencing factors in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Given that Kearns continued to violate the
terms of his supervised release despite the district court’s
leniency and warnings and that the sentence imposed was within
the three to nine months applicable guideline range for each of
his violations of supervised release, Kearns has not shown that
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-50198
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the sentence imposed by the district court was unreasonable or
plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 114,
120 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1804 (2006). The
record indicates that the district court implicitly considered
the § 3553(a) factors when it imposed Kearns’s sentence,
including the nature and circumstances of Kearns’s violations of
his supervised release; Kearns’s history and characteristics; and
the need for a lengthy sentence to deter Kearns’s continued
violations of supervised release. See United States v. Gonzalez,
250 F.3d 923, 930 (5th Cir. 2001).
Kearns argues that the district court failed to honor or
wrongly punished him for obtaining a state court order that
purported to discharge his obligation to pay the restitution
ordered by the district court and that the district court made
false statements that it would impose a lengthy sentence in order
to make him repudiate the state court order. Kearns has not
shown that the district court erred in determining that the state
court order was void for lack of jurisdiction and was not
entitled to full faith and credit in the district court. See
Tennessee ex rel. Sizemore v. Surety Bank, 200 F.3d 373, 377 (5th
Cir. 2000). The district court did not err in finding that
Kearns’s issuance of the worthless promissory note and obtaining
the state court order were part of a pattern of bad faith and
continued refusal to comply with the terms of his supervised
No. 03-50198
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release. See United States v. Caldwell, 830 F.2d 36, 39-40 (5th
Cir. 1987).
Kearns argues that the district court erred in denying his
“motion for closure,” which was based on the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The district court did
not err in denying this motion as the international covenant did
not create individually enforceable rights. See United States v.
Wesson, 305 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 2002).
Kearns argues that there was an enforceable agreement
between him, the Government, and the district court that
precluded the revocation of his supervised release. The record
does not support this argument. The district court did not err
in revoking Kearns’s supervised release due to his continued
violations of his supervised release. See Gonzalez, 250 F.3d at
930.
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. Kearns’s motions
for extraordinary relief, for judicial notice, for dismissal of
the appeal are DENIED. His motion to waive the requirement to
file record excerpts is DENIED as unnecessary.