United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
Revised April 30, 2007 F I L E D
April 25, 2007
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 07-30132
Summary Calendar
ELMIRA PRESTON; HOWARD PRESTON; ROSE LEFRANCE PRESTON;
SHERYL PRESTON; DEBORAH MAZIE; ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
TENET HEALTHSYSTEM MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,
doing business as Memorial Medical Center,
Defendant-Appellee,
versus
LIFECARE HOSPITAL OF NEW ORLEANS LLC, doing business as Lifecare Hospital;
LIFECARE MANAGEMENT SERVICES, L.L.C.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Consolidated with
No. 07-30160
Summary Calendar
CHERYL WEEMS, Individually and on behalf of her deceased mother,
Veola Mosby, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
1
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TOURO INFIRMARY,
Defendant-Appellee,
SHONO, INC. doing business as Specialty Hospital of New Orleans,
Defendant-Appellant.
On Petition for Permission to Appeal from the
United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana
Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:
Cheryl Weems and Touro Infirmary (“Touro”) moved to remand this class action lawsuit to
state court under the “local controversy” exception of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). The district court granted their motion to remand, and SHONO,
Inc. d/b/a Specialty Hospital of New Orleans (“SHONO”) timely appealed the order. We reverse the
district court’s judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 4, 2006, Cheryl Weems, individually and on behalf of her deceased mother and
all others similarly situated, filed a class action petition against Touro and SHONO in the Civil
District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. Weems’s claims involve injuries and/or deaths
allegedly caused by defects and unreasonably dangerous conditions at the medical facilities of Touro
2
and SHONO on August 29, 2005, the date of Hurricane Katrina. Weems further contends that Touro
and SHONO failed to provide adequate transportation away from the premises after Hurricane
Katrina made landfall. In the petition, Weems proposes to certify the following class of persons:
All persons, except Defendants’ employees, who sustained injury and/or damage,
including but not limited to, personal injury or wrongful death, as a result of
unreasonable dangerous conditions and/or defects in and/or on the premises of
TOURO and SHONO on or about August 29, 2005, and/or as a result of the failure
of TOURO and SHONO to attain, maintain, and/or provide an adequate means of
transportation to timely and/or safely move persons off its premises in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina.
On August 29, 2006, SHONO removed the action to federal court pursuant to CAFA. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2) & 1453(b). Neither Weems nor Touro contests that SHONO satisfied the
threshold requirements for removal. § 1332(d)(2). Instead, Weems and Touro moved to remand the
case under the local controversy exception. On December 14, 2006, the district court granted their
motion to remand. The district court’s opinion reads in pertinent part that:
The court concludes that the controversy in this case is truly local inasmuch as it
affects the New Orleans area to the exclusion of all others. The alleged injuries
occurred in Louisiana, and the two defendants are Louisiana corporations. Further,
the best evidence that is available at this time indicates that more than two-thirds of
the proposed plaintiff class are citizens of Louisiana. . . . As to the citizenship of
those who may be filing wrongful death or survival actions, SHONO does not
challenge Touro’s contention that seven patients died. Assuming that all of their
representatives are not citizens of Louisiana, the number of Louisiana class members
would still exceed two-thirds of the class.
3
SHONO sought permission to appeal, and on February 14, 2007, the court granted permission
under § 1453(c).1 We address whether Weems and SHONO presented sufficient evidence to establish
the two-thirds citizenship requirement under the local controversy exception, § 1332(d)(4)(A).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court conducts a de novo review of the district court’s remand order. Sherrod v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d
1326, 1336 (5th Cir. 1995)). We review the district court’s factual findings as to the citizenship of
the parties for clear error. Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 1996). A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous only when “although there may be evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire [record] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Campos v. City of Baytown, Tex., 840 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir.1988) (citing Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Statutory Background
Congress enacted CAFA to encourage federal jurisdiction over interstate class action lawsuits
of national interest. CAFA contains a basic jurisdictional test, which requires a removing defendant
to prove minimal diversity and an aggregated amount in controversy of $5,000,000 or more. 28
1
On February 5, 2007, shortly before another panel granted permission to appeal in Weems,
we entered an order that granted a defendant permission to appeal a remand order in Preston v. Tenet
HealthSystems Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 07-30132. These two class action lawsuits involve nearly
identical factual backgrounds; however, the parties and procedural histories are different. On appeal,
both Appellants ask the court to determine whether the parties moving for remand introduced
sufficient evidence to satisfy the citizenship requirement under CAFA’s exceptions to federal
jurisdiction. Due to the factual similarities and the legal issues of first impression, the court
consolidated these two appeals. Accordingly, we timely enter two separate judgments.
4
U.S.C. § 1332(d). The district court can decline jurisdiction under three provisions: (1) the home
state exception, § 1332(d)(4)(B); (2) the local controversy exception, § 1332(d)(4)(A); and (3)
discretionary jurisdiction, § 1332(d)(3).
Pursuant to the local controversy exception, the only provision at issue in this appeal, the
district court “shall decline to exercise jurisdiction” when the action meets the following criteria:
(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the
aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed;
(II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant--
(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff class;
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted
by the proposed plaintiff class; and
(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was originally filed; and
(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related conduct of
each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action was originally filed; and
(ii) during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, no other class
action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of the
defendants on behalf of the same or other persons.
§ 1332(4)(A).
B. The Local Controversy Exception
1. Burden of Proof and Evidentiary Standard
In the consolidated case, Preston v. Memorial Medical Center, we held that the parties
moving to remand the class action to state court must prove that the CAFA exceptions to federal
jurisdiction divest the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478
F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2007); Frazier v. Pioneer Ams. LLC, 455 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2006).
We also held that the party moving for remand must prove the statutory citizenship requirement by
a preponderance of the evidence. Welsh v. Am. Surety Co. of N.Y., 186 F.2d 16, 17 (5th Cir. 1951).
5
We reasoned that Congress explicitly enumerated any envisioned deviations from the general removal
statute, and nothing in CAFA’s text suggests that Congress meant to impose a heightened burden of
proof on parties attempting to remand a class action lawsuit to state court.
2. Proving Citizenship to Defeat Diversity Jurisdiction
In determining diversity jurisdiction, the state where someone establishes his domicile serves
a dual function as his state of citizenship. Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954). A
person’s state of domicile presumptively continues unless rebutted with sufficient evidence of change.
Acridge, 334 F.3d at 448 (citing Palazzo v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000)). Domicile
requires the demonstration of two factors: residence and the intention to remain. “When challenged
as here, the burden rest[s] on [the plaintiff] to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was
a citizen of that State.” Welsh, 186 F.2d at 17 (internal citations omitted); see also Garcia v. Koch
Oil Co. of Tex. Inc., 351 F.3d 636, 638-39 (5th Cir. 2003). Therefore, Weems and Touro must show
that greater than two-thirds of the putative class members were citizens of Louisiana on August 4,
2006, the filing date of the class action petition. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7) (“Citizenship of the
members of the proposed plaintiff classes shall be determined for purposes of paragraphs (2) through
(6) as of the date of the filing of the complaint.”).
3. Evidence Adduced to Prove the Citizenship Requirement
SHONO argues that the evidence presented by Weems and Touro, the pre-Katrina addresses
of the hospitalized patients, does not satisfy the local controversy exception. Specifically, the medical
records do not establish that on August 4, 2006, the date Weems filed her class action petition, at
least two-thirds of the putative class members were Louisiana citizens. Touro and Weems contend
that the presumption of continuing domicile requires SHONO to demonstrate that the relocated class
6
members, who were Louisiana citizens as evinced by the medical records, do not intend to return
home.
a. Medical Records
Weems made no effort to provide citizenship data, stating in her motion that “plaintiffs believe
that the majority of the members of this class, and certainly more than 2/3 of the members are from
Louisiana.” (emphasis added). Touro submitted an affidavit from Sandy McCall, its director of
medical records, stating that
There were two hundred and ninety-nine (299) patients present on the premises of
Touro Infirmary, immediately before, during and immediately after Hurricane Katrina
made landfall in New Orleans on or about August 29, 2005. This number includes
individuals who were patients of Specialty Hospital of New Orleans (SHONO, Inc.)
And Kindred Hospital. Of the patients present on the Touro premises during and
immediately after Hurricane Katrina, two hundred and forty-two (242) of those
patients identified a Louisiana address as their primary billing address and residence.
SHONO confirmed that 200 of the 242 patients listed in Touro’s affidavit provided an Orleans Parish
address as their primary residence. Weems and Touro presented no evidence, however, to
demonstrate that these patients not only resided in Orleans Parish at the given addresses but also were
domiciled in Louisiana at the time of Hurricane Katrina. A party’s residence in a state alone does not
establish domicile. Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974). Domicile requires residence
in the state and an intent to remain in the state. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30, 48 (1989). Therefore, the medical records are not tantamount to sufficient proof of
citizenship. See Coury, 85 F.3d at 249 (“[M]ere presence in a [] location does not [constitute] . . .
domicile; it must be accompanied with the requisite intent. In most cases, the difficult issue is not
presence but whether the intent to change domicile can be shown.”).
7
Weems and Touro ask this court to presume, despite the forced mass relocation of Orleans
Parish citizens after Hurricane Katrina, that the patients’ primary billing addresses listed in the medical
records accurately reflect their domicile at the time of the filing of this action, August 4, 2006, nearly
a year after the hurricane. Weems cites no authority to support her argument that the medical records
serve as a proxy for domicile. See Combee v. Shell Oil Co., 615 F.2d 698, 700 (5th Cir. 1980) (“For
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the domicile of the parties, as opposed to their residence, is the
key.”); Mas, 489 F.2d at 1399 (“For diversity purposes, citizenship means domicile; mere residence
in the State is not sufficient.”); Stine, 213 F.2d at 448 (“Residence alone is not the equivalent of
citizenship, although the place of residence is prima facie the domicile; and citizenship is not
necessarily lost by protected absence from home, where the intention to return remains.”). Touro
argues that proof of citizenship based on a party’s residence alone permits the district court to assume
that a person’s state of residence and state of citizenship are the same unless rebutted with sufficient
evidence. See Kitson v. Bank of Edwardsville, No. 06-528-GPM, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 85285 (S.D.
Ill. Nov. 22, 2006) (holding that evidence of the putative class members’ residence creates a
rebuttable presumption, and if not contested by the opposing party, then residency demonstrates
citizenship for CAFA jurisdictional purposes). This approach finds limited support in the case law
of our sister circuits. See, e.g., Hendrix v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 390 F.2d 299, 301 & n.9 (10th
Cir. 1968) (quoting Kelleam v. Maryland Cas. Co. of Baltimore, 112 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1940) (“[I]t
was indicated that proof that a person is a resident of a state is prima facie evidence that he is a citizen
thereof and shifts burden of showing that his domicile and citizenship are elsewhere than at the place
of his residence to the party so alleging.”).
8
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Dyer, the Tenth Circuit held that
the defendant’s allegation in the state court complaint that the plaintiff was a Wyoming resident
created a presumption of continuing residence in Wyoming. 19 F.3d 514 (10th Cir. 1994). In
determining citizenship, the court found that “no [contradictory] evidence appears in the record
before us and therefore there is a permissible inference” that the plaintiff remained a Wyoming
resident until commencement of the action. 19 F.3d at 519. Based on this inference, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that “[w]hile there are references in the evidence to [the plaintiff’s] residence
instead of his domicile and citizenship, we feel this is not fatal to jurisdiction. . . . We are not satisfied
that the evidentiary showing in the record is such that the determination of diversity for jurisdictional
purposes was not clearly erroneous and should be sustained.” Id. at 520 (citations omitted).
In Delinger v. Brennan, the defendant listed an Indiana State Prison as his residence. 87 F.3d
214 (7th Cir. 1996). Based on deposition testimony, the district court discovered that prior to his
imprisonment, the defendant resided in New York State, where his wife still resided during his
incarceration, and he worked as a minister from offices in Elmont, New York. Id. at 216. The
Seventh Circuit held that “[s]ince domicile is a voluntary status, a forcible change in a person’s state
of residence does not alter his domicile; hence the domicile of a prisoner before he was imprisoned
is presumed to remain his domicile while he is in prison. . . . [T]he presumption articulated in Sullivan
is rebuttable, but on this meager record it has not been rebutted.” Id. at 216. In Sligh v. Doe, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that “there was some affirmative evidence pointing toward Virginia
citizenship [the license plate of a hit-and-run driver wherein accident occurred in Virginia], not
conclusive evidence by any means, but sufficient to support a finding in the absence of any
contradictory proof.” 596 F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir. 1979). Finally, in Fort Knox Transit v.
9
Humphrey, the Sixth Circuit concluded that “upon the whole record and in the absence of any
challenge to the jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s residence in Ohio is prima facie evidence of his citizenship
in that state and is not overthrown by residence in Kentucky as a member of the Armed Forces of the
United States, and there being no substantial evidence of voluntary relinquishment of an Ohio
domicile.” 151 F.2d 602, 602 (6th Cir. 1945) (emphasis added). Here, the medical records alone
show mere presence in the state. Neither Touro nor Weems provided any additional evidence, such
as vehicle registration or an extended period of residency and employment in Louisiana prior to the
forced evacuation prompted by Hurricane Katrina. See Delinger, 87 F.3d at 216; Sligh, 596 F.2d at
1171. The cases cited above undeniably incorporate language amenable to an argument that the court
may determine citizenship based solely on evidence of residency, but Touro fails to appreciate that
in these lawsuits, the moving party did not ultimately prevail just because the opposing party offered
no rebuttal evidence. Instead, the court considered the entire record to determine whether the
evidence of residency was simultaneously sufficient to establish citizenship. Even in Kitson, the only
post-CAFA case related specifically to the citizenship requirement, the class action had been pending
for over two years when the district court remanded the lawsuit to state court under the local
controversy and home state exceptions. 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 85285. The court noted the extensive
record adduced over the course of the proceedings, and concessions from both defendants regarding
“the overwhelming likelihood that substantially more than two-thirds of class members are Illinois
citizens.” Kitson, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 85285 at *20. Accordingly, Weems’s and Touro’s proposed
approach for determining citizenship gives undue attention to the naked statements of law as opposed
to the substance of the relevant opinions. Based on the record, which includes only the primary billing
addresses of the hospitalized patients, Weems and Touro still fail to establish the type of residency
10
information reviewed in other circuits employing the presumption that a person’s residency forms an
adequate basis for inferring citizenship unless contested with sufficient evidence.
Despite the undeniably local character of this class action lawsuit, Congress enumerated
objective requirements for remanding a case to state court under the local controversy exception,
including a two-thirds citizenship requirement. Weems and Touro did not raise arguments pursuant
to the discretionary jurisdiction provision in their remand motions to the district court. Accordingly,
our review entails an analysis confined to the two-thirds citizenship requirement instead of the totality
of the circumstances analysis applied in the consolidated case. Yet even under the discretionary
jurisdiction provision employed in Preston, which permits district courts to weigh the local
characteristics of the litigation as part of the remand determination, the movants must still prove that
between one-third and two-thirds of the putative class were citizens of the state in which the suit was
filed. While the plaintiffs in Preston chose to rely on affidavits from a representative number of the
class members and the emergency contact information of the deceased patients, parties may also
produce more traditional forms of proof used to establish citizenship.
Prior to CAFA, the removing parties needed to show citizenship with respect to the named
plaintiffs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)-(4). In these instances, the district court could consider the
“places where the litigant exercises civil and political rights, pays taxes, owns real and personal
property, has driver’s and other licenses, maintains bank accounts, belongs to clubs and churches, has
places of business or employment, and maintains a home for his family.” Acridge, 334 F.3d at 448
(quoting Coury, 85 F.3d at 251). These indicators of a person’s citizenship are often a matter of
public record easily accessed by attorneys and investigators. Moreover, as master of the complaint
with the creative license for defining the putative class, the plaintiffs are in the best position to
11
establish citizenship and produce probative evidence. We acknowledge that marshaling evidence of
citizenship for the unnamed class members may be a formidable task, especially in light of the
circumstances presented here, but the court must evaluate sufficiency on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether the district court can make a credible estimate. In this case, with no evidence of
intent provided by the movants, the district court could not make the requisite credible estimate
necessary to remand under the local controversy exception.
b. Presumption of Continuing Domicile
In Preston, we acknowledged that “[t]here is a presumption in favor of [a person’s]
continuing domicile which requires the party seeking to show a change in domicile to come forward
with enough evidence to that effect . . . .” Quoting Coury, 85 F.3d at 251. In order to defeat the
presumption and establish a new domicile, the person must demonstrate both (1) residence in a new
state and (2) an intention to remain in that state indefinitely. Coury, 85 F.3d at 250 (“Mere presence
in a new location does not effect a change of domicile; it must be accompanied with the requisite
intent.”). To rely on the presumption of continuing domicile, however, we need more information
than Weems and Touro placed in the record. Weems’s and Touro’s failure to adequately establish the
domicile of the plaintiffs at the time of Hurricane Katrina or at the time of the filing of the lawsuit
extinguishes any argument that the court may presume continuing domicile. See Coury, 334 F.3d at
250. Weems and Touro provided the district court with no evidence, except the medical records, to
evince the intentions of class members currently residing in states other than Louisiana to either
remain out-of-state or return to Louisiana. Without anything more than the patients primary billing
addresses, the district court lacked the grounds for making a credible estimate that at least two-thirds
12
of the patients and other proposed class members were citizens of Louisiana during the relevant time
period.
The record in Preston included a class of approximately fifty fewer patients than the proposed
class in Weems, the primary billing addresses provided in the medical records, emergency contact
information for the deceased patients, the current addresses for some of the potential class members,
and eight affidavits stating an intent of returning to New Orleans. Moreover, the plaintiffs in Preston
filed their petition less than two months after Hurricane Katrina on October 6, 2005; the plaintiffs
here filed their petition approximately one year after the storm on August 4, 2006. We acknowledge
that many Hurricane Katrina victims may intend to return home and are currently dispersed
throughout the nation, but we are not persuaded that the medical records constitute the only evidence
available to Weems and Touro for discharging their evidentiary burden. The district court in Preston
possessed some indication that patients and other potential class members intended on returning to
New Orleans. Despite the logistical challenges of offering reliable evidence at this preliminary
jurisdictional stage, CAFA does not permit the courts to make a citizenship determination based on
a record bare of any evidence showing class members’ intent to be domiciled in Louisiana. The pre-
Katrina addresses in the medical records fail to satisfy this burden. Therefore, Weems and Touro do
not receive the benefit of the continuing domicile presumption.
c. Data from Road Home Project and United States Census Bureau
Weems contends that statistics from the Road Home Project and voter turnout prove that
many Hurricane Katrina victims living in states other than Louisiana intend to return home. These
population projections are much too broad for any court to rely on in determining the citizenship of
a class member. The medical records and confined time frame of the alleged events giving rise to the
13
lawsuit limit the number of potential plaintiffs. Accordingly, generalized information about the Road
Home project and voter turnout lacks the specificity required for the court to determine whether two-
thirds of the class members were domiciled in Louisiana at the time this lawsuit was filed. SHONO
admitted a November 2006 post-Katrina census report, conducted by the United States Census
Bureau, showing that the population of Orleans Parish significantly decreased between August and
October 2006. The appellant in Preston submitted the same population survey. As we concluded
in Preston, the census data is too general to contradict an assertion that two-thirds of the patients
were not domiciled in the area at the relevant time. The survey reports data from an initial analysis
conducted less than a year after Hurricane Katrina and only accounts for population decreases in the
Orleans Parish area. For these reasons, we find such evidence unpersuasive in proving the arguments
of either party.
4. Determination of Class Size
Weems and Touro only account for patients admitted to the hospital at the time of Hurricane
Katrina but provide no citizenship data for beneficiaries that may bring wrongful death and other
derivative claims. In Preston, we determined that the discrete number of patients hospitalized at
Memorial when Hurricane Katrina made landfall constitutes a reasonable estimate of the total class
for determining the preliminary jurisdictional question of citizenship. We also noted that at the class
certification stage, the district court conducts a more in-depth inquiry into the number of potential
class members based on the pleaded class definition. Robinson v. Tex. Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 387 F.3d
416, 421 (5th Cir. 2004); James v. City of Dallas, Tex., 254 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 1113 (2002).
14
Under CAFA’s limited exception, the quality and quantity of evidence available to the movant
will necessarily vary from case to case based on the class definition and underlying facts.
Nonetheless, it is clear that the movant must make some minimal showing of the citizenship of the
proposed class at the time that suit was filed. Weems’s motion to the district court states that
“plaintiffs believe the majority of the members of this class, and certainly more than 2/3 of the
members, are from Louisiana.” Weems then attempted to shift the burden of proof and argued to the
district court that “[i]f defendant SHONO is in possession of information which would negate this
proposition–namely information regarding the citizenship and/or domicile of the other members of
the class, they should be forced to produce it as the Defendant bears the burden of persuasion in
establishing federal jurisdiction.” This statement clearly shows that Weems did not marshal evidence
specific to the proposed class. Further, Touro’s submission of the medical records provide only
addresses, an incomplete picture of the citizenship determination, with no evidence of an intent held
by at least two-thirds of the class members to maintain domicile in Louisiana.
In any sufficiency of the evidence analysis, even under the exceptional circumstances of the
hurricane, attendant flooding, and forced evacuation, plaintiffs must offer more than conclusory
statements to prove citizenship at the relevant time period. Here, Weems and Touro do not even
offer an affidavit from the named plaintiffs but instead point only to the primary billing addresses
provided in the medical records at the time of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. To be clear,
affidavits are not the only type of evidence sufficient to prove citizenship, and the eight affidavits
presented in Preston were not the dispositive linchpin for our holding. In this case, however, Weems
essentially rested on the pleadings while deciding to forgo the opportunity to conduct limited
discovery as contemplated by CAFA.
15
At this juncture, neither the district court record, including the motions to remand, nor the
briefing to this court indicate any efforts to put forth specific evidence regarding the citizenship of
the class. Even in light of the presumption of continuing domicile, there still must be sufficient
evidence to preponderate that the proposed class members were citizens at the time that the lawsuit
was filed in August 2006. As the movants, Weems and Touro must present some modicum of
evidence in the record that is directly aimed at the statutory required time frame, i.e. the date of the
filing of the suit. Otherwise, the district court is left to speculate rather than extrapolate that two-
thirds of the proposed class were citizens of Louisiana in August 2006. Since Weems and Touro
offered no evidence regarding the citizenship of the proposed class for the relevant time period, we
find that the parties failed to meet the two-thirds citizenship requirement under the local controversy
exception.
IV. CONCLUSION
The CAFA exceptions are “designed to draw a delicate balance between making a federal
forum available to genuinely national litigation and allowing the state courts to retain cases when the
controversy is strongly linked to that state.” Hart v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 457 F.3d
675, 682 (7th Cir. 2006). Although styled as the local controversy exception, the term “local” is a
misnomer in the context of the statutory requirements–the key feature of any judicial inquiry under
this CAFA exception must focus on the two-thirds fraction and not whether the surrounding facts
implicate a local or national controversy. The medical records alone cannot form an adequate basis
for the district court to make a credible estimate that two-thirds of the proposed class were citizens
of Louisiana on August 4, 2006. The medical records only provide the court with residency
information for the proposed class and fail to demonstrate their intent to be domiciled in New
16
Orleans. Weems and Touro neglected to submit evidence of intent for any member of the proposed
class, which vitiated the district court’s ability even to extrapolate a citizenship determination. We
therefore conclude that the evidence adduced by Weems and Touro is insufficient to allow a credible
estimate to be made that at least two-thirds of the proposed class members were domiciled in
Louisiana at the time of filing the class action. For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s order
to remand this class action lawsuit back to state court.
17