[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
May 5, 2006
No. 05-12422 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
BIA No. A95-223-020
JOHN WILFREDO LAVERDE GONZALEZ,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(May 5, 2006)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John Wilfredo Laverde Gonzalez (“Laverde”), a native and citizen of
Colombia, through counsel, petitions us for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’s (“BIA’s”) order denying his motion to reconsider its summary
affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of his applications for
asylum and withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (“CAT”), which were filed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231 and 8
C.F.R. § 208.16(c), and in which Laverde claimed that he had been persecuted in
Colombia by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”), on account
of his political opinion and membership in the Conservative Party. On appeal,
Laverde challenges (1) the merits of the IJ’s denial of relief, (2) the BIA’s
summary affirmance of the IJ’s order, and (3) the BIA’s denial of his motion for
reconsideration.
We must inquire sua sponte into subject-matter jurisdiction whenever it may
be lacking. Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1179 (11th Cir. 2004). A petitioner
has 30 days from the date of the final order of removal to seek review in our Court.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(1). “Since the statutory limit for filing a petition for
review in an immigration proceeding is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional,’ it is not
subject to equitable tolling.” Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1272 n.3
(11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). The deadline was not suspended or tolled by
Laverde’s filing of a motion to reconsider within 30 days of the final removal
order’s issuance. See id. Because Laverde failed to file a timely petition for
review of the BIA’s final order of removal, we lack jurisdiction to consider his
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arguments to the extent they challenge the merits of the IJ’s order or the BIA’s
final order of removal. Therefore, we dismiss that portion of Laverde’s petition for
review.
Regarding the BIA’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, Laverde
argues that the BIA erred by (1) concluding that he had raised no arguments on
appeal which would have caused it to reverse the IJ’s decision, (2) failing to use
independent judgment in its decision, and (3) failing to consider all of the relevant
evidence.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reconsider for an abuse of
discretion. Assa’ad v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 332 F.3d 1321, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003).
Motions to reconsider are disfavored, especially in a removal proceeding, “where,
as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who
wishes merely to remain in the United States.” I.N.S. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314,
323, 112 S. Ct. 719, 724-25, 116 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1992). A motion to reconsider
must specify “the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be
supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).
Laverde’s arguments in his motion for reconsideration were arguments that
he either made, or should have made, in his initial brief before the BIA. Laverde
generally argues on appeal that the BIA failed to use “its own independent
judgment.” However, he has failed to cite to legal authority or support in the
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record for this argument. See Zafar v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 426 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th
Cir. 2005) (rejecting constitutional challenge where petitioners neither cited to
legal authority, nor support in the record, for their challenge). Laverde also argues
that the IJ erred in finding that he is not a refugee. However, in his brief to this
Court, he points to little in the record that establishes clearly his status as a refugee.
Indeed, in his motion for reconsideration, Laverde does not cite to the record at all.
Thus, Laverde did not specify any “errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision
[that were] supported by pertinent authority.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).
Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Laverde’s motion for
reconsideration. Accordingly, we deny this portion of Laverde’s petition for
review.
PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.
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