[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUG 22, 2006
No. 05-16480 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00010-CR-5-MCR
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TAVARES GENEARD TROUBLEFIELD,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(August 22, 2006)
Before BIRCH, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Tavares Geneard Troublefield appeals his 150-month sentence for
conspiracy to distribute and possess cocaine base and more than 500 grams of
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(1)(C) and 846,
and distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(C). Troublefield argues that the sentence was unreasonable in light of
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and, thus, was in contravention of United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Because the district court’s
exercise of discretion was not unreasonable, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Troublefield pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute, and possess
with the intent to distribute, cocaine and cocaine base and to three counts of
distribution of cocaine base. Troublefield concedes that the sentence fell within
the advisory guidelines range of 135 to 168 months imprisonment for a defendant
with an adjusted offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of IV. He
maintains, however, that the district court should have sentenced him to a “term
under the advisory minimum” because he “just barely” qualified for a criminal
history category of IV and because “the nature of his qualifying offenses were very
minor in comparison to [t]he charges” in the present indictment. Appellant’s Br. at
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7.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the ultimate sentence imposed by the district court for
reasonableness, and we “consider the final sentence, in its entirety, in light of the
§ 3553(a) factors.” 1 United States v. Valnor, 451 F.3d 744, 750 (11th Cir. 2006)
(citations omitted). “Review for reasonableness is deferential.” United States v.
Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). We “recognize that there
is a range of reasonable sentences from which the district court may choose, and
when the district court imposes a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range,
we ordinarily will expect that choice to be a reasonable one.” Id. The party
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There is no question that the district court followed the appropriate steps to determine
Troublefield’s sentence, but we recite the now familiar standard anyway:
After Booker, sentencing requires two steps. First, the district court must consult
the Guidelines and correctly calculate the range provided by the Guidelines.
Second, the district court must consider several factors to determine a reasonable
sentence: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need
to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical
care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8)
pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid
unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims.
United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
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challenging the sentence carries the burden of proving that the sentence was
unreasonable in light of both the record and the § 3553(a) factors. Id.
Here, it is undisputed that the district court’s calculation of the Guidelines
range was accurate. Thus, the sole issue is whether Troublefield’s 150-month
sentence was reasonable in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and
we conclude that it was. As an example, the district court noted that Troublefield
engaged in criminal drug offenses after getting out of jail following each of his
previous convictions and that, therefore, a substantial sentence was needed to deter
recidivism and protect the public, each a factor listed in § 3553(a). Troublefield
has failed to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable.
III. CONCLUSION
Troublefield has appealed his 150-month sentence stemming from a guilty
plea to three counts of distribution and one count of conspiracy to distribute and
possess cocaine and cocaine base. Troublefield argued that the sentence was
unreasonable in light of factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and, thus, in
contravention of Booker. We conclude, however, that the district court’s exercise
of discretion was not unreasonable. AFFIRMED.
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