Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 6, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D20-1029
Lower Tribunal No. 18-12194
________________
Paulo Cesar Mantegazza Pomelli, et al.,
Appellants,
vs.
Paola Mantegazza Pomelli, et al.,
Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, David C.
Miller, Judge.
Law Offices of Kravitz & Guerra, P.A., and Lidice Diaz, for appellants.
Nelson Mullins Broad and Cassel, Kimberly J. Freedman, Amy Steele
Donner, and Erin K. Kolmansberger, for appellee Paola Mantegazza
Pomelli.
Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and LOGUE, and BOKOR, JJ.
FERNANDEZ, C.J.
Paulo Cesar Mantegazza Pomelli (“the Husband”) filed this
interlocutory appeal of the following trial court orders: 1) the order granting
Paula Mantegazza Pomelli’s (“the Wife”) motion for section 57.105 sanctions
against the Husband, and 2) the order imposing sanctions pursuant to the
trial court’s inherent authority. We affirm the order granting section 57.105
sanctions and reverse and remand the order imposing sanctions on the
court’s inherent authority, with instructions for the trial court to conduct a
noticed evidentiary hearing on sanctions.
We review orders imposing attorney’s fees as sanctions for an abuse
of discretion. Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cty. v. Denson, 189 So. 3d
1013, 1014 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). “Discretion . . . is abused when the judicial
action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying
that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view
adopted by the trial court.” Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203
(Fla. 1980). Procedural due process issues are reviewed de novo. Lopez v.
Regalado, 257 So. 3d 550, 554 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).
As to section 57.105 sanctions, we find that such sanctions were
properly imposed on the Husband for filing an unfounded motion for
rehearing. Upon review of the trial court’s extensive findings of bad faith and
finding that the motion for rehearing lacked support by the material facts, in
2
the context of the Husband’s repeated attempts to disrupt proceedings
below, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
section 57.105 sanctions upon the Husband. See § 57.105(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
(2019) (“Upon the court’s initiative or motion of any party, the court shall
award a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . on any claim or defense . . . in which
the court finds that the losing party or the losing party’s attorney knew or
should have known that a claim or defense when initially presented to
the court . . . [w]as not supported by the material facts necessary to establish
the claim or defense[.]”). Further, we find that the Husband’s claims of due
process violations are unsupported by the record. We therefore affirm the
order granting section 57.105 sanctions against the Husband.
Upon review of the order granting sanctions pursuant to the trial court’s
inherent authority, we reverse and remand on due process grounds. Due
process requires notice and an opportunity to allow the party to amend the
offending pleading. See Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So. 2d 221, 227 (Fla.
2002); S. Coatings, Inc. v. City of Tamarac, 943 So. 2d 948, 952 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2006). Accordingly, we reverse and remand this order for a noticed
hearing to determine whether sanctions are appropriate.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the order granting section 57.105
sanctions and reverse and remand the order imposing sanctions on the
3
court’s inherent authority, with instructions for the trial court to conduct a
noticed evidentiary hearing on sanctions.
Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part with instructions.
4