Filed 10/8/21 P. v. Campos CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E074824
v. (Super.Ct.No. SWF1800223)
ALFONSO CAMPOS, JR., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark Mandio, Judge.
Affirmed as modified.
Jason J. Szydlik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Matthew Rodriquez, Acting Attorney General, Julie
L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers, Matthew Mulford, Sharon L.
Rhodes, Lise S. Jacobson, and Joy Utomi Hartmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
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In 2018 Alfonso Campos, Jr., pled guilty to felony vandalism and misdemeanor
reckless driving charges. The court sentenced him to three years’ felony probation as part
of a plea agreement. It also imposed a probation condition requiring Campos to pay
$108,487.36 in restitution to his victim. Campos appealed the restitution condition,
arguing it doesn’t meet the standard for a valid probation condition under People v. Lent
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and that it violated his 14th Amendment due process rights.
In supplemental briefing, Campos also argues that under recently enacted Assembly Bill
No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Session) (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, §§ 1-2) (Assembly Bill 1950)
his probation should be reduced to two years. We affirm as modified.
I. FACTS1
On July 3, 2017, Campos and the victim, Eric, were both driving northbound on I-
215. Eric was driving a motorcycle. Campos was driving recklessly, swerving through
traffic, tailgating, and passing other drivers on the right shoulder and center median. At
some point, Campos pulled up behind Eric and began tailgating him, nearly hitting him.
Eric moved into the middle lane, and Campos pulled up alongside him. The two
exchanged hand gestures, and Campos indicated for Eric to pull over. On the side of the
road, their argument became physical. Campos reported Eric knocked him down and
continued to hit him, while Eric claims Campos was also hitting him. Eric eventually
stopped fighting, gathered Campos’s belongings from the ground and handed them to
1The facts underlying Campos’s convictions are taken from the police reports
attached as exhibit 1 to Campos’s successful motion to augment the record.
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him, telling him to leave. Campos got back in his car, drove into Eric’s motorcycle, then
left.
When the police responded to the scene, Eric did not appear to be hurt and he
didn’t report any physical injuries. He said Campos hit his motorcycle with his car and he
“thought that he was going to get ran over” in the process. However, when he spoke to
the police again, on July 31, 2017, this time with his lawyer present, he said Campos had
also hit him with his car, and injured him, when he ran into the bike. Eric said he suffered
injuries to both ankles and that he had back pain and numbness in his neck and down his
back to his left leg and foot, including his left bicep and groin.
The police also questioned six eyewitnesses. Three saw the physical altercation
only. However, three others saw Campos pull away and hit Eric’s motorcycle. One said
she saw Campos hit the motorcycle and didn’t mention whether Eric was hit as well. The
two others, though, affirmatively noted that Campos only hit the motorcycle and did not
hit Eric. One of these two witnesses stopped about 100 yards away when he saw the two
fighting. He saw Campos intentionally run over the motorcycle, but “never saw the car
strike the rider or the rider fall to the ground.” The other witness was passing by when he
saw Campos hit the bike, and followed Campos in order to get his license plate number.
He said Campos did not hit Eric and Eric was standing far enough from his bike that he
would’ve avoided being hit.
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On September 6, 2018, Campos pled guilty to misdemeanor reckless driving (Veh.
Code., § 23103, subd. (a)) and felony vandalism. (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a).) Pursuant
to a plea agreement, the trial court placed Campos on three years’ felony probation.
As a condition of probation, the court ordered Campos to pay victim restitution,
with the amount to be determined by probation and any dispute as to the amount resolved
in court. Campos provided documentation of his alleged losses to probation on March 26,
2019, and again on December 12, 2019. Probation recommended the amount of
restitution should be $108,487.36, consisting of $103,063.71 in medical bills, $500 for an
auto insurance deductible, and $4,923.65 for motorcycle accessories. The court adopted
probation’s recommendation and ordered Campos to pay his victim $108,487.36 in
restitution as a condition of probation.
On February 20, 2020, Campos timely appealed.
Assembly Bill 1950 went into effect on January 1, 2021, while Campos’s appeal
was pending. After it went into effect, Campos requested permission to file a
supplemental brief addressing the retroactive application of Assembly Bill 1950, which
we granted.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Restitution Condition
Campos makes two arguments for why the restitution condition is invalid. First, he
argues the restitution fine violated the limitations on probation conditions set out in Lent
because Eric’s medical bills were unrelated to Campos’s criminal conduct as he didn’t
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actually injure Eric. Second, he argues it violates his due process rights because the court
relied on Eric’s unreliable statement in determining the amount of restitution. We
disagree with both arguments.2
1. Due Process
We first address whether the record allowed the trial court to conclude Eric was
actually injured or if such a determination violated Campos’s due process rights, before
determining whether awarding restitution for those injuries was appropriate under Lent.
“[T]he imposition of a particular condition of probation is subject to review for
abuse of that discretion. ‘As with any exercise of discretion, the court violates this
standard when it imposes a condition of probation that is arbitrary, capricious or exceeds
the bounds of reason under the circumstances. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Martinez (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 759, 764, disapproved of on other grounds in People v. Bryant (2021)
11 Cal.5th 976.) “No abuse of discretion will be found where there is a rational and
factual basis for the amount of restitution ordered.” (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161
Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542 (Gemelli).)
When it comes to imposing restitution, “[t]he scope of a criminal defendant’s due
process rights at a hearing to determine the amount of restitution is very limited: ‘ “A
defendant’s due process rights are protected when the probation report gives notice of the
amount of restitution claimed . . . , and the defendant has an opportunity to challenge the
2The People also argue Campos forfeited his right to challenge the restitution
order. Because we conclude Campos’s appeal fails on the merits, we don’t address the
People’s forfeiture arguments.
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figures in the probation report at the sentencing hearing.” ’ ” (People v. Cain (2000) 82
Cal.App.4th 81, 86.) That being said, “[a]lthough not all the procedural safeguards
required at trial also apply in a sentencing or probation hearing, such a hearing violates
due process if it is fundamentally unfair. [Citation.] ‘Reliability of the information
considered by the court is the key issue in determining fundamental fairness’ in this
context. [Citation.] A court’s reliance, in its sentencing and probation decisions, on
factually erroneous sentencing reports or other incorrect or unreliable information can
constitute a denial of due process.” (People v. Eckley (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1072,
1080.)
“ ‘ “ ‘ “When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution
ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing
court.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1045.) “Once the victim
makes a prima facie showing . . . the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the
amount of losses claimed by the victim. [Citation.] The defendant has the burden of
rebutting the victim’s statement of losses.” (Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1543.)
“ ‘[T]he standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence,
not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Keichler, at p. 1045.) “ ‘In reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘[t]he power of the appellate court begins and ends with
a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted,’ to support the trial court’s findings.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “Substantial evidence
must be of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible and of solid
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value.” (People v. Briscoe (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 585.) “ ‘The uncorroborated
testimony of a single witness is sufficient . . . unless the testimony is physically
impossible or inherently improbable.’ ” (People v. Duncan (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1014,
1018 (Duncan).)
At the restitution hearing here, the People presented the probation reports
summarizing Eric’s claimed losses. The probation reports didn’t contain the underlying
medical bills, merely a summary of the total amount claimed. Campos presented the
police report. Neither party presented any other evidence. Campos chose not to call or
question any witnesses, or even question Eric himself, though it was his right to do so and
his burden to disprove the prima facie evidence of loss in the probation report. This left
the trial court to weigh the credibility of Eric’s claims based solely on the reported
statements in the police report. After hearing argument, the court noted there was
conflicting evidence about whether Campos had hit Eric with his car but credited Eric’s
statement that he had been hit.
The court spent the balance of the hearing discussing with the parties whether the
probation reports provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for determining Eric’s damages,
or whether additional documentation was necessary. Presuming the probation department
had carried out its duty to make an accurate restitution recommendation, the court
concluded the probation reports were sufficient to establish Eric’s damages. In accepting
probation’s recommendation, the court also noted “there’s no defense evidence here. The
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defense also could have subpoenaed the probation officer, as well as the documents they
were relying on, and I could have examined them. Neither side has chosen to do that.”
Pointing to the statements of the witnesses who said Campos had not hit Eric with
his car, Campos argues the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion
that Eric was injured. But this argument overlooks our standard of review. On appeal, we
may not reweigh the evidence, and the account of one witness may be sufficient to
support the trial court’s determination—unless that witness’s account is “ ‘physically
impossible or inherently improbable.’ ” (Duncan, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018.).
Here, though Eric was the only witness to say he was hit, he was also in the best position
to observe what happened (because it happened to him). We assume the trial court found
Eric’s second statement to the police a more credible account of events than his first or
the statements of the other witnesses. And there is a reasonable basis for doing so. Two of
the three witnesses were driving on the freeway when they saw the altercation, and the
other was about a football field away when he stopped to watch the events unfold. Based
on these perception issues, the court could reasonably conclude that Eric was in the best
position to observe what happened to him and his account was the most reliable.
Campos argues Eric’s second statement to police cannot constitute substantial
evidence to support the court’s factual finding because Eric wasn’t under oath at the time,
and thus his uncorroborated statements are not technically testimony. He argues that this
fact makes his case distinguishable from those cases which hold that the uncorroborated
testimony of a single witness is sufficient to prove a critical fact. (See, e.g., Duncan,
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supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018.) But this argument ignores that all of the evidence
before the court was unsworn testimony, including the eyewitness statements Campos
relies on. Thus, all the evidence the court relied on was of the same value from a legal
perspective, and there was no purely legal basis to conclude Eric’s unsworn statements
were less credible than the eyewitness’s unsworn statements.
Though it is a close call, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s determination that Campos was responsible for Eric’s injuries and medical bills.
We agree with Campos that the evidence here is relatively slim, but we cannot conclude
the court acted irrationally in believing Eric’s second account of the incident or in relying
on probation’s determination as to the validity and credibility of his claimed medical
expenses. Perhaps more importantly, Campos didn’t attempt to dispute these medical
expenses, instead focusing on the impropriety of awarding medical expenses at all.
2. Validity of the Condition under People v. Lent
“Generally, ‘[a] condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it “(1) has
no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct
which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably
related to future criminality . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] This test is conjunctive—all
three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.”
(People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379, quoting Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486,
fn. 1.)
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Both the California Constitution and Penal Code section 1202.4 entitle victims of
a crime to restitution from the person convicted of that crime. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28,
subd. (b).) However, “the scope of a trial court’s discretion is broader when restitution is
imposed as a condition of probation,” rather than under Penal Code section 1202.4.
(People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663, fn. 7.) For instance, while Penal Code
section 1202.4 limits restitution awards to the victim’s actual economic losses, when
imposed as a condition of probation, “[t]here is no requirement the restitution order be
limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable,
nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might be
recoverable in a civil action.” (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.) Indeed,
“[u]nder certain circumstances, restitution has been found proper where the loss was
caused by related conduct not resulting in a conviction [citation], by conduct underlying
dismissed and uncharged counts [citation], and by conduct resulting in an acquittal.”
(Ibid.)
Under this rule, the trial court may impose restitution for uncharged criminal
conduct or even non-criminal conduct so long as it is reasonably related to the
defendant’s actual criminal conduct or potential future criminal conduct. Given this, we
cannot say the court’s decision to impose restitution here fell outside its broad discretion.
It is true that Campos was not charged for injuring Eric. However, this fact alone is not
dispositive, since courts can impose restitution for uncharged criminal acts. As discussed
above, the court here implicitly found Campos did actually injure Eric while in the
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process of vandalizing his motorcycle and generally driving recklessly. Thus, to the
extent the court found Campos was responsible for Eric’s injuries, those injuries resulted
from the same conduct which gave rise to Campos’s conviction. A condition requiring
Campos to pay for injuries he caused during his charged criminal conduct is about as
reasonably related to Campos’s criminal conduct as it is possible to be.
Accordingly, we affirm the court’s order requiring Campos to pay $108,487.36 in
restitution to Eric as a condition of probation.
B. Assembly Bill 1950
Campos argues Assembly Bill 1950 applies to him and requires we reduce his
sentence from three years’ probation to two. The People agree Assembly Bill 1950
applies in this case, but argue remand is necessary to allow the trial court to fully
resentence Campos. We agree Campos is entitled to the ameliorative benefits of
Assembly Bill 1950. We also agree with Campos that the appropriate remedy is to reduce
his probation term without remanding.
Assembly Bill 1950 went into effect on January 1, 2021, and amended Penal Code
section 1203.1 to limit the probation period for any felony violation to two years. (Pen.
Code, § 1203.1.) “When an amendatory statute either lessens the punishment for a crime
or . . . ‘ “vests in the trial court discretion to impose either the same penalty as under the
former law or a lesser penalty,” ’ it is reasonable for courts to infer, absent evidence to
the contrary and as a matter of statutory construction, that the Legislature intended the
amendatory statute to retroactively apply to the fullest extent constitutionally
11
permissible—that is, to all cases not final when the statute becomes effective.” (People v.
Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 972, italics omitted.) Two other courts have recently
found that this presumption of retroactivity applies to Assembly Bill 1950, and therefore
probationers whose cases were not final at the time Assembly Bill 1950 went into effect
are entitled to its ameliorative effects. (See People v. Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 943,
956-958 (Sims); People v. Quinn (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 874, 879-885 (Quinn).)
We find these cases persuasive, and because Campos’s conviction was not final as
of the effective date of this change, he is entitled to the ameliorative benefits of Assembly
Bill 1950. (See People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 306 [“ ‘[F]or the purpose of
determining retroactive application of an amendment to a criminal statute, a judgment is
not final until the time for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court has passed.’ ”].) Moreover, the People concede he is entitled to such retroactive
application.
The only remaining issue is the exact remedy to which Campos is entitled.
Campos argues we can and should reduce his probation period from three years to two on
our own. The People argue we must remand to allow the trial court to resentence
Campos. The People point out that the court in Sims retroactively applied Assembly
Bill 1950 but concluded the proper remedy was to remand. However, we note that the
court in Quinn concluded the opposite. Moreover, neither Quinn nor Sims explained their
reasoning for their chosen disposition in any detail. Nevertheless, the People argue the
Sims approach is the correct one because “[m]erely striking any portion of the
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probationary term that exceeds two years would deprive the trial court and the parties of a
necessary determination of the status of Campos’s probation.”
We are unpersuaded. The People’s argument conflates reduction of the sentence
with termination of probation. Reducing Campos’s probation period would not deprive
the trial court of its authority to determine whether Campos successfully completed
probation or whether a violation during the proper probationary period justifies
revocation or tolling. Nor would it limit the People’s ability to contest termination, as the
trial court retains jurisdiction to modify or terminate probation. (Pen. Code, § 1203.3,
subd. (a); Quinn, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 884-885 & fn. 6.)
Accordingly, we conclude the proper remedy is to reduce Campos’s probationary
term without remand.
III. DISPOSITION
We modify the order granting probation reducing the term to two years. We direct
the trial court to correct the minute order to reflect the imposition of a two-year term of
formal probation, and to notify probation of the change to defendant’s probationary term.
In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
SLOUGH
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
MENETREZ
J.
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