[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 17, 2007
No. 06-12495 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00005-CR-HL-7
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(January 17, 2007)
Before TJOFLAT, HULL and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Williams, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se his conviction and
sentence for various drug offenses, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
money laundering, and structuring money transactions. Through counsel,
Williams previously appealed his conviction and sentence to this Court, and we
remanded for resentencing. Williams now raises arguments unrelated to his
resentencing that we either rejected or did not address in his first appeal. We
affirm.
Williams contends that the district court erroneously refused to discharge his
appointed counsel and erred when it calculated the advisory sentencing guidelines
range, but we rejected these arguments in Williams’s first appeal. The doctrine of
the law of the case bars reconsideration unless “(1) our prior decision resulted from
a trial where the parties presented substantially different evidence from the case at
bar; (2) subsequently released controlling authority dictates a contrary result; or (3)
the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice.”
Alphamed, Inc. v. B. Braun Med., Inc., 367 F.3d 1280, 1285-86 & 1286 n.3 (11th
Cir. 2004). None of these exceptions applies. Williams cites an intervening case
of the Supreme Court, United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, __ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct.
2557 (2006), but this decision did not address any of the issues rejected in
Williams’s first appeal.
Williams also raises an argument we did not address in his first appeal that,
even if not barred by the doctrine of the law of the case, still fails. Williams
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contends that the district court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel of choice by refusing to continue his trial and allow him additional time to
retain counsel. The district court had “wide latitude in balancing the right to
counsel of choice against the needs of fairness and . . . the demands of its
calendar.” Id. at 2565-66 (citations omitted). “Defendants are only guaranteed a
fair or reasonable opportunity to select the attorney of their choice.” United States
v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005).
Williams was given a fair and reasonable opportunity to retain counsel.
Williams informed the district court on August 31, 2004, that he intended to retain
counsel, and the district court warned Williams to do so before Williams’s
upcoming trial. On October 25, 2004, the day his trial began, Williams had not yet
retained counsel, but sought a continuance of an unspecified length. Williams
asserted that he had spoken with Thomas Pittman, a private attorney, but Pittman
was not present in court, had not contacted the district court, and could not be
reached. Williams had not retained Pittman, and Williams could not verify that he
had the means to do so. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Williams a continuance in the light of “the general interest in the prompt and
efficient administration of justice.” Id.
AFFIRMED.
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