IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Detention of ) No. 82006-1-I
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J.G., ) DIVISION ONE
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Appellant. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
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MANN, C.J. — J.G. appeals the trial court’s order committing her for 14 days of
involuntary treatment. J.G. argues that the trial court erred in determining that she was
gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(24), and that she was deprived of her
constitutional right to have a jury determine if she had a mental illness justifying
involuntary commitment. We affirm.
FACTS
J.G., who is in her forties, has lived with her grandmother her entire life.
Although J.G. had a bedroom in her grandmother’s home, about a year and a half
before her detention she began living in a backyard garden shed. The shed was
unfurnished, had a bare floor with some rags on it, an unhinged door, and lacked heat
and running water. J.G. refused to move back into the house in spite of pleas from her
grandmother.
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
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J.G.’s grandmother began noticing J.G.’s hygiene worsening. For about the first
year that she stayed in the shed, J.G. would still access the house to use the toilet and
shower occasionally. During the six months before her detention, J.G. stopped
showering and infrequently, if ever, used the bathroom. J.G. was toileting in the
backyard.
J.G.’s grandmother often brought food and beverages and left them outside the
shed. J.G. would drink the beverages, but her grandmother never saw her eat and
observed that J.G. had lost weight in the months before her detention. J.G. refused to
move back into the home, and instead stayed in the shed day and night. J.G.’s
grandmother observed J.G. becoming more agitated and she began damaging her
grandmother’s property.
On September 3, 2020, a Snohomish County Designated Crisis Responder
petitioned to detain J.G. for an initial 72 hours of psychiatric evaluation and treatment at
her family’s request. On September 4, 2020, the Snohomish County Superior Court
granted the petition on the grounds that there was probable cause to believe J.G. was
gravely disabled.
J.G. was detained at Swedish Hospital in Edmonds on September 4, 2020 and
then transferred to Fairfax Hospital in Kirkland. Doctors at Fairfax Hospital diagnosed
J.G. with schizophrenia spectrum disorder and other psychotic disorder. J.G.’s
symptoms included: hallucinations, paranoia, delusions, labile, restless, guarded,
intermittent eye contact, poor insight, poor judgment, disoriented and only oriented to
person and place, agitated, and aggressiveness.
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The court held a probable cause hearing where J.G.’s aunt, grandmother, and a
court evaluator testified. The trial court found that J.G. suffers from a mental disorder
rendering her gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(24) (a) and (b), and ordered her
to remain at Fairfax Hospital for 14 days of inpatient treatment. RCW 71.05.240.
J.G. appeals.
ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
J.G. argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s
findings and, in turn, its conclusion of law that she was gravely disabled. We disagree.
We review an involuntary commitment order to determine whether substantial
evidence supports a trial court’s finding and, if so, whether those findings support the
trial court’s conclusion of law. In re Det. of H.N., 188 Wn. App. 744, 762, 355 P.3d 294
(2015). “Evidence is substantial if it is sufficient to convince a reasonable person of the
truth of the finding.” State v. Klein, 156 Wn.2d 102, 115, 124 P.3d 644 (2005). We
review conclusions of law de novo. In re Estate of Haviland, 162 Wn. App. 548, 561,
255 P.3d 854 (2011).
RCW 71.05.020(24) defines “gravely disabled” as:
A condition in which a person, as a result of a behavioral health disorder:
(a) is in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide
for his or her essential human needs or safety; or (b) manifests severe
deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating
loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions and is not
receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or safety.
See also In re the Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 202, 728 P.2d 138 (1986).
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Here, the court granted the civil commitment petition under both prongs (a) and
(b) of the gravely disabled definition. We review each in turn.
There was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that J.G. was in
danger of serious physical harm resulting from failure to provide for her essential needs.
RCW 71.05.020(24)(a). A finding of grave disability under prong (a) requires “recent,
tangible evidence of a failure or inability to provide for such essential human needs as
food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 204-04. The
failure to provide for one’s own needs must present a “high probability of serious
physical harm within the near future.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 205.
J.G. was residing in an unheated garden shed with no floor, door, or running
water. The hospital’s mental health expert testified that the shed was not a safe
environment. The court appropriately noted that the coming fall and winter months
presented a risk of physical harm. J.G.’s diet and hygiene were also worsening,
presenting additional risk. Combined, the evidence presented supports the trial court’s
findings under RCW 71.05.020(24)(a).
There is likewise sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that J.G.
was manifesting severe deterioration and not receiving essential care for her health or
safety. RCW 71.05.020(24)(b). To make this finding under prong (b), there needed to
be evidence of a severe deterioration in functioning and evidence that, without
intervention, a person will not receive treatment that is essential to their health and
safety, and that absent such treatment there are articulable harmful consequences for
the person. LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 207.
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At baseline, J.G. was communicative, non-aggressive, ate regularly, and
maintained hygiene. Prior to her commitment, J.G.’s aunt, grandmother, and the court
evaluator testified that J.G. had become completely withdrawn, sitting in the shed
without stimuli. As previously noted, J.G.’s eating and hygiene habits worsened. J.G.
was becoming increasingly aggressive, damaging her grandmother’s property. The trial
court correctly noted that J.G. had deteriorated to the point of needing professional
intervention. Without such intervention, there was substantial risk of continued harm to
property and harm to J.G.’s health. In whole, the evidence supports the trial court’s
findings under RCW 71.05.020(24)(b).
Because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings under both
prongs of RCW 71.05.020(24), the trial court did not err in its legal conclusion that J.G.
was gravely disabled.
B. Right to Jury Trial
J.G. argues that the trial court denied her constitutional right to have a jury
determine if she had a mental illness justifying a 14-day involuntary commitment. We
disagree.
This court rejected J.G.’s argument in In re Detention of S.E., 199 Wn. App. 609,
400 P.3d 1217 (2017). We confirmed S.E.’s holding that there is no right to a jury trial in
a hearing on a 14-day involuntary commitment petition in In re Detention of T.C., 11 Wn.
App. 2d 51, 59-60, 450 P.3d 1230 (2019).
J.G. argues that S.E. erred in its analysis of whether an individual is
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial under Article I, Section 21 of the Washington
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Constitution. 1 See S.E., 199 Wn. App. at 614-15. Because J.G. advances no novel
theory as to why our analysis in S.E. is incorrect, we decline to overrule its holding.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
1 Determining whether the state constitution grants the right to a jury trial requires two steps:
“First, we determine the scope of the right to a jury trial as it existed at the time of our founding in 1889;
second, we determine if the type of action at issue is similar to one that would include the right to a jury
trial at that time.” In re Det. of M.W. v. Dep’t of Soc. and Health Serv., 185 Wn.2d 633, 662, 374 P.3d
1123 (2016). S.E. underwent this analysis to arrive at its holding. 199 Wn. App. at 614-15.
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