FILED
November 16, 2021
released at 3:00 p.m.
EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
No. 20-0750 – Christopher Morris v. Steven Corder, MD, et al. SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
Armstead, Justice, dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Jenkins:
The circumstances of this matter are tragic. The family members of the
decedent, Ms. Wade, are understandably grief-stricken. Although I am sympathetic to
Petitioner’s enormous loss, from a legal standpoint I agree with the circuit court’s ruling
that Petitioner’s claims for medical negligence are barred by his failure to allege that the
decedent was “in the custody” of Respondents at the time of her suicide. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the circuit court erred by granting
Respondents’ motion to dismiss Petitioner’s claims.
This Court has long held that “negligence actions seeking damages for the
suicide of another have generally been barred because the act of suicide is considered
deliberate and intentional, and therefore, an intervening act that precludes a finding that the
defendant is responsible[.]” Moats v. Preston Cnty. Comm’n, 206 W. Va. 8, 16, 521 S.E.2d
180, 188 (1999). The Court in Moats set forth the narrow circumstance in which a plaintiff
may assert a claim for wrongful death by suicide:
Recovery for wrongful death by suicide may be possible
where the defendant had a duty to prevent the suicide from
occurring. In order to recover, the plaintiff must show the
existence of some relationship between the defendant(s) and
the decedent giving rise to a duty to prevent the decedent from
committing suicide. Generally, such relationship exists if one
of the parties, knowing the other is suicidal, is placed in the
superior position of caretaker of the other who depends upon
that caretaker either entirely or with respect to a particular
matter.
Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
1
The circuit court cited this syllabus point and stated, “Plaintiff’s Complaint
does not allege that Defendants were in a relationship that gave rise to a duty to prevent
the suicide such as that of a custodial caretaker.” Further, the circuit court noted that this
Court addressed the exception to our general bar on wrongful death by suicide claims in a
recent memorandum decision, Hull v. Nasher-Alneam, No. 18-1028, 2020 WL 882087 (W.
Va. Feb. 24, 2020) (memorandum decision), cert. denied, No. 20-1818, 2021 WL 4507880
(U.S. Oct. 4, 2021) (“Hull”).
In Hull, issued approximately six months before the circuit court granted
Respondents’ motion to dismiss, this Court provided:
Consistent with Moats, the circuit court in this matter
found that petitioners’ malpractice claims were barred, unless
they fell within a recognized exception to the general rule
barring claims based upon suicide. The circuit court further
held that this Court has recognized only one narrow exception
to the general rule “where the defendant is found to have had a
duty to prevent the suicide from occurring” which applies to
“someone who has a duty of custodial care, knows that the
potential for suicide exists, and fails to take the appropriate
measures to prevent the suicide from occurring.” [quoting
Moats, 206 W. Va. at 16, 521 S.E.2d at 188.] This exception
has been applied to jails, hospitals, reform schools, and others
having physical custody and control over the persons.
In the instant case, the circuit court found, as a matter of
law, that petitioners’ claims do not fall within the narrow
exception recognized in Moats. To fit within this exception,
petitioners would have had to allege facts to satisfy each of
these elements: custodial care, knowledge of the potential
for suicide, and failure to take appropriate measures to
prevent the suicide from occurring.
Id., 2020 WL 882087, at *3 (emphasis added).
2
Relying on this analysis, the Court in Hull concluded:
The complaint does not allege that Mr. Hull was in the
custodial care of respondents at the time he committed suicide,
nor did petitioners allege that Mr. Hull had ever been in the
custodial care of respondents. . . . Inasmuch as petitioners
allege no facts that would cause this case to fall within the
single, narrow exception to the general rule, we concur with
the circuit court’s well-founded conclusion that Mr. Hull’s
suicide bars petitioners’ claims.
Id.
I believe the circuit court correctly determined that under Moats, and the Hull
memorandum decision issued by this Court in February of 2020, Petitioner’s claims for
medical negligence are barred by his failure to allege that the decedent was “in the custody”
of Respondents at the time of her suicide. While Hull was a memorandum decision, rather
than a signed opinion, the issue of whether a plaintiff asserting a claim for wrongful death
by suicide must establish that the decedent was in the custodial care of a defendant was
squarely before the Court and addressed in that case. 1
The majority’s discussion of Hull is limited to a footnote in which it attempts
to distinguish Hull from the instant case. The facts of the two cases are not identical;
1
This Court has held that memorandum decisions may be cited as legal authority,
and are legal precedent. Therefore, the circuit court’s application of our ruling in Hull was
proper. See Syl. Pt. 5 State v. McKinley, 234 W. Va. 143, 764 S.E.2d 303 (2014) (“While
memorandum decisions may be cited as legal authority, and are legal precedent, their value
as precedent is necessarily more limited; where a conflict exists between a published
opinion and a memorandum decision, the published opinion controls.”). Further, I see no
conflict between the Court’s holding in Moats and our ruling in Hull. The Court in Hull
explained the precise type of “special relationship” that is necessary to satisfy the narrow
exception to the general bar on wrongful death by suicide claims. Providing a specific
instance of what this “special relationship” entails (custodial care) does not conflict with
syllabus point six of Moats.
3
however, there is no dispute that this Court addressed custodial care in the context of a
wrongful death by suicide claim in Hull. The majority’s departure from our ruling in Hull
is not supported under the doctrine of stare decisis.
In syllabus point 2 of Dailey v. Bechtel Corp., 157 W. Va. 1023, 207 S.E.2d
169 (1974), this Court held that “[a]n appellate court should not overrule a previous
decision recently rendered without evidence of changing conditions or serious judicial
error in interpretation sufficient to compel deviation from the basic policy of the doctrine
of stare decisis, which is to promote certainty, stability, and uniformity in the law.”
(emphasis added). Additionally, we have observed that
[s]tare decisis . . is a matter of judicial policy. . . . It is a policy
which promotes certainty, stability and uniformity in the law.
It should be deviated from only when urgent reason requires
deviation. . . . In the rare case when it clearly is apparent that
an error has been made or that the application of an outmoded
rule, due to changing conditions, results in injustice, deviation
from that policy is warranted.
Woodrum v. Johnson, 210 W. Va. 762, 766 n. 8, 559 S.E.2d 908, 912 n. 8 (2001) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
This Court’s ruling in Hull was “recently rendered”—it was decided six
months before the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. Moreover, I see no changing
conditions or serious judicial error in interpretation sufficient to compel deviation from our
rulings in Moats and Hull.
Finally, a number of courts outside of our jurisdiction have concluded that a
plaintiff asserting a wrongful death by suicide claim must establish that a custodial
4
relationship existed between the decedent and a defendant. 2 As one court recognized, “a
review of cases in other jurisdictions advances only one type of special relationship that
consistently imposes a duty on an actor to prevent another’s suicide, namely a relationship
predicated on a custodial relationship.” Lee v. Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324, 330 (Hawaii
1996) (Veteran’s Services outpatient counselor with history of treatment and close personal
knowledge of patient had no duty to prevent that patient’s suicide); see also McLaughlin
v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 125 (N.H. 1983) (suggesting that liability against a psychiatrist
would be inappropriate over a non-hospitalized patient); Christian v. Counseling Res.
Assoc., Inc., 2014 WL 4100681, at *7-10 (Del. Super. July 16, 2014) (no special
relationship between outpatient primary care physician and mental health counselor and
decedent because no custody or control); Waybright v. Frederick Cty., MD, 528 F.3d 199,
207 (4th Cir. 2008) (applying Maryland law and stating, “a special relationship is all but
synonymous with a custodial relationship.” (citation omitted)); Watson v. Adams, 2015 WL
1486869, at *7 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2015) (“Both South Carolina and federal courts have
rejected attempts to extend the duty to prevent suicide beyond the period of custody.”).
Based on the foregoing, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to
reverse the circuit court’s order granting Respondents’ motion to dismiss.
2
As recognized by the majority, there is a split of authority on this issue from courts
outside of our jurisdiction.
5