In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 8, 2021
S21A0706. WILLERSON v. THE STATE.
LAGRUA, Justice.
Bryant Willerson was convicted of murder in connection with
the beating death of William McClain. On appeal, Willerson
contends that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to
find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of which he
was convicted. He also argues that his trial counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance for failing to properly impeach
a witness. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. 1
1McClain was killed on June 12, 2011. On August 28, 2012, a Richmond
County grand jury indicted Willerson for malice murder and felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault. On September 7, 2012, Willerson filed a
motion for psychological evaluation, which the trial court granted on October
26, 2012. Willerson underwent psychological evaluations in November 2012
and was determined to be competent to stand trial. At a jury trial held from
September 21 to 23, 2015, the jury found Willerson guilty but mentally ill on
both counts. On September 23, 2015, the trial court sentenced Willerson to life
without the possibility of parole for malice murder. The felony murder count
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial showed that Melvin Wright, Jr. was a
security guard at an empty hotel in Augusta, and was hired in part
to keep trespassers off the hotel property. Around 4:30 p.m. on June
11, 2011, Wright was at a nearby barbershop when he learned that
someone had entered the hotel property. When Wright returned to
the hotel property, he encountered Willerson and informed him that
he was not permitted to be on the premises. In response, Willerson
explained that he was on the property looking for a man who had
stolen ten dollars from him, and that this man normally stayed in
either room 123 or 124. Wright escorted Willerson off the property
but assured Willerson that he would look out for the man.
Around 11:30 p.m., Wright checked rooms 123 and 124 to see
if the man Willerson referenced was on the premises. Wright did not
was vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372 (4)
(434 SE2d 479) (1993). On September 30, 2015, Willerson timely filed a motion
for new trial, which he amended on July 6, 2018. On July 29, 2019, the trial
court denied Willerson’s amended motion for new trial. Willerson then timely
filed a notice of appeal on August 22, 2019. The appeal was docketed to the
April 2021 term of this Court and was submitted for a decision on the briefs.
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find anyone in room 123, but he could tell that someone had been
staying in the room. Wright noticed nothing else out of the ordinary
in either room. After completing his search of the two rooms, Wright
retired for the night to a different room in the hotel.
Around 2:30 a.m., Wright awoke to a “rumbling” noise. He
walked out onto his room’s outdoor balcony, heard glass breaking
and fighting from the direction of rooms 123 and 124, and called the
police. Wright recognized Willerson’s voice shouting, “You stole my
ten dollars, you shouldn’t have stole my ten dollars,” and “[A]s much
as I [done for you,] you had to steal my ten dollars, why you steal my
ten dollars?” Wright looked over the balcony and saw Willerson
striking McClain, who fell onto his back. At that moment, Wright
believed McClain was dead because McClain’s face was covered in
blood and he was lying “stiff” and motionless.
Moments after the altercation, the police arrived at the hotel
and found McClain’s half-naked body dead outside room 124. Near
the body, the police recovered a lamp base and separate lamp post,
both appearing to have blood on them. Forensic testing showed that
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the DNA profiles obtained from the blood samples, and from a hair
fiber obtained from the lamp post, matched McClain’s DNA.
The police began searching the hotel property for Willerson,
whom they located in room 124 — hiding inside the rolled up
window curtains — and subsequently placed him under arrest. The
police noted that Willerson had no visible injuries but observed what
appeared to be blood spatter on his boots and the back of his shirt.
Later testing revealed that the DNA obtained from the blood on
Willerson’s shirt matched McClain’s DNA. A crime scene
investigator testified that the blood spatter pattern on Willerson’s
shirt was “completely consistent with a weapon, if you’re beating
someone and you raise a weapon up, blood falling from that weapon,”
noting further that the spatter pattern indicated that Willerson had
swung downward and hit McClain while McClain was lying on the
ground.
McClain had multiple lacerations and facial fractures as the
result of at least seven strikes to his face and head and had
additional bruising on his lower torso in a pattern consistent with
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blunt-force blows from a long, “tubelike” object. McClain’s death was
caused by these blunt-force injuries.
At trial, Willerson claimed self-defense, relying heavily on a
pre-trial psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Michael Vitacco,
a licensed psychologist. Dr. Vitacco testified that, during the
evaluation, Willerson revealed that he and McClain had a previous
relationship and that McClain owed him money. Willerson also told
Dr. Vitacco that on the night of the incident, he walked into the hotel
room and discovered McClain masturbating on the bed, after which
McClain propositioned Willerson for sex. Willerson told Dr. Vitacco
that when he rejected McClain’s advance and attempted to leave,
McClain attacked him with a lamp. Willerson said he was afraid
that McClain would hurt him, so he “[grabbed the] lamp and began
hitting [McClain] with it.” Willerson also told Dr. Vitacco that as a
child, he was frequently abused by his parents and sexually abused
and harassed by his brother. Dr. Vitacco noted that Willerson
struggled with various mental disorders, including post-traumatic
stress disorder, anxiety disorder, psychotic disorder, and major
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depressive disorder. However, Dr. Vitacco testified that Willerson’s
symptoms were in remission at the time of the evaluation because
of various medications Willerson was taking. Dr. Vitacco concluded
that Willerson was “able to tell right from wrong,” was sane at the
time of the incident, and was competent to stand trial.
1. Willerson contends that the evidence was insufficient to find
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder. 2 We
conclude that this claim lacks merit.
When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court
views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict and
evaluate[s] whether a rational trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which
he was convicted.” Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 388 (1) (846
SE2d 83) (2020) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III)
(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). At trial, Willerson claimed
that he acted in self-defense, and the trial court instructed the jury
2 As noted above in footnote 1, Willerson’s felony murder count was
vacated by operation of law. Accordingly, his enumerations of error with regard
to that count are moot.
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to consider self-defense as an affirmative defense. “A person is
justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or
great bodily harm only if he or she reasonably believes that such
force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself
or herself or a third party[.]” OCGA § 16-3-21 (a). “[Deadly force] is
not justified if the degree of force used by the defendant exceeds that
which a reasonable person would believe necessary to defend
against the victim’s unlawful actions.” Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422,
423 (1) (554 SE2d 458) (2001). See also Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 27,
29 (2) (518 SE2d 117) (1999) (“The use of excessive force or unlawful
force while acting in self-defense is not justifiable[.]”). “When a
defendant presents evidence that he was justified in using deadly
force, the State bears the burden of disproving the defense beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Birdow v. State, 305 Ga. 48, 50 (1) (823 SE2d 736)
(2019).
Here, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to disprove
beyond a reasonable doubt the claim of self-defense. Willerson was
heard shouting about his missing ten dollars just before McClain
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was seen motionless on the ground and was found hiding in the
curtains of a nearby room. The medical examiner testified that
McClain suffered multiple contusions, lacerations, bruises, and
facial fractures and that the lacerations on McClain’s face were the
result of multiple strikes. One of the officers who arrested Willerson
testified that Willerson had not suffered any visible injuries at the
time of his arrest, and the crime scene investigator confirmed that
the blood spatter pattern found on Willerson’s clothing was
consistent with blood spatter caused by striking a person with an
object while the person was lying on the ground. Finally, the blood
on Willerson’s clothes contained only McClain’s DNA, and not
Willerson’s.
Contrary to Willerson’s assertion that his history of abuse and
mental illness supports his claim of self-defense, “the subjective
fears of a particular defendant are irrelevant in the evaluation of
this defense,” and “[t]he critical factor in a justification defense is
whether a defendant acted with the fear of a reasonable person
under the circumstances.” O’Connell v. State, 294 Ga. 379, 382 (3)
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(754 SE2d 29) (2014). Given the brutality of the attack against the
victim, the extent of the victim’s injuries, and the fact that Willerson
suffered no injuries in the altercation, the evidence presented by the
State was sufficient to contradict the self-defense claim. When
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, “the evidence
presented at trial . . . was easily sufficient to authorize a rational
jury to reject [Willerson]’s assertion that he killed [McClain] in self-
defense and to instead find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”
of the charged crimes. Velasco v. State, 306 Ga. 888, 890-891 (1) (b)
(834 SE2d 21) (2019). Accordingly, this enumeration is without
merit.
2. Willerson also contends that his trial counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to properly confront
Wright with a prior inconsistent statement in accordance with
OCGA § 24-6-613 (b). 3 We disagree.
3 OCGA § 24-6-613 (b) provides:
[E]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness
shall not be admissible unless the witness is first afforded an
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At trial, Wright testified that Willerson appeared “very angry”
during their initial encounter at the hotel. However, according to a
police report compiled by Sergeant Chris Langford, one of the
investigating officers, Wright told the police immediately after the
incident that Willerson “seemed fine” and not “overly upset about
the money.” The defense called Sergeant Langford as a witness at
trial and addressed Langford’s police report. Defense counsel asked,
“Melvin Wright told you that Bryant Willerson seemed fine, did not
seem overly upset about the money[?]” The prosecutor objected to
hearsay, and defense counsel responded by asserting that the
statement fell within the prior inconsistent statement exception to
hearsay. The prosecutor countered by noting that Wright, who had
previously testified, had not been given the chance to explain his
statement during his testimony. The trial court sustained the
prosecutor’s objection, and defense counsel never recalled Wright as
opportunity to explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement
and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate
the witness on the prior inconsistent statement or the interests of
justice otherwise require.
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a witness.
At the motion for new trial hearing, Willerson asked trial
counsel if his decision not to address the prior inconsistent
statement with Wright was part of his trial strategy. Trial counsel
responded, “Could have been, could not have been. I don’t know.”
To prevail on a claim of constitutionally ineffective assistance
of counsel, Willerson must show that his trial counsel’s performance
was deficient and that such deficient performance prejudiced his
defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) (104
SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). “To satisfy the deficiency prong,
[Willerson] must show that trial counsel performed at trial in an
objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and
in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Gaston v. State, 307
Ga. 634, 636 (2) (837 SE2d 808) (2020) (citation and punctuation
omitted). To show that trial counsel’s deficient performance was
prejudicial, “[Willerson] must show a reasonable probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome that, but for
counsel’s alleged unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
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would have been different.” Williams v. State, 305 Ga. 776, 778 (2)
(827 SE2d 849) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). “If the
defendant fails to satisfy either the ‘deficient performance’ or the
‘prejudice’ prong of the Strickland test, this Court is not required to
examine the other.” Hendrix v. State, 298 Ga. 60, 61-62 (2) (779 SE2d
322) (2015).
Pretermitting whether Willerson’s trial counsel performed
deficiently, Willerson has failed to demonstrate prejudice. Even if
Willerson had successfully impeached Wright’s testimony and cast
doubt on the assertion that Willerson was angry prior to the
altercation, this point bears little relevance to Willerson’s argument
that he acted in self-defense. In fact, as detailed above, there was
ample evidence to support a finding that Willerson’s attack was not
an act of self-defense. Thus, Willerson cannot show a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different
had defense counsel successfully impeached Wright’s testimony on
that point. Accordingly, his claim of ineffective assistance fails. See
Ferguson v. State, 297 Ga. 342, 344-345 (3) (773 SE2d 749) (2015)
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(counsel’s failure to adduce a prior inconsistent statement did not
prejudice the outcome because “even to the extent [the witness’s]
prior statement could have served to impeach his credibility, it was
unlikely to have had any impact at all on the verdicts”).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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