FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NOV 22 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JASMINE M. MATSUKADO, No. 20-15727
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
1:19-cv-00045-LEK-KJM
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting MEMORANDUM*
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, and MOLLOY,***
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for
the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
Jasmine Matsukado appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s order affirming the
denial of benefits and will reverse only if the decision of the administrative law
judge (“ALJ”) contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.
Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tommasetti v.
Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)). Even when the ALJ errs, we may
affirm its decision when the error is harmless. Id. at 1154. We affirm.
I
The ALJ did not commit reversible legal error by dismissing portions of
Matsukado’s subjective symptoms testimony as inconsistent with evidence in the
record. The ALJ failed to identify with sufficient specificity “which part of
[Matsukado]’s testimony” it was dismissing. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133,
1138 (9th Cir. 2014). But because the ALJ gave little weight to medical opinion
evidence that was substantially similar to Matsukado’s testimony, we can
reasonably discern which specific portions of her testimony the ALJ found not
credible. See Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th
Cir. 2014). Therefore, this error was harmless. See id.
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Additionally, the ALJ provided “specific, clear, and convincing” reasons,
supported by substantial evidence, for discrediting these portions of Matsukado’s
testimony. Burrell, 775 F.3d at 1137-38. Matsukado’s activities of daily living
from the time of her alleged disability onset date—which have included driving,
shopping in stores, daily exercise, some work activity, and going camping—and
her recent medical history—which indicates conservative treatment and good
progress at physical therapy—are inconsistent with the severe disabling limitations
she alleges. See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th
Cir. 2009) (holding ALJ may discount claimant’s subjective symptom testimony
based on inconsistencies with evidence of daily activities like cleaning, driving,
and seeking employment post-onset); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040
(9th Cir. 2008) (affirming ALJ’s reliance on claimant’s favorable response to
“conservative treatment[,] including physical therapy,” in discrediting claim of
disabling pain). And even if this evidence is “susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion” we must uphold. Burch v. Barnhart, 400
F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).
II
The ALJ did not err in assigning little weight to the medical opinion of
Matsukado’s treating physician, Dr. Kipta. As the ALJ discussed, Dr. Kipta met
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with Matsukado only twice, and the severe limitations he assessed conflicted with
her aforementioned activities of daily living. These are “specific and legitimate
reasons that are supported by substantial evidence” for discrediting a treating
physician’s opinion. Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017); see
also Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Under
certain circumstances, a treating physician’s opinion on some matter may be
entitled to little if any weight. This might be the case, for instance, if the treating
physician has not seen the patient long enough to ‘have obtained a longitudinal
picture’ of the patient’s impairments . . . .” (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)(i)
(current version at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i))); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d
853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of a treating physician’s opinion
where the purported “restrictions appear to be inconsistent with the level of activity
that [the claimant] engaged in”).
AFFIRMED.
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