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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX
02-DEC-2021
10:34 AM
Dkt. 11 OP
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAIʻI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
ERIK WILLIS,
Defendant-Appellee.
SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)
DECEMBER 2, 2021
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J.
Ordinarily police officers must get a warrant before
entering a home without permission. But when exigent
circumstances arise, and the police have probable cause to
arrest or search, our state and federal constitutions allow
warrantless home entries.
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The State invokes this “exigent circumstances” exception to
justify a warrantless home entry into Erik Willis’s residence.
It advances an expansive view on what creates an “exigency”: it
argues a crime’s random and violent nature alone can pose
exigent circumstances validating a warrantless home intrusion.
We hold that the gravity of the crime, by itself, does not
establish an exigency empowering law enforcement officers to
bypass the warrant requirement. To support a warrantless home
intrusion under the exigency exception, the State must
articulate objective facts showing an immediate law enforcement
need for the entry. Those facts must be independent of the
underlying offense’s grave nature. And they must be present
when the police enter the home.
I.
Honolulu Police Department officers entered Willis’s home
to arrest him. They did not have permission or a warrant. The
police had probable cause to believe that three days earlier,
Willis had repeatedly stabbed a teenager without provocation at
a Kahala area beach. The evidence supporting probable cause
included several security videos showing a person of interest.
One HPD officer identified Willis as the person in the videos.
This officer knew Willis and where he lived; the officer had
previously interacted with him as a “mentor.”
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After surveilling Willis for a day and a half, the police
made a warrantless entry into his home. Inside the home, the
police happened to see shoes and a shirt that matched the
suspect’s footwear and upper garment. The police arrested
Willis. While detained at home, Willis asked the officers about
getting his shirt from his family’s washing machine. About two
hours later, still without a warrant, the police recovered the
shoes and shirt.
A grand jury indicted Willis for attempted murder in the
second degree.
Willis moved to suppress the shoes, the shirt, and the
statements he made when he was arrested.
Circuit Court of the First Circuit Judge Kevin A. Souza
granted the motion. The court found that the police lacked
exigent circumstances to enter Willis’s residence without a
warrant. It reasoned that Willis had been under surveillance
for a day and a half before his arrest. The court underscored
that there was “no evidence [that Willis] was armed, or that he
was actively attempting to flee the jurisdiction.”
Because the police unlawfully entered Willis’s home, the
court rejected the State’s argument that the police validly
seized the shoes and shirt under the plain view doctrine. As
fruits of the illegal entry, the court suppressed the shoes,
shirt, and statements.
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The State appealed. We accepted its application for
transfer. The State does not contest the court’s factual
findings. It also does not challenge the court’s determination
that no one consented to the home entry. Instead, the State
limits its appeal to the court’s legal conclusions regarding the
exigency exception, the plain view seizure, the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine, and the resulting suppression of the
evidence.
The State focuses on rebutting the court’s finding of no
exigency. Willis’s “random, unprovoked stabbing of a woman
lying on the beach,” the State argues, yielded an exigent
circumstance that validated the home entry. The State
highlights the “stranger-danger” nature of the attack. It
credits an HPD detective’s testimony that Willis presented “a
different risk” because he had randomly and violently attacked a
person without apparent motive. Because the police feared
Willis “might attack again randomly,” the State claims, they
couldn’t devote the six or more hours they said they needed to
write an affidavit and then get a warrant.
The State also alludes to three facts related to Willis’s
purported danger. It mentions a “past instance[] of
biting . . . a paramedic who was trying to help him.” It also
says that some surveillance videos showed Willis “trespassing,”
“suspiciously looking into somebody else’s garage,” and “looking
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around, prowling around.” The State further notes that the
knife used in the attack was never recovered; so, it claims, the
police had a reason to believe Willis was armed.
Willis defends the court’s order granting his motion to
suppress. He argues the State cannot justify a warrantless home
entry solely on the basis that a suspect “attacked and injured
an unknown victim for unknown reasons.” Willis concedes that
the police had probable cause to arrest him.
We agree with Willis and affirm the court’s ruling.
II.
There’s no place like home when it comes to the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 7 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added). This
clause matches article I, section 7, except for our
constitution’s added protection against unreasonable “invasions
of privacy.” Haw. Const. art. I, § 7.
“House” is the only location mentioned in both
constitutional provisions. In the context of searches and
seizures, “the home is first among equals.” Florida v.
Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013); see also Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (observing that the “physical entry of the
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home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed” (citation omitted)); Cf. State v. Line,
121 Hawaiʻi 74, 85, 214 P.3d 613, 624 (2009) (recognizing “the
special privacy interest in the home”).
If the government has probable cause, it can ordinarily
arrest someone without a warrant in a public place for a felony
or misdemeanor crime. See generally Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, n.11, 354 (2001); United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976).
But going into a person’s home to make an arrest is
different. Police officers must get a warrant before entering a
dwelling unless an exception applies. Lange v. California, __
U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 2011, 2017 (2021); Line, 121 Hawaiʻi at 86,
214 P.3d at 625. A warrantless entry into a home is
“presumptively unreasonable.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 586; State v.
Pulse, 83 Hawaiʻi 229, 245, 925 P.2d 797, 813 (1996).
The only way to validate a warrantless and nonconsensual
home entry is to show “exigent circumstances.” See Line, 121
Hawaiʻi at 77, 85, 214 P.3d at 616, 624 (recognizing in a case
where the police entered a home without consent or a warrant
that “any warrantless entrance of a private dwelling by the
police can only be justified under the exigent circumstances
exceptions to the warrant requirement” (cleaned up)); State v.
Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 510–11, 606 P.2d 913, 917 (1980) (per
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curiam) (holding that “under both Federal and Hawaii
Constitutions, law enforcement officers may not enter the home
of a suspect to effect his arrest, without his consent or
without prior judicial authorization, in the absence of exigent
circumstances”).
The police must have probable cause to arrest or search.
See Pulse, 83 Hawaiʻi at 245, 925 P.2d at 813 (explaining that
one “well-recognized and narrowly-defined exception to the
warrant requirement occurs when the government has probable
cause to search and exigent circumstances exist necessitating
immediate police action” (emphasis added) (cleaned up)). But,
“no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or
seizure absent exigent circumstances or some other recognized
exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Bonnell, 75
Haw. 124, 137–38, 856 P.2d 1265, 1273 (1993) (cleaned up).
Immediacy shapes exigency. Exigent circumstances exist
“when the demands of the occasion reasonably call for an
immediate police response.” State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawaiʻi 87,
102, 997 P.2d 13, 28 (2000) (citations omitted). The exigency
exception thus permits law enforcement officers to respond to
“now or never” situations with “no time to secure a warrant.”
Lange, __ U.S. at __, 141 S. Ct. at 2018 (citations omitted).
Exigent circumstances emerge “where there is an imminent
threat of harm to a person, where there is a danger of serious
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property damage, where a suspect is likely to escape, or where
evidence is likely to be removed or destroyed.” State v.
Naeole, 148 Hawaiʻi 243, 250, 470 P.3d 1120, 1127 (2020).
An exigency is determined based on the totality of the
circumstances. Lange, __ U.S. at __, 141 S. Ct. at 2018;
Jenkins, 93 Hawaiʻi at 102, 997 P.2d at 28. It must have existed
at the time of the warrantless search or seizure. See State v.
Dorson, 62 Haw. 377, 385, 615 P.2d 740, 746 (1980) (explaining
that “an exigency must be shown by the State to have existed at
the time of the entry” (emphasis added)).
The State must prove exigency; it must identify “specific
and articulable facts” showing why the police had to act without
delay. Pulse, 83 Hawaiʻi at 245, 925 P.2d at 813 (citation
omitted).
Here, the State insists that exigent circumstances existed
because Willis posed an “imminent danger to the public.”
Willis’s “random, unprovoked stabbing of a woman lying on the
beach,” the State argues, made him dangerous. The State says
that given the “stranger-danger” nature of the crime, the police
couldn’t wait for a warrant. The State also mentions that:
Willis had previously bit a paramedic who tried to help him;
some surveillance videos showed Willis suspiciously looking
around on the day of the stabbing; and the police hadn’t
recovered the knife used in the attack.
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That’s it. The State does not point to any other facts
demanding an immediate police intervention. What it articulates
does not validate the HPD officers’ warrantless entry into
Willis’s home.
First, the State’s reliance on the stabbing’s violent and
random nature fails. The State does not identify any case that
held the grave or violent nature of the underlying offense alone
can justify a warrantless search or seizure within one’s home.
And we are unaware of any case supporting that proposition.
Rather, the gravity of the crime standing alone cannot
establish exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740, 752 (1984) (recognizing that “courts have
permitted warrantless home arrests for major felonies if
identifiable exigencies, independent of the gravity of the
offense, existed at the time of the arrest” (emphasis added));
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (declining “to hold
that the seriousness of the offense under investigation itself
creates exigent circumstances of the kind that under the Fourth
Amendment justify a warrantless search”).
This approach makes sense. If the underlying offense’s
troubling nature alone can create exigent circumstances as the
State suggests, all “stranger-danger” and violent assault cases
would meet the exigency exception. The expansive reach of the
State’s position dooms it. Caniglia v. Strom, __ U.S. __, 141
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S. Ct. 1596, 1600 (2021) (emphasizing that the Court “has
repeatedly declined to expand the scope of exceptions to the
warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry into the home”
(cleaned up)).
We hold that the gravity of the underlying crime, by
itself, cannot supply exigent circumstances validating
warrantless home intrusions.
Second, beyond the stabbing’s “stranger-danger” nature, the
record doesn’t show anything more about the threat Willis posed
to the public at the time of his arrest. It in fact undercuts
the State’s claim that an immediate police action was necessary.
The police had been watching Willis for a day and a half
before deciding to make a warrantless arrest. This surveillance
seemingly did not reveal any information indicating that Willis
would attack someone again. The officers knew Willis’s identity
and where he lived. They had no evidence that Willis was armed.
They also didn’t have any evidence that Willis was attempting to
flee.
The State’s secondary points – the past biting incident,
the video footage of Willis “looking around,” and the
unrecovered knife used in the stabbing - do not show an
immediate need to arrest Willis without a warrant either. The
record also belies the State’s reliance on these facts. One
officer conceded that the crime’s gravity was the sole reason
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for the warrantless arrest. The officer said the circumstances
of the stabbing in and of themselves rendered Willis dangerous.
He testified “[t]here [were] no additional facts” suggesting
that Willis was “armed and dangerous.”
The record only shows the officers’ subjective inkling that
Willis might randomly attack someone because he was accused of
randomly attacking someone. The officers’ subjective reasoning
alone cannot empower them to bypass the constitutional warrant
requirement for home intrusions. See State v. Dias, 62 Haw. 52,
56–57, 609 P.2d 637, 640 (1980) (explaining that “the
justification for the warrantless entry must rest on more than
[police officers’] subjective belief . . .”); see also McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“When an officer undertakes to act as his own
magistrate, he ought to be in a position to justify it by
pointing to some real immediate and serious consequence if [the
officer] postponed action to get a warrant.” (Emphasis added)).
To support a warrantless home entry under the exigency
exception, the State must point to specific and articulable
facts objectively showing the immediate necessity of its action.
Dias, 62 Haw. at 56-57, 609 P.2d at 640-41. Those facts must be
independent of the gravity of the underlying crime; and they
must be present at the time of the entry. Welsh, 466 U.S. at
752. The State failed to meet its burden.
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We conclude that the police did not face a now or never
situation permitting them to enter Willis’s home without a
warrant. The officers should have secured a warrant before
intruding into his residence. See Mitchell v. Wisconsin, __
U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2541 (2019) (Sotomayor, J. dissenting)
(“If there is time, get a warrant.”).
III.
Inside Willis’s home, the police saw the footwear and shirt
that they believed the stabbing suspect wore. This sighting
might have been inadvertent. But it didn’t stem from a lawful
police presence. So the plain view doctrine does not validate
the seizure of the shoes and shirt. See State v. Meyer, 78
Hawaiʻi 308, 317, 893 P.2d 159, 168 (1995) (requiring “a lawful
intrusion” for the State to successfully invoke the plain view
doctrine).
The exclusionary rule then bars the use of the shoes and
shirt (and any derivative evidence) at trial. See State v.
Weldon, 144 Hawaiʻi 522, 534, 445 P.3d 103, 115 (2019)
(recognizing that courts “prohibit the use of evidence at trial
that comes to light as a result of the exploitation of a
previous illegal act of the police”). This rule also operates
to exclude the statements Willis made while detained at home;
those statements resulted from the unlawful home intrusion.
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IV.
Because the police entered Willis’s home without exigent
circumstances, permission, or a warrant, the circuit court
correctly suppressed the evidence and precluded its use at
trial. We affirm the court’s findings of fact, conclusions of
law and order granting Willis’s motion to suppress.
Stephen K. Tsushima, /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for appellant
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Eric A. Seitz,
(Della A. Belatti, Jonathan /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
M.F. Loo, and Kevin Yolken,
with him on the briefs) /s/ Michael D. Wilson
for appellee
/s/ Todd W. Eddins
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