[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
January 3, 2007
No. 06-10332 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-80827-CV-WPD
ROY DIXON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RIC L. BRADSHAW,
Sheriff, of Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(January 3, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Roy Dixon, acting pro se, appeals the district court’s order of summary
judgment in favor of his former employer, the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office,
on his claims of race discrimination, negligent misrepresentation and constructive
discharge brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1). The Sheriff’s Office denied Dixon a transfer to a correctional
officer position in the Vehicle Maintenance Department after he was rated poorly
by an interview panel. Dixon later quit his position after being asked to substitute
for an officer in Vehicle Maintenance. After a careful review of the parties’ briefs
and the record, we affirm the district court’s decision.
We review orders granting summary judgment de novo. Vessels v. Atlanta
Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36
L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), once Dixon establishes the prima facie case for disparate
treatment, the burden shifts to the Sheriff’s Office to articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory basis for the employment action. Once the Sheriff’s Office has
met its burden, Dixon then must show these proffered reasons are pretextual. See
Vessels, 408 F.3d at 767-68. Even if Dixon is correct that the failure to transfer
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him was an adverse employment action, he has failed to establish pretext to rebut
the Sheriff’s Office’s proffered legitimate reason that another officer was more
qualified because that officer scored higher during interviews. Dixon points to the
use of the oral examination procedure and alterations to his score sheet after his
interview; however, there is no evidence that either of these actions were motivated
by racial animus. Dixon also alleges that two interviewers scored him unfairly.
Even if this is true, there is no evidence that this conduct was based on Dixon’s
race. Finally, Dixon’s suggestion that Manny Perez’s statements and actions
demonstrate pretext is without merit because Perez was not a decisionmaker in the
second interview process.
Dixon has failed to establish a negligent misrepresentation claim since he
can neither show that the Human Resource department made statements with the
knowledge of their falsity nor that any injury resulted from his reliance on such
statements. See Souran v. Travelers Insurance Co., 982 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir.
1993) (listing the elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim under Florida
law). Dixon similarly failed to establish a claim for constructive discharge because
he did not show the conditions of his work environment were so intolerable that
the conditions compelled resignation. See Hill v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 934 F.2d
1518, 1527 (11th Cir. 1991).
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Accordingly, we find summary judgment was appropriate on Dixon’s
claims, and we affirm the district court’s order.
AFFIRMED.
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