IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
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RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
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BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
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ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
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ACTION.
RENDERED: DECEMBER 16, 2021
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2020-SC-0236-WC
ANTHONY HELTON APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. NO. 2019-CA-1757
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
NO. WC-15-81290
TM POWER ENTERPRISES, INC.; APPELLEES
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX
REL. DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY
GENERAL; HONORABLE. GRANT S.
ROARK, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
I. BACKGROUND
On June 9, 2013, Anthony Helton fell from a thirty-six-foot ladder in the
course of his employment for TM Power Enterprises, Inc. As a result of the fall,
Helton is now a paraplegic. Helton and Power Enterprises settled his workers’
compensation claim in an agreement that requires Power Enterprises to pay
Helton permanent disability benefits. The settlement agreement approved by
the Administrative Law Judge provides: “[t]he parties recognize that KRS
342.730(4) states such benefits shall terminate when [Helton] reaches the age
of 70 . . . . Helton reserves the right to appeal the application of KRS
342.730(4) retroactively to his claim both on grounds of statutory construction
and constitutionality of retroactive application of the statute.”
Helton filed a motion asking the ALJ to rule on the issues not decided by
the settlement agreement to determine the duration of his benefits pursuant to
KRS 342.730(4). The ALJ determined Helton’s benefits terminate when he
reaches seventy years of age, but noted an administrative body may not
address issues concerning the constitutionality of a statute. Helton appealed
the ALJ’s decision to the Workers’ Compensation Board, which affirmed the
ALJ and acknowledged it could not rule on the issues concerning the
constitutionality of KRS 342.730(4).
Helton appealed the Board’s decision to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed and held the statute was constitutional. He now appeals to this
Court, arguing: (1) the application of the current version of KRS 342.730(4) to
his award violates the contracts clauses of the federal and state constitutions;
(2) the retroactive enactment of KRS 342.730(4) is an exercise of absolute and
arbitrary power, in violation of Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution; and (3)
that KRS 342.730(4) is severable from the remainder of the statute and he
should, therefore, be entitled to lifetime benefits. We disagree and affirm the
Court of Appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
KRS 342.730(4) concerns the termination of workers’ compensation
benefits. In Parker v. Webster Cnty. Coal, LLC (Dotiki Mine), 529 S.W.3d 759
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(Ky. 2017), this Court found the then-current 1996 version of KRS 342.730(4)
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. The 1996 version of the statute
tied the termination of workers’ compensation benefits to the time at which the
employee qualified for normal old-age Social Security benefits. This Court held
this was an arbitrary distinction with no rational relation to a legitimate state
interest.
In Holcim v. Swinford, 581 S.W.3d 37 (Ky. 2019), we considered whether
a 2018 version of KRS 342.730(4) could be applied retroactively. Quoting a
Legislative Research Commission comment beneath the statute, this Court
held in Holcim that the amendment “applies to those cases which ‘have not
been fully and finally adjudicated, or are in the appellate process, or for which
time to file an appeal [h]as not lapsed, as of the effective date of this Act.’” Id.
at 44.
Whereas the pre-Parker version of KRS 342.730(4) linked workers’
compensation benefit termination to the time at which the worker qualified for
old-age Social Security benefits (and thereby violated an individual’s right to
equal protection under the law by arbitrarily treating similarly-situated
individuals differently), the 2018 version of the statutory subsection links the
termination of benefits to the injured employee attaining a particular age.
Under the amendment, a claimant’s benefits terminate on his or her seventieth
birthday or four years after his or her work injury or last injurious exposure,
whichever occurs later. Helton argues this statute is constitutionally infirm on
numerous grounds.
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A. Contracts Clause
Helton first argues the retroactive application of KRS 342.730(4) denies
his rights under the contracts clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
Both the Constitution of the United States and the Kentucky Constitution
protect citizens of our Commonwealth from the state’s infringement on their
right to contract. Article 1, Section 10, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution reads, in pertinent part, “[n]o State shall . . . pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . .
.” Likewise, Section 19 of the Kentucky Constitution provides, “[n]o ex post
facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be enacted.”
Helton argues KRS 342.730(4) violates these contracts clauses.
In Dowell v. Matthews Contracting, 627 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Ky. 2021), this
Court stated if “the fundamental premise of a Contracts Clause analysis—the
existence of a contract—is absent . . . our analysis ends.” See Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 190 (1992) (holding Contracts Clause
inapplicable because employer and employee did not assent to specific
statutory terms). Therefore, we must first determine whether a contract exists
in this case.
Helton “point[s] to no contract or place within the statutory scheme
where [he is] guaranteed certain benefits that were mutually assented to and
bargained for.” Dowell, 627 S.W.3d at 895. This Court has held “the Workers’
Compensation Act (WCA) does not constitute a contract between Kentucky
workers and their employers or the state.” Id. at 894. Rather than providing
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contractual rights, we explained, “the WCA is a statutory scheme that may be
amended as the General Assembly chooses, provided it fits within our
constitutional framework.” Id. at 894–95. “The workers’ compensation system
is controlled by the state and is governed by legislative enactments. It is not a
contract . . . between employers and their employees. Changes to the relevant
statutes, therefore, do not create a Contracts Clause issue.” Id. at 896.
Since the Workers’ Compensation Act does not constitute a contract, “a
complete Contracts Clause analysis is unnecessary.” Id. at 894. The
protections of the clauses simply do not apply. “Because the WCA does not
form a contract, there are no contractual rights that the amendment to KRS
342.730(4) could infringe.” Id. at 895. Just as in Dowell, we hold there was no
contracts clause violation.
B. Absolute and Arbitrary Power
Helton also makes a fleeting reference to Section 2 of the Kentucky
Constitution, which reads, “[a]bsolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty
and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest
majority.” Courts in this Commonwealth have recognized for half a century
that when a “legislative body acts in a purported policy-making or law-making
function . . . the concept of what is ‘arbitrary’ is much more narrowly
constricted . . . .” City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Ky.
1971). Such an action is only “arbitrary if there is no rational connection
between that action and the purpose for which the body’s power to act exists.
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Where the existence of such rational connection is ‘fairly debatable’ the action
will not be disturbed by a court.” Id.
This Court has “consistently held that treating older injured workers
differently from younger injured workers is rationally related to the legitimate
government interests in preventing a duplication of benefits and saving money
for the workers’ compensation system.” Cates v. Kroger, 627 S.W.3d 864, 869
(Ky. 2021). KRS 342.730(4) does not amount to an absolute and arbitrary
exercise of power.
C. Severability and Lifetime Benefits
Helton also argues that KRS 342.730(4) is severable from the remainder
of the statute and that benefits should be paid for the duration of his life.
Because the latest version of the statute applies and because there is no
constitutional violation, this Court need not address these arguments due to its
resolution of the contracts clause issue.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
All sitting. All concur.
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Christopher P. Evensen
Evensen Law Office, LLC
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, TM POWER ENTERPRISES, INC.:
Douglas A. U’Sellis
U’Sellis Mayer & Associates, PSC
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL.
DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL:
Matthew F. Kuhn
Brett R. Nolan
Alexander Y. Magera
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
Hon. Grant S. Roark
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD:
Michael W. Alvey
Chairman
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