Case: 20-60446 Document: 00516144023 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/23/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 23, 2021
No. 20-60446
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Claudia Vasquez-Rosales,
Petitioner,
versus
Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A208 997 328
Before Barksdale, Willett, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Claudia Vasquez-Rosales, a native and citizen of Honduras, seeks
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissing her appeal of
an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denying her application for asylum and
withholding of removal. Vasquez contends the BIA erroneously concluded:
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-60446 Document: 00516144023 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/23/2021
No. 20-60446
the harm she suffered did not constitute persecution; and she failed to
establish she was, or would be, harmed because of membership in her
asserted particular social group (PSG; one of three claimed to the IJ)—
members of the Vasquez family. (She does not challenge, and has therefore
abandoned, the BIA’s conclusion she is ineligible for relief under the
Convention Against Torture. See Thuri v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 788, 793 (5th
Cir. 2004) (noting unbriefed challenges considered abandoned).)
In considering the BIA’s decision (and the IJ’s decision, to the extent
it influenced the BIA), legal conclusions are reviewed de novo; factual
findings, for substantial evidence. Iruegas-Valdez v. Yates, 846 F.3d 806, 810
(5th Cir. 2017). Under the substantial-evidence standard, reversal is
improper unless “the evidence compels it”. Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131,
1134 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
To qualify for asylum, applicant must establish, inter alia, either “past
persecution”, or a “well-founded fear of future persecution”, based on one
of five enumerated grounds, including membership in a particular social
group. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (establishing asylum eligibility); 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining refugee), 1158(b)(1) (listing conditions for
granting asylum). To qualify for withholding of removal, “applicant must
demonstrate a clear probability of persecution upon return”. Roy v. Ashcroft,
389 F.3d 132, 138 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “Withholding of
removal is a higher standard than asylum”. Id. (citation omitted).
Accordingly, an applicant who fails to meet the asylum standard cannot meet
the withholding-of-removal standard. Dayo v. Holder, 687 F.3d 653, 658–59
(5th Cir. 2012).
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Vasquez did
not suffer past persecution because the three threats she received: occurred
over a short period of time; were not accompanied by physical violence; and
2
Case: 20-60446 Document: 00516144023 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/23/2021
No. 20-60446
stopped after she moved to another part of the country. See Gjetani v. Barr,
968 F.3d 393, 395 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting asylum requires petitioner to
demonstrate “systematic, sustained pattern of assaults or other acts of
oppression—not individual or even a handful of assaults or threats”).
Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that the purpose of
the threats was to persuade Vasquez to help dismiss criminal charges against
the man (her partner and father of her child) who killed her daughter in the
United States, because: Vasquez was first threatened after she refused to
help; and no other members of her family were similarly threatened. The
evidence, therefore, does not compel the conclusion Vasquez suffered, or
would suffer, harm because of her family membership (her claimed PSG
here). See Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 492–93 (5th Cir. 2015)
(concluding petitioner did not qualify for withholding of removal because
petitioner failed to “demonstrate[] that no reasonable factfinder could
conclude that she was not persecuted on account of her family
membership”).
Contrary to Vasquez’ contention that eligibility for withholding of
removal requires her to establish family membership was “a reason”, as
opposed to a “central reason”, for her asserted persecution, an applicant
pursuing withholding of removal must establish a protected ground, such as
a particular social group, was, or would be, a “central reason” for
persecution. See Revencu v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 396, 402–03 (5th Cir. 2018)
(denying relief).
DENIED.
3