dissenting:
Jack T. Taylor, Jr. and his successors in interest have been litigating the title to the land at issue in this case for forty-three years, beginning in the federal district court of the district of Colorado. Because I believe that principles of res judicata, finality and certainty of title direct the outcome of this most recent proceeding, I would uphold the findings and conclusions of the trial court as to due process and res judicata. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority opinion that reopens this controversy and grants rights to landowners who are able to trace their settlement claims 1 to the time of Williams Gilpin's ownership, provided that they were not named and served in the 1960's Torrens Title action.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In 1960, Jack T. Taylor, Jr. purchased the mountain tract of the Taylor Ranch estate. Because he knew that there was a cloud on his title arising out of uses historically made of that property by some inhabitants of the area, he sought to clear up any ownership disputes by commencing a Torrens action. He filed the action in the federal district court, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction predicated on his status as a resident of North Carolina. In his application, he named and served 316 defendants individually who he anticipated could have sought to assert a claim against his property. During the course of the Torrens proceedings, he named and served 142 additional defendants at the instigation of the court, based upon testimony of the court-appointed title examiner, who opined that the compilation of named defendants were the only individuals who had a possible interest in the property as landowners of Costilla County.
The federal district court confirmed Taylor's title in an order in 1965, finding that the defendant claimants had no rights of any kind or nature to the estate. Specifically, the court denied the three grounds upon which the claimants attempted to assert their rights. First, the court found that any rights the original settlers asserted under Mexican law did not survive the acquisition of lands by the United States. Second, the court found that the Beaubien document conveyed no rights by express grant or dedication, it did not mention the lands comprising the mountain tract and it did not contain language of conveyance. Finally, the court found that the claimants had not acquired any rights through their previous uses of the land by prescription or adverse possession, because they could not establish the requisite exclusivity, hostility, or adversity to ownership. Two years later, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals approved the court's reasoning and affirmed entry of the Torrens decree.
Taylor acquired additional adjacent lands in 19783, known as the Salazar Estate. The Salazar Estate was the subject of a quiet title action in 1960, and the successful owner recorded his deed and then conveyed his title.
Beginning in 1978, Taylor subdivided portions of the properties and sold off the parcels. Three years later, in 1981, petitioners filed suit in the district court for Costilla County, initially attacking the Torrens decree and attempting to quiet title to the mountain tract. They claimed usufructuary rights in the mountain tract to fish, hunt, recreate, gather firewood, harvest timber and graze cattle and sheep.
On Taylor's motion on the pleadings, the trial court entered judgment denying the claimants' assertion of rights. The court *1169found that because of the prior Torrens proceedings and decree, res judicata and statutes of limitations barred all of petitioners' claims. The court of appeals affirmed and the claimants sought certiorari before this court.
On review before this court in 1994, claimants argued that res judicata did not bar their claims, because they did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of the Torrens action. Specifically, the claimants contended that they were readily ascertainable parties due personal notice of the Torrens proceedings, because their interests were recorded in the Costilla County records, were referenced in both Taylor's deed and the Gilpin agreement, were mentioned in the title examiner's report, and were referred to in Taylor's own application. Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210, 1227 a. 26 (Colo.1994). This court observed that in a Torrens proceeding, an applicant must personally serve known parties, but may give notice to unknown parties by publication. Id. at 1222.
The court determined that the legislature intended to "require applicants to exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the names and addresses of persons having any interest in the subject property and therefore required to be listed in the application and personally served." Id. at 1227. The court declared that the burden of proving that notice was inadequate rests on the party challenging the Torrens decree. However, the court concluded that because the record was not fully developed, a material fact remained as to whether the claimants would be able to satisfy their burden of showing that Taylor should have known their names and personally served them when he filed his application in 1960. Id. at 1222. Thus, this court concluded that the record was inadequate to determine the constitutionality of the notice upon which the Torrens decree was predicated. Id. at 1219.
Three justices dissented on the grounds that res judicata did bar the claims and that notice was sufficient. The chief issue on which the majority and dissent disagreed was what a Torrens petitioner was required to do in order to "ascertain the identities of otherwise 'unknown' claimants, that is, claimants whose names or interests do not appear in the record chain of title and who are not in possession of the land." Id. at 12831 (J. Vol-lack, dissenting). The dissenting justices feared that the majority had exaggerated the constitutional requirement, imposing a duty on Torrens applicants "to search for a potential claimant beyond public records or beyond inspecting the land to ascertain who was in possession," in spite of the United States Supreme Court's directions in Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) that there is "no requirement of 'impracticable and extended searches' to locate those beneficiaries whose interests were remote." Rael, 876 P.2d at 12834. The dissent cited other Court precedent for the proposition that, "One is not required to undertake 'extraordinary efforts to discover the identity and whereabouts of a [claimant] whose identity is not in the public record." " Id. at 1234 (quoting Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799 n. 4, 108 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983)). Further, the dissent posited that even if the majority's standard was correct, the determination of whether Taylor exercised reasonable dili-genee was a question of law for the court, not an issue of fact that required remand to the trial court. Id. at 1285.
The majority remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of determining whether the claimants were readily ascertainable persons who had an interest in the property and who had, thus, been entitled to personal service of notice of the Torrens action. To the extent the plaintiffs were such readily ascertainable persons with an identifiable interest, the majority held that they had been denied due process and, as to them, the Torrens action could not stand.
On remand, the trial court bifurcated the subsequent proceedings, first addressing the notice issues. The plaintiffs claimed an interest in the property as landowners in Cos-tilla County, who were not named and personally served in the 1960 Torrens action, but whose names were readily ascertainable in the records of the Assessor of Costilla Coun- - ty. The defendant claimed that he had exercised reasonable diligence in identifying the *1170persons claiming an interest in his property under the Beaubien document. Specifically, he offered evidence that he obtained an abstract of title that identified all persons who had claimed any interest of record in the property and that he named and served those individuals. Second, he offered evidence that he undertook an inspection of the property and named and served all individuals who were occupying or using the land. The real issue of contention in this phase of the trial court proceeding was: could Taylor reasonably rely upon the real property ree-ords maintained by the Clerk and Recorder of Costilla County for the purpose of identifying individuals with an asserted interest in the property? The trial court agreed with defendant and his real estate experts that such reliance was reasonable and, sufficient. Specifically, the court noted that the Assessor's records could serve to provide addresses for otherwise identified individuals, but were in no sense indices of title The court then found that the claimants were not identified either in Taylor's abstract of title or the real property records, and therefore were only entitled to personal service if they had an identifiable interest in the land by their occupancy of the land. Eliminating all other parties, and refusing to certify a class action, the court found only eight potential claimants who had a readily ascertainable interest and who had not been personally served with notice.
At a later point in time, the court moved to the proceeding on the merits. In that proceeding, the court refused to permit the claimants to assert rights based on prescription, finding that the claimants had added a claim for prescriptive rights at a very late point in the litigation and should therefore not be allowed to pursue it. The court also found that although four of the claimants were barred from asserting rights to the mountain tract because they or their predecessors were named in the Torrens action, those same claimants had corresponding identifiable rights to the Salazar estate and had not been personally named and served in the quiet title action. Another claimant was eliminated because he acquired his property many years after the Torrens action. The court did uphold the rights of two individuals to use roads on the Taylor estate necessary to access their adjudicated water rights. For the remaining parties, the court considered whether the Beaubien document legally or factually established rights of use. - The court found that the document did not pertain to the lands of the mountain tract or the Salazar estate. Further, the court found that the Beaubien document, was merely a writing of regulations of the earlier territory, rather than a document of conveyance, hence no rights were ever conveyed. Thus with the exception of access rights for the two individuals with separate water rights, the court dismissed all claims with prejudice.
The court of appeals affirmed and this court granted certiorari again. This court reversed the substantive rulings of the trial court, holding that even though the Beaubien document did not expressly grant any rights, the claimants acquired rights through pre-seription, estoppel and prior use. I dissented from that conclusion; however, it is now the law of the State and it is from that junction that the present opinions, both the majority and this dissent, flow. Today, the court reverses the trial court's holdings regarding sufficiency of notice. I suggest that, even given the majority's earlier conclusions as to the rights established by the Beaubien doeument, the trial court's rulings on Taylor's due diligence search and inquiry should stand.
II. The Majority Opinion
I first note an inconsistency between this court's 1994 opinion in Rael and the present opinion. The majority here determines, as a matter of law, that all landowners in Costilla County were entitled to notice of the Torrens Action. In Rael, the court specifically rejected any such conclusion, and rather carved out a question of fact and returned that question of fact to the trial court. The trial court then reached principled findings, grounded in law and evidence, regarding the identity of the various individuals whose interests were readily ascertainable. The majority court reverses those findings, now holding as a matter of law that all landowners in the County had readily ascertainable interests. If the court had so intended, a remand to the trial court in 1994 would not *1171have been necessary. Accordingly, I read the majority opinion as contravening our ear-Her opinion in Rael.
More particularly, I take issue with the majority's conclusion that, as a matter of law, every individual landowner in Costilla County was a potential holder of implied or adverse rights in the Taylor Ranch. Such a broad-brush determination belies all requirements associated with the acquisition of such rights-which are, necessarily, related to the use a particular claimant may have made of the property. Certainly, an inspection of the tax records of the assessor's office could not have revealed which landowners in the county had gained rights through preseription.
The majority decision does acknowledge, rightfully in my view, that those individuals who recorded an interest, or who were using the property and were therefore personally named and served in the Torrens and quiet title actions are now barred from asserting their interests because of the operation of res judicata. Those individuals were clearly the ones with the most palpable, readily ascertainable interests. Nonetheless, the majority revives the interests of landowners in the county whose rights were so attenuated and ephemeral as to avoid ready identification by Taylor or by the court-appointed title examiner. Many of those individuals to this day remain nameless, unidentified by any party, and yet they may now, thirty years later, finally assert a claim. The simple point is that for these individuals to become legitimate parties to a Torrens action, all they had to do was file a document recording their asserted interest. That is the sanctioned, statutory process in this state designed to protect certainty of title. The individuals here who did so were precluded because they had no legitimate interest, and various courts so held. I suggest that it is unreasonable now to hold that Taylor was required to name and serve every landowner in Costilla County in order to secure title to his property. I also note, in passing, that had he done so, his title would now be secure because none of those individuals could have asserted better rights than the ones who did litigate their claims. Because I conclude that reasonable diligence does not require a landowner to serve all the parties in a county in case they might at some point have acquired rights by preseription or implication, and because I feel that this decision defeats the purpose of the Torrens Act by rendering Torrens decrees inconclusive, I respectfully dissent.
III. Colorado Real Estate Title Standards
Over fifty years ago, the Colorado Bar Association (CBA) adopted title standards. 2 Cathy Stricklin Krendl, Colorado Methods of Practice § 62.33, at 148 (1998). These standards represent CBA's assessment of the manner in which experienced title examiners in the state of Colorado consider certain issues affecting the marketability of title. Id. Specific to our purposes, the title standards set forth the methods that a competent attorney should undertake to investigate marketability of a title so as to be able to issue an opinion to that effect. Krendl, supre § 62.33, at 12-18 (Supp.2002). Plaintiffs in this case argue, and the majority agreed, that a reasonable search of the title of Taylor Ranch would have included a search of the tax records of the county. The Colorado Real Estate Title Standards do not assign any such responsibility under any cireum-stances.
According to section 1.1.2 of the standards, an examining attorney must search "for the recorded documents which affect title to such real property ... either from a personal examination by the examining attorney of the real property records of the county in which such real property is located or from an examination of an abstract of title which purports to contain such recorded documents." Attorneys Title Guar. Fund, Inc., Colorado Real Estate Title Standards 1.1.2 (1997) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Although cireumstances may make it necessary for the examiner to inquire further, "more frequently, such matters are excepted from the scope of the examining attorney's title opinion" as outside of such cireumstances, generally, "the examining attorney has no obligation to question the accuracy or completeness of the real property records of the county or the abstract of title." Id. at 1.1.5 (Scope of search of mat*1172ters not of record). When such cireumstances arise:
Those matters outside of the real property records to which title opinions are commonly made subject include rights of parties in possession or occupancy of the real property; matters that may be disclosed by an accurate survey of the real property; statutory mechaniecs' Hens, easements, or claims of easements, not shown by the public records; liens for the payment of taxes....
Id. at 1.1.5.
These materials all relate specifically to the land at issue and to real property in general. They would all contain information as to the specific rights and statutes affecting the title to the property. By contrast, a search of tax records offers no information as to the burdens upon a piece of property, which may have arisen by prescription.
Colorado courts have recognized that "[dlocuments outside the chain of title provide no notice unless a possible irregularity appears in the record which indicates the existence of some outside interest by which the title may be affected." Collins v. Scott, 943 P.2d 20, 22 (Colo.App.1996). Constructive notice is given when a document is recorded "in the office of the appropriate clerk and. recorder." Id. However, Colorado courts have declined "to extend the presumption of constructive notice to information contained in" outside materials such as trade name affidavits. Nile Valley Fed. S & L v. Sec. Title Guar. Corp., 813 P.2d 849, 852 (Colo.App.1991).
The Beaubien document was outside the chain of title and had never been recorded in the title so as to create a cloud on the Taylor title. Even if we assume that Taylor had a duty of inquiry notice arising out of that document, the duties attendant upon inquiry notice have never included those now prescribed by the majority. This court suggested in Bray v. Germain Inv. Co., 105 Colo. 403, 98 P.2d 993, 995 (1940) that publication notice is not sufficient when an examiner may, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, "discover the identity of a party interested in the res." However, the court in that case considered the rights of individuals whose identities and addresses were made known to the publishing party by the interested party's attorneys, prior to the publication. Id. at 994. The court noted that until their identities were made known, "reasonable diligence was exercised" and publication notice would have sufficed. Id. at 995.
The Federal District Court in 1965 reviewed the sufficiency of notice in the Torrens action, requiring Taylor to name and serve a number of additional parties. That determination was upheld. Again, a trial court has reviewed in detail what Taylor did, what he knew or should have known at the time, and has upheld the procedure he undertook, except as to a few claimants. This issue has been fully resolved, in accordance with prevailing law and title examination requirements. It should be allowed some postponed finality.
IV. Torrens Title Registration: the Purpose and Procedure
Title searches are necessitated by the land title recording system used in almost every state today. The recording system traces its roots back to the earliest conveyances of real property during the colonial period. This system makes no promises to reward a diligent search, but merely invites the purchaser to inspect an index organized by the names of those parties who have recorded their interest in real estate and allows the searcher to gamble on that basis as to the certainty of his title. Roger A. Cunningham et al., The Law of Property § 11.15, at 827 (1984).
In contrast, the Torrens system of registration of title was designed to convey absolute certainty of title. Developed in 1858 by Sir Robert Torrens, the system, differs from land title recording systems both in nature and result. 14 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 88.012] (rev. ed.1999). Tangibly, under a recording system, the records maintained merely include evidence of the instruments of conveyance by which a title was transferred. However, under the registration system, what is registered is the actual title to the land. 42 A.L.R.2d 1388 § 1 (1955). After the title is registered, a transfer of title may only take place when the *1173owner voluntarily submits his copy of the registration to the registrar, who then issues a new certificate. Id.
Academics bemoan the uncertainty of title conveyed under the recording system, and champion the Torrens system as offering a sensible modern solution to many problems. Calls for conveyancing reform focus on three major areas of concern: 1) inadequate security for land titles, 2) speed in determination of title status, and 3) cost of assuring title. John E. Cribbet & Corwin W. Johnson, Principles of the Law of Property 347-48 @@rd ed.1989). All of these concerns are readily answered by a registration system.
The purpose of Torrens registration is to "make the title to property more certain and readily ascertainable [to] third parties." Powell, supra, § 88.02[1]. Unlike the traditional recording system, under a registration system it is not necessary for purchasers "to search, examine and analyze the evidence of title." Id. The purchaser can readily find the exact status of the title. Id. "No historical search of the title is ever necessary or relevant." Cunningham, supra, § 11.15, at 829. "The title examination process is vastly simplified and duplication of searches as successive transfers of the same land occur is eliminated." Id. Further, it is efficient and cost effective-in most cases a competent attorney can verify a registered title in about an hour. Cribbet, supra, at 351.
Most importantly, title registration affords maximum security of title Id. at 352. "So long as the owner takes proper care of his duplicate, it is an absolute safeguard against loss of title by reason of a forged deed." R.G. Patton, Priorities, Recording, Registration, in 4 American Law of Property 521, § 1741 (A. James Casner ed., 1952). The conclusiveness of the title is "of vital interest to the holder, to mortgagees who loan him money, and to anyone who is about to purchase the title from him." Id. at § 17.47.
The purpose of Torrens registration systems is thus accurately characterized as follows:
The objects of the [Torrens] system are as follows: First, the ereation of an indefeasible title in the registered owner; second, simplification in the transfer of land; third, certainty and facility in the proof of title by reference to a certificate issued by a government official made conclusive by law; and fourth, the saving to the community of the cost of a new examination of title in connection with each transfer or transaction affecting the land.
State ex rel. Draper v. Wilder, 145 Ohio St. 447, 62 N.E.2d 156, 158 (1945) (quoting 8 Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed., 258, § 4415). ‘
Registration statutes are voluntary rather than mandatory, and current owners have little motivation to undergo the expense of guaranteeing their title via registration unless the courts then uphold such registration decrees. It is easy to appreciate that the degree of effectiveness of title registration depends fundamentally upon "the degree to which a certificate of title ... is conclusive and able to withstand challenge as to the ownership of a specific parcel of real estate." Powell, supra, § 88.02[3][al.
V. The Colorado Torrens Act
Colorado has adopted a system of voluntary registration under the Torrens Regis tration Act. When a court enters a decree of registration, that decree binds the land and quiets the title thereto, and is "forever binding and conclusive upon all persons." § 38-36-180, 5 CRS. (2002). The registration decree may not be attacked unless an individual holding an interest in or lien upon the land, who was not actually served with process or notified of the application filing, and who in fact had no actual notice or information of the filing, petitions to reopen the registration within 90 days of its entry and before an innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. § 38-36-1381. All other complaints against the decree must be pursued as actions in tort or indemnity. Id.
Thus after 90 days, no person may atterapt to recover any interest in registered land. § 38-36-1382. The recipient of the registration decree and subsequent purchasers may rest confident in their absolute title. No adverse party may ever attack the estate; the property is protected even against adverse possession. § 3-86-137 ("No title to *1174registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall ever be acquired by prescription or adverse possession."). The decree is an agreement forever running with the land, and all dealings with the land are controlled by the statutes of the registration act, unless the owner formally removes the land from registration. § 38-86-1836.
VI. Relevant Case Law
This court has long upheld the validity of Torrens registration decrees against attack. As carly as People ex rel. Smith v. Crissman, 41 Colo. 450, 92 P. 949 (1907), this court upheld the constitutional validity of Torrens decrees against complaints of due process violation. A short time later, this court protected a ereditor's reliance on a Torrens decree against a subsequent possessor of the property with a valid recorded interest. Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Fischer, 75 Colo. 371, 226 P. 146 (1924). The court observed, "the purpose of the [Torrens] act was to escape from the old rules governing the transfer of real estate." Id. at 147.
Other states have recognized the important role Torrens registration plays in solidifying title to real property. Comparing registration to recording, the Supreme Court of Minnesota observed that under a recording system:
[Plrospective purchasers of real property must examine the recorded evidence of transfers and encumbrances. With the passage of time and the inevitable lengthening of chains of title, this process understandably becomes more cumbersome and uncertain. Every time title to real property changes hands, the number of documents in a chain of title increases and the encumbrances that may constitute a defect in title increase in direct proportion. Thus, many title examiners feel compelled to raise any and all possible defects, even those that may be considered de minimus, when ascertaining whether title is marketable. As a result, examination of titles becomes less efficient and the status of titles becomes less certain.
Hersh Props., LLC v. McDonald's Corp., 588 N.W.2d 728, 782-33 (Minn.1999) (citing Paul E. Basye, Trends and Progress-The Marketable Title Acts, 47 Towa L.Rev. 261, 261 (1962)). Comparatively, the court recognized that Minnesota's registration system "operates to vest conclusive title in the holder of a certificate of title issued pursuant to judicial proceedings." Id. at 788. It is the "conclusive nature of certificates of title [which] allows real property owners to rely on the certificate of title while disregarding most interests not evidenced on the current certificate of title." Id. at 7834.
Similarly, in Massachusetts, the Supreme Court recognized that Torrens systems are "deemed advantageous since "[the difficulty with the [recording] system is that no one can be absolutely certain whether he is buying a good title or a bad one.... The great purpose of the Torrens System is to rid land titles of this peril, for with its disappearance disappears all the expense, trouble and delay that attend running the title back through previous transfers." " Kozdras v. Land/Vest Props., Inc., 382 Mass. 34, 418 N.E.2d 1105, 1111 (1980) (quoting Hurd, Exposition of the Torrens System of Registration of Title, in The Torrens System of Registration and Transfer of the Title to Real Estate 88-89 (Yeakle ed. 1894)).
The Supreme Court of North Carolina thus accurately concluded that the just purpose of the Torrens system is:
to secure by a decree of court, or other similar proceedings, a title impregnable against attack; to make a permanent and complete record of the exact status of the title with the certificate of registration showing at a glance all liens, eneum-brances, and claims against the title; and to protect the registered owner against all claims or demands not noted on the book for the registration of titles. _
State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 126, 179 S.E.2d 371 (1971) (quoting Frederick B. McCall, The Torrens System-After Thirty-Five Years, 10 N.C. L.Rev. 329 (1982)).
Of course, Colorado's Torrens Registration Act must comply with the due process re*1175quirements of the United States Constitution. Specifically, the Torrens system may not deprive any individual of his interest in land without providing him due notice of the registration proceedings, that he may appear to assert his rights.2
Under Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), due process requires that any interested parties must be given notice of the proceedings that is reasonably caleu-lated, under the cireumstances, to apprise them of the action and give them an opportunity to present their objections. Id. at 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, While a mere gesture toward supplying notice is insufficient, personal service is not always required. Id. at 814-15, 70 S.Ct. 652.
The focus is whether the means adopted by the petitioner are those that a reasonable person who truly desires to reach any absent parties would use to do so. Id. at 815, 70 S.Ct. 652. Thus the notice must "reasonably convey the required information" and afford a reasonable time for parties to appear. Id. at 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, Always the "practicalities and peculiarities of the case" weigh into the consideration of the appropriateness of the notice. Id. A state may dispense with certain notice to beneficiaries "whose interests or whereabouts could not with due diligence be ascertained," "whose interests are either conjectural or future," or who "do not in the due course of business come to knowledge" even when they could be discovered upon investigation. Id. at 317, 70 S.Ct. 652.
While the Court noted in Mullane that, where the names and post office addresses of affected parties are "at hand," notice by mail is required, the court was not referring to any and all parties who may be unearthed through investigation Id. at 318-19, 70 S.Ct. 652. Rather the court referenced those parties whose identities, as in that case, were "on [the] books" of the petitioning party himself and thus gave him ready actual knowledge of the parties' in interest identities and whereabouts. Id. at 318, 70 S.Ct. 652.
Importantly, of course, I repeat the statutory mandate that any attack on the Torrens decree under Colorado law must be initiated within 90 days of entry of the decree. All other remedies are damages remedies. Hence, even if the Torrens decree here is in some way defective, the claimants' only remedy is money damages, and not rights to the property.
VII, Application
Jack Taylor, and the title examiner appointed to examine the interests of competing parties in the 1960 Torrens action, exercised due diligence to identify and notify all reasonably ascertainable parties of the Torrens proceedings. Following standard Colorado procedures, they examined the title to the estate, tracing the record of title through the real estate records of the clerk and recorder's office and inspecting the land for unidentified occupants. In addition, the examiner made requests of two parties claiming to represent further unidentified individuals with interests. Finally, Taylor fenced in the property to give actual notice to any parties attempting to use the property, and published notice in the county newspaper for six weeks. These methods exceeded the nee-essary procedures and served to support the entry of a valid Torrens decree. Subsequent purchasers were entitled to rely upon the certificate of registration to protect their acquisition of the estates. Alternatively, any errors justifying relief must, according to statute, be brought as actions for damages, as title to the land indisputably rests in the hands of those in whom title was quieted by the Torrens decree or purchasers who relied upon that decree.
VIIL Costs
I find no basis for assessment of prospective costs against Taylor under C.R.C.P. *117654(d). "Costs" under the Rule reflect expenditures already made by a prevailing party, not expenditures occasioned by a remand order. The discretion to award future costs is committed to the trial court. Taylor and his successors in interest have made every effort to follow statutory and court-ordered procedures, presumably at great expense. Now to be ordered to pay costs of serving unidentified and uncounted claimants operates as an unwarranted sanction. Lastly, it is the plaintiffs who seek to quiet title as against a registered Torrens decree. Irrespective of the legal merit of their claims, they continue to bear the buzden of going forward should they so choose. Taylor is the defendant here.
IX. Conclusion
This case has had a tortuous history, of almost Dickensian proportion. Yet, despite the convoluted procedural background, clear rules of law apply and those clear rules operate to preclude these claimants from asserting any interest in the Taylor Ranch property. Counterbalanced against those clear rules of law are individuals who represent part of the history and heart of Colorado. However, acceding to their claims is truly a departure from settled principles of property law, finality of judgment, and certainty of title. I respectfully dissent, and would affirm the trial court's rulings regarding the sufficiency of notice and operation of res judicata.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE RICE joins in this dissent.
. The majority requires that prospective claimants document that they currently own a parcel of land, a portion or all of which was settled during the Gilpin era. Whether or not the occupants of the parcel exercised the rights claimed on Taylor Ranch for the one hundred and fifty years since that time, the majority offers those occupants a legal interest in Taylor Ranch. By bypassing a requirement that the claimant trace his or her title back to an owner during the Gilpin era, I fear that the majority has created a circumstance in which these rights may come as a windfall to individuals who have no history in the area, no tie to people who actually exercised the rights and no legal entitlement.
. I do not find Jacobucci v. Dist. Court, 189 Colo. 380, 541 P.2d 667 (1975) instructive on this issue. In Jacobucci, this court ruled as a matter of law that readily ascertainable possessors of water rights could not collectively be served notice through a mutual ditch company, which itself had no actual ownership rights in or rights to use the water.