[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-15114 FEBRUARY 9, 2007
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00195-CR-C-S
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICKEY LEE MOODY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(February 9, 2007)
Before BIRCH, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Mickey Lee Moody appeals his 180-month sentence for possession of a
firearm by convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal,
Moody argues that the district court erred by treating a 1982 conviction for third-
degree burglary of a drug store as a qualifying conviction for purposes of the
Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (“ACCA”). After careful review,
we affirm.
A person convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding one year is prohibited from possessing a firearm in or affecting
commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). A defendant convicted under § 922(g)(1)
is subject to the sentence-enhancement provision of the ACCA, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e), which provides, inter alia, the following:
(1) In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and
has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section
922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or
both, committed on occasions different from one another, such person
shall be . . . imprisoned not less than fifteen years. . . .
...
(2)(B) [T]he term “violent felony” means any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that –
(ii) is burglary . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), (e)(2)(B). We review de novo whether a particular
conviction is a violent felony for purposes of § 924(e) and the ACCA. See United
States v. Day, 465 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2006).
The offense of burglary, in the context of § 924(e), does not depend on the
definition adopted by the state where the person was convicted. See Taylor v.
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United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590 (1990). Moreover, burglary for § 924 purposes is
not limited to the common-law definition. Id. at 593-96. Rather, “a person has
been convicted of a burglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement if he is
convicted of any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic
elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or
structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
In determining whether a crime qualifies as a burglary, the district court
should “look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior
offense.” Id. at 602. Applying Taylor, we have held that “a district court only may
inquire into the conduct surrounding a conviction if ambiguities in the judgment
make the crime of violence determination impossible from the face of the judgment
itself.” United States v. Spell, 44 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1995). Thus, where the
state statute defines burglary as unlawfully entering a structure or a conveyance, a
court would not be able to determine, based solely on the judgment, if a person was
convicted of burglary of a structure or of a conveyance. Day, 465 F.3d at 1266.
Because burglary of a conveyance is not a “generic burglary” as defined in Taylor,
a court may need to look at the underlying conduct in order to determine whether
the conviction was a qualifying conviction. Id.
Here, the Alabama statute, under which Moody was convicted in 1982, is
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unambiguous. It defines third-degree burglary as “knowingly enter[ing] or
remain[ing] unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime.” Ala. Code
§ 13A-7-7 (emphasis added). Simply put, because the statutory language
unambiguously includes the elements of “generic burglary,” as outlined in Taylor,
and provides for a term of imprisonment greater than one year, it is a qualifying
offense under § 924(e). Accordingly, the district court did not err by sentencing
Moody in compliance with § 924(e).
AFFIRMED.
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