[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
-------------------------------------------U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 06-12027 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAR 15, 2007
Non-Argument Calendar
-------------------------------------------- THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 05-00413-CR-T-24-EAJ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAUL CAMACHO-BENITEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
-------------------------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
---------------------------------------
(March 15, 2007)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, DUBINA and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-Appellant Raul Camacho-Benitez appeals his 135-month
sentence imposed after he pled guilty to (1) possession with intent to distribute
five kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States, in violation of 46 App. U.S.C. § 1903(a), (g); 18 U.S.C. § 2;
and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii); and (2) conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 46 App. U.S.C. § 1903(a), (g), and
(j); and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). No reversible error has been shown; we
affirm.
Camacho-Benitez first argues that the district court erred in denying him a
minor role reduction, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). He asserts that he was less culpable
than the other persons found on the boat (which was carrying 5,443 kilograms of
cocaine) because he was “merely a crew member” who played a smaller role in the
smuggling operation than the boat’s captain or drug representative.
We review for clear error the district court’s determinations about a
defendant’s role in an offense. United States v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1348 (11th
Cir. 2002). The burden is on the defendant to establish his role by a
preponderance of evidence. Id. Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), “[a] defendant
warrants a two-level reduction for playing a minor role in an offense if he is less
culpable than most other participants, although his role could not be described as
minimal.” Id. Sentencing courts should consider two elements when determining
a defendant’s role in an offense: “first, the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct
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for which [he] has been held accountable at sentencing, and, second, [his] role as
compared to that of other participants in [his] relevant conduct.” United States v.
De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 940 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
The district court committed no clear error in determining that Camacho-
Benitez’s role in the offense was more than minor. About the first element,
Camacho-Benitez’s sentence was based only on the relevant conduct for which he
was held accountable at sentencing: 5,443 kilograms of cocaine seized from the
boat on which he was found. In the drug courier context, a large amount of drugs
is an important factor in determining the availability of a minor role adjustment.
Id. at 943 (“[T]he amount of drugs imported is a material consideration in
assessing a defendant’s role in [his] relevant conduct. . . . [W]e do not foreclose
the possibility that amount of drugs may be dispositive . . . . ”). About the second
element, Camacho-Benitez was one of only nine crew members on the boat, which
was carrying over five tons of cocaine. He has failed to show that he “was less
culpable than most other participants in [his] relevant conduct.” Id. at 944. We
see no clear error in the district court’s refusal to apply a minor role reduction in
this case.
Camacho-Benitez next argues that his sentence was unreasonable under the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). He
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contends that, in determining his sentence, the district court should have
considered that he lives in poverty, struggles to support his wife and children, and
was displaced from his home in Colombia by armed guerillas. Camacho-Benitez
also asserts that the district court failed to consider sufficiently the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities with his co-defendants who received shorter
sentences and with a co-defendant who brought a firearm on the boat but received
the same sentence as Camacho-Benitez. He contends that the district court should
have considered the “victimless nature of [his] offense.”
Camacho-Benitez was sentenced after the Supreme Court issued its decision
in Booker; so we review his sentence for reasonableness in the light of the factors
set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241,
1244-46 (11th Cir. 2005). Under section 3553(a), a district court should consider,
among other things, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, the need for adequate deterrence and protection of
the public, policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, provision for the
medical and educational needs of the defendant, and the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7).
We conclude that Camacho-Benitez’s sentence was reasonable. The district
court correctly calculated his Guidelines imprisonment range as 135 to 168
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months; and the court sentenced Camacho-Benitez to the lowest point of that
range.1 See United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting
that “ordinarily we would expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be
reasonable”).
In addition, in sentencing Camacho-Benitez, the district court noted his
advisory Guidelines range and the section 3553(a) factors, commenting in
particular on the large amount of drugs involved in this case. The district court
also explained that the sentence imposed was not greater than necessary to comply
with the statutory purposes of sentencing. The district court judge was not
required to discuss all of the section 3553(a) factors at the sentencing hearing. See
United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
“nothing in Booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record
that it has explicitly considered each of the section 3553(a) factors or to discuss
each of the section 3553(a) factors”). And nothing in the record convinces us that
Camacho-Benitez’s sentence was unreasonable in the light of the section 3553(a)
factors.2
1
Except for disputing the district court’s decision not to apply a minor role reduction to his
sentence, Camacho-Benitez does not challenge the district court’s calculation of his Guidelines
range.
2
The government argues that Camacho-Benitez’s failure to request a sentence below his
applicable Guidelines range, raise an objection in district court to the reasonableness of his sentence,
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AFFIRMED.
or argue that the district court did not consider sufficiently the section 3553(a) factors, indicates that,
instead of reviewing his sentence for reasonableness, we should review Camacho-Benitez’s
challenge on appeal to the reasonableness of his sentence only for plain error. We need not decide
this issue because, for the reasons discussed, Camacho-Benitez’s claim that his sentence was
unreasonable fails under either standard of review.
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