United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 5, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-60015
RANA MOAZZAM,
Petitioner,
v.
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A79 008 156
Before KING, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Rana Moazzam is a 33-year-old native and citizen of Pakistan
who entered the United States as a visitor for a fourth and final
time on December 31, 2001. After staying in the United States
longer than permitted, he was placed in removal proceedings on
March 25, 2003. On April 14, 2004, Moazzam testified before an
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that he was a member of the Muttahida
*
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Quami Movement (“MQM”), a large political party in Pakistan, and
that he had been physically abused and beaten as a result of that
affiliation. The IJ found no evidence to support a finding of past
torture or persecution, and also found that Moazzam could viably
relocate within Pakistan to avoid any potential persecution based
on his allegiance to MQM. The IJ therefore rejected Moazzam’s
pleas for asylum and withholding of removal, and ordered him
removed from the United States.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed that ruling
on August 22, 2005. Moazzam did not seek review of that decision,
but on November 15, 2005, Moazzam moved to reopen his immigration
proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). He argued
that conditions had changed in Pakistan, and sought to introduce
evidence to that effect. On December 12, 2005, the BIA found that
the new evidence was not likely to change the result in the case
and denied the motion to reopen. Moazzam appealed.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen “under a
highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Zhao v.
Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 303 (5th Cir. 2005). The relevant question
is “‘whether the Board has acted within the bounds of an abundant
discretion granted it by Congress,’” and we will not reverse that
decision, even if we deem it erroneous, unless it is “‘capricious,
racially invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or
otherwise so irrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result
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of any perceptible rational approach.’” Id. at 304 (quoting
Pritchett v. INS, 993 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1993).
Moazzam attached three exhibits to his motion to reopen that
he believed demonstrated changed conditions in his native Pakistan.
Two of these were articles about sectarian violence in Pakistan
released in late 2005; the third was a country report on Pakistan
issued by the State Department in February of 2005. The BIA found
the evidence unpersuasive, saying that it “consists only of general
reports of continuing political violence in Pakistan, and contains
no information specifically relating to the respondent” (emphasis
added). The italicized language is the basis of Moazzam’s appeal.
He argues that the BIA misapplied the law and imposed upon him a
burden to show that he, individually and personally, is likely to
face persecution upon his return to Pakistan, when in fact it would
be sufficient to show that he is a member of MQM, and that there is
a pattern or practice of persecution against MQM members. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(b)(2)(I).
Moazzam is quite right about the law, but we find his argument
unavailing. Moazzam reads too much into the italicized phrase
above. Though the wording of the order is clumsy, we do not read
it as imposing a uniquely high threshold on Moazzam, nor as
misconstruing the relevant legal standard. Rather, we read it to
say that the new evidence spoke more to ongoing violence in
Pakistan generally, and not to persecution suffered by members of
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MQM—and thus, Moazzam—specifically. Our review of the new evidence
confirms that this is certainly true. The evidence suggests
ongoing violence among and against many sectarian groups in
Pakistan, but there is no indication that said violence was on the
rise, either in general terms or against members of MQM, since the
BIA’s initial ruling. In light of the record evidence, then, we
cannot say that the BIA’s decision was “‘capricious, racially
invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise
so irrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result of any
perceptible rational approach.’” Zhao, 404 F.3d at 304 (internal
quotation omitted).
The petition for review is DENIED.
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