[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DEC 03, 2007
No. 07-11849 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
Agency No. A97-896-850
NOHEMY CANO-MUNOZ,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(December 3, 2007)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner Nohemy Cano-Munoz, through counsel, seeks review of the
Board of Immigration Appeal’s (“BIA”) decision to adopt and affirm the
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) removal order and denial of her applications for asylum
and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms
of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), 8 U.S.C. §§
1158, 1231, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c).
The IJ denied Cano-Munoz’s application for asylum and withholding of
removal because she found that Cano-Munoz’s claims were not credible.
Cano-Munoz argues that (1) the IJ failed to create a record that provides for
meaningful appellate review because the IJ's decision did not provide a rational
explanation and is devoid of any reasoning, and (2) the IJ violated her right to due
process by acting in an unprofessional and biased manner. The Attorney General
responds that Cano-Munoz abandoned any challenge to the credibility finding
because she did not raise the issue in her initial brief, and this court does not have
jurisdiction to hear the due process claim because she failed to exhaust her claim
with the BIA.
Meaningful Appellate Review
When the BIA issues a decision, we review only that decision, except to the
extent that the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257
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F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, because the BIA expressly adopted the
IJ’s decision, we will review the IJ’s decision.
We remand when an order does not contain a sufficient explanation of the
ruling. See Danley v. Allen, 480 F.3d 1090, 1091-92 (11th Cir. 2007) (remanding
to a district court because one sentence summary denials precluded meaningful
appellate review) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 case). To establish asylum eligibility, the
alien must, with specific and credible evidence (1) establish past persecution on
account of a statutorily listed factor, or (2) establish a “well-founded fear” of future
persecution on account of a statutorily listed factor. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), (b);
Forgue v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 2005); Al Najjar,
257 F.3d at 1287. Issues not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned. Access
Now, Inc. v. SW. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004).
The IJ stated that the reason for denying Cano-Munoz’s claims was that the
claims were not credible. Moreover, the IJ stated her reasons for deciding that the
claims were not credible. Thus, the record is sufficient to conduct a meaningful
appellate review. Because Cano-Munoz did not challenge the adverse credibility
finding, we deem the issue abandoned. Accordingly, we deny the petition on this
issue.
Jurisdiction to Consider the Due Process Claim
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“We review subject matter jurisdiction de novo.” See Gonzalez-Oropeza v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 321 F.3d 1331, 1332 (11th Cir. 2003). We lack jurisdiction to
consider claims raised in a petition for review unless the petitioner exhausted her
administrative remedies with respect to those claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1);
Sundar v. I.N.S., 328 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003). In order to exhaust all
administrative remedies, an alien must raise her claims before the BIA. Sundar,
328 F.3d at 1323. Exhaustion is required when the alleged due process violation is
the denial of a full and fair hearing before a neutral fact finder. Amaya-
Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2006). This court
liberally reads briefs filed pro se. Lorisme v. I.N.S., 129 F.3d 1441, 1444 n.3 (11th
Cir. 1997) (allowing a pro se petitioner to adopt a board member’s dissent as his
appellate argument).
After a thorough and liberal reading of Cano-Munoz’s pro se brief on appeal
to the BIA, we conclude that she only claimed that the IJ did not consider the
complete record, and not that she was denied due process because the IJ was biased
and acted disrespectfully. Because Cano-Munoz did not make a claim of bias on
the part of the IJ in her appeal to the BIA, the claim has not been exhausted. Thus,
we lack jurisdiction to consider her due process claim. Accordingly, we dismiss
her due process claim.
PETITION DENIED IN PART, AND DISMISSED IN PART.
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