IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 27, 2008
No. 06-30887 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
DENNIS PATRICK BROWN,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
NACE JERRY MILLER, in his individual and official capacities,
Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Before DeMOSS, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge:
Nace Jerry Miller (Miller) appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity. We affirm in part, dismiss in
part, and remand for further proceedings.
I
Because this is an appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss, these facts
are taken from the pleadings and are presented in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. In 1984, Dennis Patrick Brown (Brown) was convicted of rape and
sentenced to life in prison. Twenty years later, DNA testing proved him
innocent, and he was released. He sued the city of Covington, Louisiana, and
No. 06-30887
several of its officers for their alleged misconduct in the investigation and
prosecution of his case.
Jane Doe,1 a white woman, was raped in her home in Covington,
Louisiana, in 1984. She provided her minipad and underwear to the police,
along with specimens from a rape examination, all of which were forwarded to
the Louisiana State Police Crime Laboratory. Ms. Doe also assisted the police
in creating a sketch of her attacker, though the sketch lacked identifiable
features because the attack had occurred in the dark and the attacker had worn
a baseball cap and mask. Later, Ms. Doe identified Brown as her attacker in a
line-up; he had been asked to volunteer for the line-up only as a “fill-in” and was
not represented by counsel. The police obtained samples of blood, hair, and
saliva, and fingerprinted Brown but did not arrest him.
The police investigator forwarded the physical samples to the Louisiana
State Crime lab, along with an annotation that Brown had been “identified via
line-up.” Brown alleges that this annotation violated department policy, and
that its purpose was to encourage the lab to confirm a genetic match and to
suppress any exculpatory results. Miller, the laboratory technician, performed
the “ABO test” on the samples, and then compared the antigens in Brown’s blood
with the antigens found in the mixture of blood and semen from the minipad and
underwear. This test revealed the presence of the H antigen in the mixture.
Both Jane Doe and Brown had blood type O and were secretors.2 Brown alleges
that at least three scenarios were consistent with these facts: (i) the rapist was
1
The victim’s name has been changed to protect her privacy.
2
A secretor is an individual whose blood antigens appear in his or her bodily fluids,
such as saliva and semen.
2
No. 06-30887
a non-secretor of any blood type, and the H antigen from the minipad came from
Jane Doe’s own blood rather from the rapist’s semen, (ii) the rapist was a type
O secretor, or (iii) the majority of the blood–semen mixture consisted of the
victim’s own blood, and the characteristics of the semen were “masked” and did
not appear in the results. Brown alleges that at this point Miller either
intentionally and in bad faith failed to conduct additional, commonly used tests
(“Rh tests” and “enzyme tests”) that would have made the identification more
specific and accurate, and likely excluded Brown as the donor, or, in the
alternative, that Miller did conduct those tests, that those tests were
conclusively exculpatory, and that Miller concealed the exculpatory results.
Brown specifically alleges that these other tests were commonly used in the
same lab at the time, that Miller knew about and used those other tests in the
same year, that Miller was unable to draw conclusions in similar identification
cases without performing those more specific tests, and that Miller could have
performed those tests in Brown’s case. Miller argues that these facts support an
inference either that Miller actually did conduct the tests in this case or that he
knew he should have reported that his results were inconclusive without further
testing.
Shortly after the testing, Miller gave “verbal confirmation” of a positive
match to an investigating officer. Although the content of this conversation is
unknown, the officer immediately swore out an affidavit that Brown had been
“positively identified” by the blood test. Brown alleges that this verbal
confirmation was in violation of police procedure. Police officers arrested Brown,
and he was charged with the rape.
Miller later submitted a written report, which stated that the semen donor
either had blood type O or was a non-secretor. Brown alleges that this was a
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No. 06-30887
scientifically inaccurate conclusion to draw from the results, because it failed to
acknowledge possibility (iii) above—that the H antigen had come only from the
victim’s own blood and indicated nothing about the rapist. At trial, Miller
testified that he could conclude on the basis of his blood tests that Brown was
within the 46.5% of the male population who could have contributed the semen.
Brown alleges that this statement was inaccurate and misleading for the same
reasons his report was misleading.
Based on the blood results, the line-up identification, and what he alleges
was a false and coerced confession, Brown was convicted and sentenced to life
in prison. Brown alleges that all of the wrongful actions by Miller were done
intentionally and in bad faith, and that they were in furtherance of a conspiracy
with police officers to deny Brown his constitutional rights because of his race.
The minipad was re-tested in 2003 by the state of Louisiana and the
Innocence Project. This testing revealed that Brown could not have been the
donor of the semen. Brown was released, and the City of Covington declined to
re-prosecute.
Brown sued the City of Covington and several of its police officers and
Miller. The five claims against Miller, out of ten total in the initial complaint,
are the following:
Claim III: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for depriving Brown of his
rights to a fair trial and due process of law;
Claim IV: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985(3) claims for conspiracy
to deprive Brown of his rights because of racial
animus;
Claim VII: State law claim for malicious prosecution;
Claim VIII: State law claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress;
Claim X: State law claim for spoliation of evidence.
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No. 06-30887
The remaining claims were against other police officers and the City itself, who
are not parties to this interlocutory appeal. Miller filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing both that Brown had failed to state a claim and that Miller was entitled
to official immunity against Brown’s claims. The district court ordered Brown
to submit a reply brief in accordance with FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a) and our holding in
Schultea v. Wood3 to plead specific facts that would overcome Miller’s assertion
of qualified immunity. Brown complied. The district court then denied the
motion to dismiss, finding both that Brown had stated a claim and that Miller
was not entitled to qualified immunity on the basis of the pleadings and reply.
Miller timely appealed the denial of the qualified immunity defense.
II
We have appellate jurisdiction to review a district court’s order denying
a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity to the extent that it turns
on an issue of law.4 We review the district court’s denial of the qualified
immunity defense de novo, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.5 In an interlocutory appeal of
a denial of qualified immunity, we have jurisdiction to consider only whether “a
certain course of conduct would, as a matter of law, be objectively unreasonable
in light of clearly established law.”6
A
3
See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433-34 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
4
Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 251 (5th Cir. 2005).
5
Id. at 252.
6
Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
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No. 06-30887
To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must first show
a violation of the Constitution or of federal law, and then show that the violation
was committed by someone acting under color of state law.”7 The qualified
immunity defense to such claims seeks to shield from liability government
officials performing discretionary functions “insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”8 Courts must evaluate claims of
qualified immunity in a two step process: first, a court must determine whether
the “facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right”; if the
court finds a violation then it proceeds to the second step, which is to determine
whether “the right was clearly established . . . in light of the specific context of
the case.”9 “To be clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity, the
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.”10 There need not be
“commanding precedent” that holds that the “very action in question” is
unlawful; the unlawfulness need only be “readily apparent from relevant
precedent in sufficiently similar situations.”11
7
Atteberry, 430 F.3d at 252-253.
8
Kinney, 367 F.3d at 349 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
9
Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (2007) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
201 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10
Atteberry, 430 F.3d at 256 (quoting Kinney, 367 F.3d at 349-50) (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted).
11
Id. at 257 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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No. 06-30887
Brown alleges two acts that he claims violated his rights. First, he alleges
that Miller overstated the results of the blood tests he conducted, effectively
fabricating evidence by overstating his results and putting forward misleading
scientific conclusions. Second, he alleges that Miller ran additional tests besides
those he reported (i.e., enzyme tests), that the results exculpated Brown, and
that Miller concealed, suppressed, or destroyed these results.
Brown alleges that Miller’s laboratory report “had no scientific basis [and]
grossly overstated the results of [the] laboratory results, and violated standard
procedures for analyzing blood–semen stains,” thus creating a “misleading and
materially inaccurate inculpatory serology report” when Miller knew he should
have reported that the results were inconclusive. A criminal defendant’s due
process rights are violated when the government obtains a conviction with
testimony that government agents know is false.12 In Geter v. Fortenberry, we
stated that “a police officer cannot avail himself of a qualified immunity defense
if he procures false identification by unlawful means . . . .”13 A false or
scientifically inaccurate report is equivalent to any other false evidence created
by investigators, such as a false police report; as we have stated, there is no
reason a government scientific expert “should enjoy immunity greater than that
of other investigators.”14 As the First Circuit held, “if any concept is
fundamental to our American system of justice, it is that those charged with
upholding the law are prohibited from deliberately fabricating evidence . . . .”15
12
See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
13
Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1559 (5th Cir. 1988).
14
Keko v. Hingle, 318 F.3d 639, 644 (5th Cir. 2003).
15
Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2004).
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No. 06-30887
And, as that court explained, the right of criminal defendants to be free from
false or fabricated evidence was well settled by 1959 or earlier.16 On facts
similar to those in this case, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the laboratory
technician was not entitled to qualified immunity for the allegedly false reports
made in 1986.17 We therefore hold that the deliberate or knowing creation of a
misleading and scientifically inaccurate serology report amounts to a violation
of a defendant’s due process rights, and that a reasonable laboratory technician
in 1984 would have understood that those actions violated those rights. The
district court did not err in denying qualified immunity on this theory.
Brown also alleges that Miller concealed, suppressed, or destroyed lab
results that were conclusively exculpatory with respect to Brown. The Supreme
Court held in Brady v. Maryland that a criminal prosecutor’s failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant violates a defendant’s right to a
fair trial.18 A police officer’s deliberate concealment of exculpatory evidence
violates this same right, and can give rise to liability under § 1983.19 By 1967,
a public official’s concealment of exculpatory evidence was a constitutional
violation in this circuit.20 Therefore, the law was sufficiently clear in 1984 that
a state crime lab technician would have known that suppression of exculpatory
16
See id. at 45 (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269).
17
Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298-1300 (10th Cir. 2004).
18
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963).
19
See Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1559 (5th Cir. 1988).
20
See Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 480 n.11 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing
Luna v. Beto, 391 F.2d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1967)) (holding that “concealing exculpatory evidence
by police officers” was a constitutional violation in this circuit by 1967).
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No. 06-30887
blood test results would violate a defendant’s rights. Miller does not argue
otherwise. We therefore hold that the district court did not err in denying the
qualified immunity defense on this theory.
B
Section 1985(3) prohibits persons from conspiring “for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws . . . .”21 Brown alleged in his complaint and reply that Miller overstated
results and concealed exculpatory results in furtherance of a conspiracy with the
other investigating police officers in order to arrest and convict Brown because
of his race. In his reply brief, Brown alleged specific facts that would either
directly or inferentially support his claims, including: the rape victim was white
and Brown is black; that a police officer wrote to Miller that the suspect was a
“young Black Male” and had been identified via line-up; that Miller created a
false and misleading lab report positively identifying Brown as the rapist; that
Miller suppressed exculpatory test results; and that Miller and the other officers
were motivated by racial animus against Brown.
On appeal, Miller argues only that Brown failed to sufficiently plead a
§ 1985 cause of action. He never argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity
even if the allegations, including conspiracy and racial animus, are true. Miller’s
argument about the § 1985 claim is therefore merely an attack on the district
court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In this
interlocutory appeal, we have jurisdiction only to consider the question whether
Miller is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. We do not have
21
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
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No. 06-30887
jurisdiction to review the simple denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim.22 We therefore dismiss this portion of Miller’s appeal.
C
Finally, we will address Brown’s state law claims. Our jurisdiction to
review denials of motions to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity is
procedural, and derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1291 rather than from substantive
federal law.23 Because federal courts use federal procedure even when applying
state law, we give interlocutory review to denials of motions to dismiss state law
claims on the basis of qualified immunity, regardless of whether state courts,
applying their own procedure, would do the same.24 In evaluating a motion to
dismiss a state claim on the grounds of qualified immunity, federal courts must
apply the state’s substantive law of qualified immunity.25 But Miller has not
argued that he has qualified immunity against the state law claims under the
Louisiana law of qualified immunity. He argues only the federal law of qualified
immunity in his motions to dismiss before the district court and in his appellate
briefs. Accordingly, he has waived any assignments of error regarding the denial
of his motion to dismiss the state law claims on the basis of qualified immunity.
* * *
For these reasons, we AFFIRM IN PART, DISMISS IN PART, and
REMAND for further proceedings.
22
See Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 251-52 (5th Cir. 2005).
23
See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 921 (1997) (holding that state courts need not
provide interlocutory review of denials of motions to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity,
even for federal claims).
24
Sorey v. Kellett, 849 F.2d 960, 961-63 (5th Cir. 1988).
25
Id.
10