[Cite as Cuyahoga Cty. Treasurer v. Holloway, 2022-Ohio-301.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
TREASURER OF CUYAHOGA
COUNTY, OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 110433
v. :
SHAWN HOLLOWAY, ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellants. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: DISMISSED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 3, 2022
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-15-854999
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Hannah Singerman, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Shawn Holloway, pro se.
MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
Defendant-appellant, Shawn Holloway (“Holloway”), pro se, appeals
the trial court’s reinstatement of a vacated decree of foreclosure in favor of plaintiff-
appellee, Treasurer of Cuyahoga County. For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss
this appeal as moot.
On November 30, 2015, the county filed a complaint in foreclosure of
real property located at 2848 East 102nd Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44104, permanent
parcel number 128-11-066, for delinquent real property taxes. On December 18,
2015, Holloway answered the complaint.
On November 22, 2016, the matter proceeded to a hearing before the
magistrate. On November 30, 2016, the magistrate issued a decision with findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of foreclosure. On December 12, 2016,
Holloway filed a pro se motion to “set aside” the magistrate’s decision. Holloway’s
motion was essentially an objection to the magistrate’s decision. On December 14,
2016, the trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision and entered a decree of
foreclosure without ruling on Holloway’s objections.
On December 30, 2016, Holloway filed notice of appeal in Treasurer
of Cuyahoga Cty. v. Holloway, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105309, 2017-Ohio-8065.
On January 20, 2017, the trial court denied Holloway’s motion to stay absent
Holloway’s filing of a supersedeas bond.
On March 10, 2017, the trial court issued an order of sale for
April 10, 2017, and if the property did not sell, a second sale on April 24, 2017. On
May 17, 2017, the county forfeited the property to the state of Ohio.
On October 5, 2017, this court dismissed Holloway’s appeal for lack
of a final appealable order because the trial court had not ruled on Holloway’s timely
objections before adopting the magistrate’s decision. On March 30, 2018, the trial
court reviewed the magistrate’s November 30, 2016 decision, found that it did “not
properly reflect the record,” and vacated its December 14, 2016 decree of
foreclosure.
On April 4, 2018, the magistrate issued a revised decision with
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of foreclosure without objection
from Holloway. On May 1, 2018, the trial court adopted the magistrate’s revised
decision and reentered a decree of foreclosure.
On July 6, 2018, the trial court issued orders of sale for August 6 and
August 20, 2018. On August 7, 2018, the trial court ordered the sheriff to return the
order of sale without execution. Attached to this order is the trial court’s finding that
the property was sold in a forfeited land sale held on November 2, 2017.
Nearly a year later, on July 24, 2019, the county moved to vacate the
decree of foreclosure and dismiss the case, stating that Holloway had “redeemed the
parcel by payment in full of all taxes, assessments, penalties, interest and other
charges, if any, in accordance with [R.C.] 5721.25 * * *, together with all costs
incurred in these proceedings.” The trial court granted the county’s motion on
August 7, 2019.
More than a year and a half later, on February 23, 2021, the county
moved to reinstate the May 1, 2018 decree of foreclosure. In the motion, the county
stated that it filed its July 24, 2019 motion to vacate “in error.” The county explained
that the property had not sold in April 2017, was forfeited to the state, and later sold
to a third party who paid the delinquent taxes.
On March 19, 2021, the trial court granted the county’s motion to
reinstate the foreclosure decree, finding that
[the county] had previously moved to vacate the judgment of
foreclosure on the mistaken belief that [Holloway] had redeemed the
parcel. However, the taxes were brought current through adjustment
due to forfeiture of the parcel to the state, along with payments made
to the Treasurer by a subsequent bona fide purchaser. In order to
remove the cloud on title to the parcel, the journal entry filed
August 7, 2019 vacating the judgment of foreclosure and dismissing the
case is vacated, set aside, and held for naught. The judgment of
foreclosure entered May 1, 2018 is reinstated and remains in full force
and effect.
Holloway appeals this judgment,1 raising a single assignment of error:
The trial court erred when it allowed [the county] to prevail on a Motion
to Reinstate a Foreclosure Judgment outside of the legislative
parameters expressly set forth in R.C. 2305.19, and by allowing counsel
to withdraw without filing an answer motion, giving an extension of
time to do so, or holding an inquiry hearing where counsel was recently
disciplined for similar conduct. All in violation of [Holloway’s] right to
due process of law as guaranteed under the Sixth and Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
In his sole assignment of error, Holloway argues that the trial court
erred when it reinstated its May 1, 2018 foreclosure decree because the trial court,
in effect, treated the county’s motion as a motion for reconsideration. The county
argues that the trial court’s August 7, 2019 judgment entry vacating its May 1, 2018
foreclosure decree was void because the August 7, 2019 judgment was based on a
1 New counsel for Holloway filed a notice of appearance on March 31, 2021, and a
notice of appeal on April 18, 2021. However, Holloway filed his appellate brief pro se.
mistaken belief that Holloway had paid the delinquent taxes and redeemed the
property when in fact the property had been forfeited to the state on May 17, 2017,
and subsequently sold to a third party. Because the property has been sold, however,
Holloway’s appeal is moot.
R.C. 323.25, governing enforcement of tax liens, provides that
foreclosure on unpaid tax liens proceed in the same manner as foreclosure on
unpaid mortgages. Rokakis v. W. Res. Leasing Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95058,
2011-Ohio-1926, ¶ 12. The same is true of foreclosure on unpaid liens of the state
under R.C. 5721.18(A). Rokakis v. Bowman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92950, 2010-
Ohio-4666, ¶ 8. R.C. 5723.01 requires property subject to foreclosure under
R.C. 323.25 and 5721.18 to be forfeited to the state if that property remains unsold
after it is twice offered for sale. After forfeiture, R.C. 5723.03 gives the former owner
a right to redeem the property until the property is sold. See Jonke v. Rubin, 170
Ohio St. 41, 44, 162 N.E.2d 116 (1959) (the right of redemption under R.C. 5723.03
is lost upon the state’s sale of the property).
In foreclosure actions, two judgments are appealable: the order of
foreclosure and the confirmation of sale. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Roznowski, 139 Ohio
St.3d 299, 2014-Ohio-1984, 11 N.E.3d 1140, ¶ 39. Failure to timely appeal a
foreclosure or forfeiture order bars any arguments pertaining to these orders.
Treasurer of Cuyahoga Cty. v. Robshir Properties, L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
Nos. 107056 and 107289, 2019-Ohio-535, ¶ 34. Once the property is sold in
foreclosure or forfeiture, failure to timely appeal confirmation of the sale limits the
former owner’s remedies because the law protects the property rights of the third-
party purchaser, who retains title to the property. Blisswood Village Home Owners
Assn. v. Euclid Community Reinvestment, L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105854,
2018-Ohio-1091, ¶ 16; Robshir Properties, L.L.C. at ¶ 38.
When property is no longer recoverable, R.C. 2329.45 provides
restitution as an alternative remedy if a foreclosure decree is reversed on appeal.
Provident Funding Assocs., L.P. v. Turner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100153, 2014-
Ohio-2529, at ¶ 6. However, R.C. 2329.45 only applies if the appellant sought and
obtained a stay of the distribution of the proceeds. Id. If the appellant fails to obtain
a stay, any appeal of the foreclosure decree is moot because “‘the matter has been
extinguished through satisfaction of the judgment, the individual subject matter of
the case is no longer under the control of the court[,] and the court cannot afford
relief to the parties to the action.’” Blisswood Village Home Owners Assn. v. Genesis
Real Estate Holdings Group, L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105861, 2018-Ohio-
1092, ¶ 13, quoting Bankers Trust Co. of California, N.A. v. Tutin, 9th Dist. Summit
No. 24329, 2009-Ohio-1333, ¶ 16.
In the instant case, Holloway appealed the trial court’s
December 14, 2016 foreclosure decree and moved for a stay but did not post a bond
pursuant to Civ.R. 62(B). Therefore, the trial court denied Holloway’s motion. In
addition, Holloway did not request a stay from this court pursuant to Civ.R. 62(D)
and App.R. 7(A). While the appeal was pending, the trial court ordered sheriff’s
sales on April 10 and April 24, 2017. The property did not sell. On May 17, 2017,
pursuant to R.C. 5723.01, the court ordered the property to be forfeited to the state.
Holloway did not appeal the court’s forfeiture decree. On November 2, 2017, the
state sold the property to a third party, cutting off Holloway’s right to redeem the
property under R.C. 5723.03. On October 5, 2017, this court dismissed Holloway’s
appeal for lack of a final appealable order. After the matter returned to the trial
court, the trial court vacated its December 14, 2016 foreclosure decree and entered
a second foreclosure decree on May 1, 2018. Holloway did not appeal this second
decree.
On appeal, Holloway asks this court to remand the matter for
dismissal with prejudice. Because the property has been sold, however, the matter
has been extinguished through satisfaction of the foreclosure judgment. Even if we
were to vacate the trial court’s reinstatement of its May 1, 2018 foreclosure decree,
we can afford Holloway no effective relief because Holloway neither appealed nor
obtained a stay of the court’s forfeiture and foreclosure orders. An appeal is moot
if the appellate court can grant no relief. Robshir Properties, L.L.C., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga Nos. 107056 and 107289, 2019-Ohio-535, at ¶ 38; Genesis Real Estate
Holdings Group, L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105861, 2018-Ohio-1092, at ¶ 14-
15; Euclid Community Reinvestment, L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105854, 2018-
Ohio-1091, at ¶ 18-19, citing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cuevas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 99921, 2014-Ohio-498; Rains, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98592, 2012-Ohio-5708;
Equibank v. Rivera, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 72224, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 185 (Jan.
22, 1998).
Accordingly, the instant appeal is dismissed as moot.
It is ordered that the parties share equally the costs herein taxed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure
_____________________________
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR