FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 23, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PYRAMID DIVERSIFIED
SERVICES, INC., d/b/a Simple HR,
Plaintiff-Counter
Defendant, No. 10-6263
(D.C. No. 5:09-CV-00622-HE)
v. (W.D. Okla.)
PROVIDENCE PROPERTY &
CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Counter
Claimant-Cross
Defendant-Cross
Claimant,
and
PACA, INC.,
Defendant-Cross
Claimant-Third Party
Plaintiff-Cross
Defendant-Appellee,
and
PARK AVENUE PROPERTY &
CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Cross-Defendant,
v.
PROVIDENCE HOLDINGS, INC.,
Third Party-Defendant-
Appellant,
__________________________
SKILSTAF, INC.,
Intervenor Defendant-
Third Party Plaintiff-
Cross Claimant-
Cross-Defendant-
Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, EBEL and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Third-party defendant Providence Holdings, Inc. appeals from a partial
summary judgment, certified as final under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), that awarded
Skilstaf, Inc. and PACA, Inc. damages arising out of a loan dispute. We AFFIRM
for substantially the same reasons given by the district court.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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B ACKGROUND
Providence is an insurance holding company. A Providence subsidiary
provided workers compensation coverage to Skilstaf and PACA, which are
organizations that manage human-resource responsibilities for various businesses.
Skilstaf and PACA loaned Providence $3.1 million under three “surplus
loan agreements” to help the subsidiary carry out its insurance business and “meet
regulatory requirements as to capital and surplus.” Aplt. Br. at 3. Providence
then loaned $7.05 million to its subsidiary pursuant to “surplus certificates.” Id.
Providence was required to repay Skilstaf and PACA “when and as interest and
principal are received on the . . . surplus note[s],” Supp. Aplee. App., Vol. 2 at
39, 44, 49.
In 2005, Providence canceled the surplus certificates and converted them to
paid-in capital. In 2008, Providence sold its subsidiary. At some point thereafter,
the subsidiary was placed into receivership and liquidated. Providence made
interest payments under the surplus loan agreements to Skilstaf and PACA
through November 2009, but failed to repay any principal.
Skilstaf and PACA sued Providence, and moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the surplus loan agreements mandated repayment of the loans when
Providence converted the surplus certificates to paid-in capital. The district court
agreed, stating that “the indebtedness represented by the surplus notes was
discharged by the conversion and that this discharge/conversion effected a
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repayment of the surplus notes within the meaning of the surplus loan
agreements.” Aplt. App. at 172. Accordingly, it granted Skilstaf and PACA
summary judgment.
D ISCUSSION
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standards as the district court. See Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d
1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In conducting our
review, “we examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Oldenkamp v. United Am.
Ins. Co., 619 F.3d 1243, 1246 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).
Providence argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because there
was no evidence concerning the amount of debt canceled by the debt-to-equity
conversion. That is incorrect. The cancellation satisfied a $7.05 million debt
owed by the subsidiary to Providence—$3.1 million of that amount had been
supplied by Skilstaf and PACA. And as the district court observed, Providence
admitted in an interrogatory that it had completed the loan transaction and
canceled the surplus certificates. Against this evidence, Providence has cited
nothing to show that the loan to its subsidiary was not repaid. “[I]n response to a
properly supported motion for summary judgment,” the non-moving party “must
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produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to find in its favor at
trial on the claim or defense under consideration.” Nahno-Lopez v. Houser, 625
F.3d 1279, 1283 (10th Cir. 2010). Providence has failed to carry its burden.
Providence also contends that because its subsidiary was in liquidation
while “Skilstaf and PACA were pursuing their motion for summary judgment,”
their recovery was limited by the surplus loan agreements. Aplt. Br. at 9.
Providence relies on language in those agreements stating that “[i]n the event of
liquidation of [the subsidiary], repayment . . . shall be paid to [Skilstaf and
PACA] out of any assets remaining after the repayment of all policy obligations
and all other liabilities of [the subsidiary].” Aplee. Supp. App., Vol. 2 at 49. But
as the district court aptly noted, Skilstaf and PACA were entitled to payment
based on the 2005 debt-to-equity conversion; consequently, the liquidation of
Providence’s subsidiary after its sale in 2008 was irrelevant.
C ONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED for substantially the same
reasons given by the district court in its September 16, 2010, order granting
summary judgment.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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