In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-3395
W ILLIAM P ADULA , Administrator of
the Estate of Jerome Clement,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
T IMOTHY L EIMBACH, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:07-cv-00035—Joseph S. Van Bokkelen, Judge.
A RGUED M AY 4, 2011—D ECIDED A UGUST 29, 2011
Before E ASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and F LAUM and
S YKES, Circuit Judges.
F LAUM, Circuit Judge. Jerome Clement, a diabetic, was
suffering from a hypoglycemic episode while driving when
he veered off the road and into a parking lot. Officers
called to the scene had reason to believe he was intoxi-
cated. When he did not comply with their commands to
step out of his car, they physically removed him, maced
2 No. 10-3395
him two or three times, struck him four times with a
baton to place handcuffs on him and prevent him
from kicking his legs and flailing his arms, and kept him
in the prone position until a paramedic arrived. The
paramedic recognized Clement’s condition and eventu-
ally got him to a hospital, where he died of natural
causes roughly two weeks later. William Padula, the
Administrator of Clement’s estate, filed § 1983 claims
against the responding officers, the City of East Chicago
(“the City”), the City of East Chicago Police Department
(“the Police Department”), and Chief Angelo Machuca Jr.
(“Chief Machuca”) for wrongful arrest, excessive force,
failure to train the officers, and condoning the use of
excessive force, in addition to claims under state law.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on Padula’s federal claims and re-
manded his state law claims to state court. We affirm.
I. Background
Clement was an insulin-dependent Type 1 diabetic. His
blood sugar periodically dropped, which could cause
him to phase out, fall to the floor, and flail his arms in
a non-combative manner.
On August 24, 2006, while driving to work, Clement
turned his vehicle into the parking lot at Metal Manage-
ment and stopped on or near a truck scale. An em-
ployee approached and asked him to move, but he ap-
peared not to hear what the employee said and
responded in incomprehensible gibberish. Someone
called 911 to report the incident and explained that an
No. 10-3395 3
unresponsive person in a car was blocking the company’s
scale, but that she did not know whether the person
was intoxicated. Before police arrived, Clement’s car
began moving towards a building, prompting someone
at the scene to reach into the car, put it in park, and
remove the keys. At around this time, a bystander ob-
served Clement frustrated and talking to himself in an
argumentative tone. He eventually passed out at the wheel.
Officers Jesus Arceo and Timothy Leimbach, responding
to a dispatch shortly after 10 AM indicating that there
was an intoxicated man in a car, were the first police
officers at the scene. They initially observed Clement
slouched over and tried to wake him by shaking him
and asking if everything was all right. When they asked
him to get out of the car, he spoke in an angry tone and
did not comply. Officer Leimbach observed Clement’s
eyes roll back into his head as he remained unresponsive.
Officer Arceo recalled that Clement was unkempt, his
eyes were bloodshot, and his car smelled like stale beer.
Officer Leimbach also smelled alcohol in the car. But
neither observed any open alcohol in the car. Officer
Nathaniel London, a canine handler, arrived at the scene
at some point after Officers Arceo and Leimbach, also
in response to a dispatch for an intoxicated person.
Clement eventually woke up and, upon seeing Officer
Arceo, swung his arm in Officer Arceo’s direction but
made no contact. He did not cooperate with the officers’
repeated requests to step out his car. So Officer
Leimbach, leaning into the car from the front passenger
side, unbuckled Clement and the officers tried to physi-
4 No. 10-3395
cally remove him from the car. Record evidence in-
dicates that Clement was dead weight. When the officers
pulled him out of the car, he fell to the ground, his legs
partially under the car, and did not comply with the
officers’ demands to move away from the car. The
officers then physically moved Clement out from under
the car.
Next, while lying on his stomach, he ignored their
commands to put his hands behind his back and
physically resisted their attempts to handcuff him. A
bystander observed Clement’s eyes roll back in his head
and that he was foaming at the mouth. Clement con-
tinued to kick, flail his arms, and move his head up and
down, which caused him to hit his face against the pave-
ment, resulting in scratches and some bleeding. An ob-
server did not think Clement knew what was going on
or was consciously fighting the officers, but rather that
he was flailing around “like he was having . . . a seizure
of some sort maybe.” A police dog was released from
the police car at some point, but it is unclear whether
an officer ordered the dog to bite Clement; regardless,
the dog did not attack Clement in any way.
The officers managed to cuff one of Clement’s hands,
but he did not obey commands to put his other arm
behind his back. An officer then struck Clement’s free
arm with a baton while trying to place it in handcuffs.
For what appears to be a fairly short period of time, one
officer had his knee on Clement’s head while the other
officers held him in the prone position: Officer Arceo
held the top of Clement’s body, Officer Leimbach kept
No. 10-3395 5
Clement’s shoulders down, and Officer London held
his torso. The officers eventually secured the second
handcuff, all the while struggling to keep Clement down
as he tried to stand up. During the struggle, Officer
Leimbach struck Clement’s leg with a baton three
times because he was kicking Officer Leimbach and
screaming. An observer described the baton strikes to
Clement’s arm and leg as “stern,” but not “severe.” Officer
Leimbach eventually pinned Clement’s leg against his
buttocks. Officer Arceo, who did not smell alcohol on
Clement’s breath when near Clement’s head, called for
an ambulance at some point during the struggle when
he saw blood on Clement’s face.
The officers sprayed mace into Clement’s face at least
once and possibly twice in the process of moving him
from his car to the ground and into handcuffs; the
record is inconclusive. There is record evidence that
someone maced Clement while he was still in the car, and
also that Officer Leimbach maced him after he was re-
moved from the car because he was resisting and
swinging his arms close to Officer Leimbach, who
testified that he believed Clement was trying to hit him.
Officer Leimbach stopped macing Clement because it
was having no effect; he continued resisting with his
eyes closed.
At some point, Officer Harretos arrived and took over
for Officer London, who returned the dog to the car.
While helping to hold Clement down as he continued
screaming and attempting to stand up, Officer Harretos
sprayed mace in Clement’s face—which was either the
6 No. 10-3395
second or third time Clement was maced—but stopped
when the two officers told him that their previous
attempts to mace Clement had no effect. He testified
that he had not seen the other officers mace Clement,
and that he did not smell alcohol on Clement.
Clement’s face was bleeding from hitting his head
against the pavement and began turning blue while the
officers held him down. Fortunately, paramedic Frank
Torres was called to the scene by a dispatcher who indi-
cated that Clement was possibly intoxicated. Torres
arrived at about 10:22 AM, roughly twenty minutes after
the officers were dispatched to the scene, and observed
Clement in a semi-prone position, laying on his right
shoulder, and “thrashing about.” Torres took Clement’s
vitals, checked his blood sugar, which was low, and then
administrated a Dextrose injection at 10:27 AM and a
second a minute later, after which Clement stopped
breathing. Torres instructed the officers to remove the
handcuffs so Clement could be placed in the ambulance.
He regained a strong pulse on his way to the hospital.
Torres did not smell alcohol on Clement’s breath at any
point.
At the hospital, Officer Leimbach received Clement’s
wallet, which had been in one of his pant pockets during
the relevant events and contained a diabetic card. The
emergency room doctor intubated Clement and later
diagnosed him with acute cardiac and respiratory
failure, severe hypoglycemia, and severe metabolic and
respiratory acidosis. At the hospital, testing revealed
that Clement had marijuana and a low presence of
alcohol in his system.
No. 10-3395 7
When Clement’s grandmother, Phyllis Jordon, retrieved
Clement’s vehicle, which had been towed from the
scene, she found Frusion bottles on the front passenger
seat and his diabetic kit pushed into the passenger seat
but still visible. The record indicates that Clement was
not wearing a diabetic necklace or bracelet during
the relevant events. Clement died of natural causes on
September 8, 2006, roughly two weeks after the relevant
events.
His estate filed suit against the defendants in Indiana
state court, and the defendants removed to federal court.
Counts I and II assert state law causes of action for wrong-
ful death, negligence, and intentional conduct, and for
negligent training, hiring, and supervision, respectively.
Count III is a § 1983 claim contending that the Officers
used excessive force and wrongfully arrested Clement,
in violation of the United States Constitution, in addition
to an analogous state law claim. Counts IV and V, also
claims under both state law and § 1983, allege that the
City, the Police Department, and Chief Machuca failed
to train and supervise the Officers, and that they con-
doned and ratified excessive force. The district court
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
on Padula’s federal claims and remanded his state
law claims to state court.
II. Discussion
Padula appeals the district court’s decision to grant the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Summary
judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there
8 No. 10-3395
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F ED .
R. C IV. P. 56. We review de novo the district court’s deci-
sion to grant summary judgment and construe all facts
and inferences in the light most favorable to Padula,
the nonmoving party. Thomas v. H&R Block E. Enters., Inc.,
630 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 2011). After briefly discussing
§ 1983, we explain our decision to affirm the district
court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the de-
fendants on Padula’s federal claims. Notably, the
district court found no Fourth Amendment violation, so
it declined to decide whether qualified immunity ap-
plied. That issue is not raised on appeal.
“Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a federal cause of action
for ‘the deprivation, under color of [state] law, of a
citizen’s rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States.’ ” Ledford
v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994)). It does
not create substantive rights; rather, “it is a means for
vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.” Id. “A
cause of action under § 1983 requires a showing that
the plaintiff was deprived of a right secured by the Con-
stitution or federal law, by a person acting under color
of law.” Thurman v. Vill. of Homewood, 446 F.3d 682, 687
(7th Cir. 2006). In § 1983 cases, “the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof on the constitutional deprivation that
underlies the claim, and thus must come forth with
sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material
fact to avoid summary judgment.” McAllister v. Price,
615 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Celotex Corp. v.
No. 10-3395 9
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“[Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56] mandates the entry of summary
judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.”); Keri v. Bd. of Trs.
of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 627-28 (7th Cir. 2006).
A. Wrongful Arrest
Padula appeals the district court’s decision to grant the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on his claim
against the Officers for wrongful arrest. He contends
that the district court erred when it found they had proba-
ble cause. We disagree.
Probable cause is an absolute defense to a wrongful
arrest claim asserted under § 1983 against police officers.
Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2008).
A police officer has probable cause to arrest if, at the
time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within
the officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in
believing, in the circumstances shown, that the
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense. In determining whether an officer
had probable cause, the court steps into the shoes of
a reasonable person in the position of the officer.
The probable cause determination must be made by
a jury if there is room for a difference of opinion
concerning the facts or the reasonable inferences to
be drawn from them.
10 No. 10-3395
Id. at 686 (internal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted); see also Marshall ex rel. Gossens v. Teske, 284 F.3d 765,
770 (7th Cir. 2002); Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240,
1246 (7th Cir. 1994). “Critically, the probable cause
analysis is an ex ante test: ‘the fact that the officer later
discovers additional evidence unknown to her at the
time of the arrest is irrelevant as to whether probable
cause existed at the crucial time.’ ” Smith v. Ball State
Univ., 295 F.3d 763, 769-70 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Qian
v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953-54 (7th Cir. 1999)).
The district court correctly concluded that the Officers
had probable cause to arrest Clement. Specifically,
when the arrest occurred, which was when the officers
removed Clement from his car and began attempting to
handcuff him, see Smith, 295 F.3d at 769-70, the Officers
had probable cause to believe that Clement had driven
while intoxicated, a crime in Indiana. IND. C ODE § 9-30-5-2
(2011).
Ample record evidence supports our conclusion. For
example, the dispatcher who called the Officers to the
scene indicated that the driver, who had driven off the
road, was intoxicated; the Officers observed that Clement
did, in fact, appear to have driven off the road;
Officers Arceo and Leimbach smelled alcohol in
Clement’s car; Clement was slouched over in his car,
appeared unkempt, and had bloodshot eyes when
Officers Arceo and Leimbach arrived; and Clement did
not comply with their requests to step out of his vehicle.
Padula does not contend that these characteristics
are inconsistent with how an intoxicated individual
No. 10-3395 11
would act. In addition, Clement was not wearing a
diabetic necklace or bracelet that would have alerted
the Officers to his medical condition, nor is there any
indication that his wallet—containing his diabetic
card—was accessible to the Officers during the struggle.
Padula failed to produce sufficient evidence to create
a genuine issue of material fact. Clement’s grand-
mother testified that after Clement’s car was towed
from the scene, she found his diabetic kit pushed down
in the front passenger seat but still visible. And there
is record evidence that Officer Leimbach was in or near
that seat when he unbuckled Clement. But there are
critical gaps in the record: There is no evidence that any
of the Officers saw or should have seen the kit, and
there is also no indication of the kit’s labeling at the time
of arrest. Thus, even inferring that the kit was visible
on Clement’s front seat, Padula failed to present any
evidence that the Officers could have identified it as
a diabetic kit in the heat of the moment. Further, Padula
does not reference any evidence that the Officers saw
or should have seen Clement foaming at the mouth
while he was on the ground, which could have alerted
them to Clement’s medical condition.
Next, Padula points to one observer’s vague testimony
that, while on the ground, Clement was flailing his arms
and legs “like he was having—I don’t know, like a
seizure of some sort maybe.” Without more clear record
evidence, however, we have no basis to find that a jury
could infer that the Officers unreasonably believed
that Clement was intoxicated.
12 No. 10-3395
Finally, Padula contends that the fact that Officer Arceo
called for an ambulance evidences that he suspected a
medical issue. Officer Arceo testified, however, that he
called the ambulance when he saw blood on Clement’s
face; he made no mention of a potential medical condi-
tion as a reason for calling the ambulance. Officer
Leimbach also testified that the ambulance was called
because Clement had blood on his face.
Because Padula failed to meet his burden at summary
judgment, the district court correctly granted summary
judgment for the defendants on Padula’s wrongful
arrest claim.
B. Excessive Force
Padula also appeals the decision to dismiss his exces-
sive force claim against the Officers. Again, we affirm.
We evaluate Padula’s excessive force claim under the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard. See
McAllister, 615 F.3d at 881. “The dispositive question is
whether, in light of the facts and circumstances that
confronted the officer (and not 20/20 hindsight), the
officer behaved in an objectively reasonable manner.” Id.;
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). In
answering that question, a number of factors are relevant:
[W]e consider factors such as “the severity of the crime
at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade arrest by flight.” We also consider whether
No. 10-3395 13
the citizen was under arrest or suspected of com-
mitting a crime, was armed, or was interfering or
attempting to interfere with the officer’s execution
of his or her duties. In the end, the excessive force
inquiry looks to whether the force used to seize
the suspect was excessive in relation to the danger
he posed—to the community or to the arresting
officers— if left unattended.
Jacobs v. City of Chi., 215 F.3d 758, 773 (7th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; other internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); see also Chelios, 520 F.3d at
689. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later
seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers[,]
violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reason-
ableness must embody allowance for the fact that
police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S.
at 396-97 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The district court correctly concluded that the Offi-
cers’ use of force was not excessive. In light of the circum-
stances and their reasonable belief that Clement
was intoxicated, Officers Leimbach and Arceo were
entitled to forcibly remove him from his car when he
did not comply with their command to get out on his
own. See Smith, 295 F.3d at 769 (“Smith posed a threat to
himself, the officers and the general public, even after
Officer Foster turned off Smith’s vehicle and attempted
unsuccessfully to communicate with him. Indeed, . . .
14 No. 10-3395
his unresponsiveness did not neutralize the safety
threat, but rather exacerbated it by adding an element
of unpredictability. We thus find that the decision to
remove Smith from his vehicle was a constitutionally
permissible action pursuant to a legitimate investigatory
stop under Terry.”); id. at 770. Further, we find no evi-
dence that the Officers removed Clement from his car
by throwing him to the ground, as in McAllister, to
which Padula directs our attention, but rather that he
fell to the ground as dead weight as they pulled him
out. See McAllister, 615 F.3d at 884 (“Viewed in the
light most favorable to McAllister, the evidence shows
that Price ignored obvious signs of McAllister’s medical
condition, pulled him out of the car, and took him to
the ground with such force that McAllister’s hip was
broken and his lung bruised from the force of Price’s
knee in his back, not because such force was necessary
but because Price was ‘angry’ with McAllister. Even if
Price was justified in using some force to remove
McAllister from the vehicle, using the force involved
here against a non-resisting suspect could have been
unreasonable given the circumstances.”). It was also
reasonable to use mace to attempt to control Clement
under the circumstances, which involved a physical
struggle both before and after placing him in handcuffs.
See Brooks v. City of Aurora, Ill., No. 10-3265, slip op. at 16,
2011 WL 2623507, at *6 (7th Cir. July 6, 2011) (“Courts
often have held that it is reasonable to use pepper spray
against a suspect who is physically resisting arrest . . . .”);
Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002)
(“Courts have consistently concluded that using pepper
No. 10-3395 15
spray is reasonable . . . where the plaintiff was either
resisting arrest or refusing police requests, such as
requests to enter a patrol car or go to the hospital. Further-
more, as a means of imposing force, pepper spray is
generally of limited intrusiveness, and it is designed to
disable a suspect without causing permanent physical
injury. Indeed, pepper spray is a very reasonable alter-
native to escalating a physical struggle with an arrestee. ”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). The
Officers’ use of batons was also reasonable. Record evi-
dence indicates that Officer Leimbach’s baton strikes
were “stern,” but not “severe,” which was appropriate
in response to Clement kicking and flailing his arms.
Further, Officer Leimbach struck Clement’s leg a third
time only because his first two strikes did not allow him
to pin Clement’s leg to his buttocks and prevent him
from kicking; there is no indication that Officer Leimbach
used his baton gratuitously. And while Padula points
to Clement’s death, presumably as evidence of the Offi-
cers’ force, see McAllister, 615 F.3d at 881 (“[A] jury
may look to the type of injury suffered by a plaintiff to
determine whether or not the amount of force used by
law enforcement was reasonable.”), the Coroner’s
Verdict states that Clement died of natural causes, not
because of any force used two weeks before his death,
and we find no other indication in the record that Clem-
ent’s death was related to the Officers’ force, see id. at 882
(“If McAllister had no evidence that his injuries were
caused by Price, they would be irrelevant . . . .”). Finally,
holding Clement in the prone position for a fairly short
period of time while trying to prevent him from injuring
16 No. 10-3395
himself or an officer was not unreasonable. See Estate
of Phillips v. City of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 593 (7th Cir.
1997) (finding force not excessive where the plaintiff
“was placed in a prone position with his hands and
legs restrained because of the need to incapacitate him
and to protect the safety of the officers and other wit-
nesses from the dangers posed by his violent behavior,”
and explaining that “[r]estraining a person in a prone
position is not, in and of itself, excessive force when
the person restrained is resisting arrest”); Cf. Smith,
295 F.3d at 771 (finding no excessive force where the
police kept the plaintiff in handcuffs several minutes
after learning that he was diabetic because “the use of
force was measured, brief and appropriate to ac-
complish the purposes of the investigatory stop—securing
Smith and his vehicle, dispelling any notion that Smith
was engaged in criminal activity and preserving the
officers’, public’s and even Smith’s safety”). The Officers
faced a fluid situation; as the struggle with Clement
escalated, the Officers appropriately increased their
force in order to keep the situation under control. See
Smith, 295 F.3d at 770 (“When police officers face what is
essentially a fluid situation, they are entitled to
graduate their response to meet the demands of the
circumstances confronting them.”); Estate of Phillips, 123
F.3d at 593.
Padula nonetheless argues that the Officers used unrea-
sonable force. He points to the fact that an officer had his
knee on Clement’s head at some point during the scuf-
fle. But that was a reasonable way to prevent
Clement from continuing to hit his head against the
No. 10-3395 17
pavement, and there is no indication that the officer
applied excessive pressure with his knee or that his
knee injured Clement in any way. He also notes that a
bystander observed Clement foaming at the mouth while
on the ground, which could have suggested a medical
condition. But, as explained above, Padula does not
reference anything in the record indicating that the
Officers saw or should have seen this.
Padula further contends that McAllister v. Price, 615
F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 1997), and Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago,
624 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2010), in which we concluded
that defendant-officers were not entitled to summary
judgment, warrant reversing. The facts of those cases,
however, distinguish them from Padula’s. In McAllister,
for example, the plaintiff, who crashed his car during a
hypoglycemic episode, was unable to respond to the
officer’s questioning. 615 F.3d at 879. In response to “a non-
resisting suspect,” the officer “ ‘threw’ McAllister to
the ground by applying his knee to McAllister’s lower
back, with his full body weight behind it.” Id. at 879,
885. We concluded that McAllister had introduced suffi-
cient evidence for a jury to infer that the officer’s force
caused Price’s injuries, which included a broken hip,
bruised lung, and other bruises, scrapes, and cuts that
left him in the hospital for three weeks and required
several weeks of rehabilitation. Id. at 884; see also Cyrus,
624 F.3d at 858, 862 (plaintiff was tasered between six
and twelve times and was pronounced dead upon arrival
at the hospital later that day). Excessive force claims
require a fact-based, case-by-case inquiry, and, as ex-
plained above, in this case, unlike McAllister and Cyrus,
18 No. 10-3395
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. See
Estate of Phillips, 123 F.3d at 592.
In light of our hesitation “to second-guess the snap
judgments made by law enforcement personnel,”
McAllister, 615 F.3d at 883, and because the record
does not present any genuine issue of material fact in-
dicating that the Officers used excessive force, we
affirm the district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment to the defendants on Padula’s excessive
force claim.
C. Padula’s Remaining Claims
Padula also filed claims against the City, the Police
Department, and Chief Machuca for failing to adequately
train and supervise the Officers, and for condoning and
ratifying excessive force, both of which, he contends,
resulted in the constitutional violations he alleges oc-
curred. That Clement makes no legal arguments
regarding either claim until his reply brief permits us to
find the issues waived. See United States v. Diaz, 533
F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2008) (arguments raised for the
first time in a reply brief are waived).
Even if not waived, however, the arguments cannot
succeed. Since Padula’s underlying claims for wrongful
arrest and excessive force failed, his claims for failure to
train and for condoning and ratifying excessive force
must also fail. See Carlson v. Bukovic, 621 F.3d 610, 623 (7th
Cir. 2010); Estate of Phillips, 123 F.3d at 596-97. We thus
affirm the district court’s decision to grant summary
No. 10-3395 19
judgment for the defendants on Padula’s remaining
federal claims.
III. Conclusion
While respectfully recognizing the tragic circum-
stances surrounding Jerome Clement’s death, we are
compelled to A FFIRM the judgment of the district court
granting summary judgment to the defendants on
Padula’s federal claims. Accordingly, we also A FFIRM
its decision to remand Padula’s remaining state law
claims to state court.
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