[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPT. 8, 2011
No. 11-13962 JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-23068-JEM
MANUEL A. VALLE,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllRespondents - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(September 8, 2011)
Before CARNES, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Death row inmate, Manuel Valle, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He complains that he was denied clemency proceedings
or alternatively was denied clemency itself without the benefit of a clemency
investigation and clemency counsel.
Petitions under § 2254 cannot be brought to challenge the process by which
clemency decisions are made when issuance of a writ would not actually or
impliedly invalidate a sentence. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81, 125
S.Ct. 1242, 1247–48 (2005) (“§ 1983 remains available for procedural challenges
where success in the action would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier
release for the prisoner”); Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2006)
(recognizing that § 1983 and § 2254 proceedings are “mutually exclusive” so that
if a claim can be properly raised in one of those proceedings it cannot be raised in
the other type of proceeding). Federal habeas corpus law exists to provide a
prisoner an avenue to attack the fact or duration of physical imprisonment and to
obtain immediate or speedier release. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 485–86, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1834 (1973) (discussing the traditional
scope of habeas corpus relief). Even if successful, Valle’s claim would not
necessarily lead to his speedier release, a commutation of his sentence, or even the
implication that his sentence is invalid. The most Valle can hope for is an
opportunity to plead for mercy. Valle’s constitutional claims about clemency
procedures are collateral to his conviction and sentence, and are not cognizable in
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this § 2254 proceeding. His complaint about Florida’s clemency procedures may
only be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Valle also argues that if Florida clemency procedures were improperly
applied in his case the entire Florida capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional
and, as a result, his death sentence (along with those of everyone else on Florida’s
death row) is unconstitutional and must be set aside. The argument is without
merit. It is undisputed that Florida law provides clemency proceedings and for the
appointment of counsel for those who are being considered for clemency. Any
problem with the application of those constitutionally adequate procedures in a
single case would not render the entire Florida capital punishment statute
unconstitutional and any death sentences imposed under it invalid.
To the extent that Valle argues he is entitled to clemency, his argument fails.
Clemency is granted as “a matter of grace.” Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard,
523 U.S. 272, 280–81, 118 S. Ct. 1244, 1250 (1998). The Florida Constitution
vests the clemency power solely in the executive branch, and exercise of the
power is discretionary. Fla. Const. art. IV, § 8; Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312,
314–16 (Fla. 1977). Valle thus has no right to clemency that he may enforce
through his habeas petition. The district court correctly dismissed Valle’s § 2254
petition.
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Alternatively, Valle requests this Court to stay the execution and remand to
the district court so that counsel may be appointed and the complaint can be raised
under § 1983. But Valle has not shown a significant or substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of his clemency claim or claims. See Hill v. McDonough,
547 U.S. 573, 584, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 2104 (2006) (stay of execution requires
“showing of a significant possibility of success on the merits”); DeYoung v.
Owens, 646 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A stay of execution is equitable
relief which this Court may grant only if the moving party shows that: (1) he has a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits . . .”) (internal marks omitted);
Powell v. Thomas, 641 F.3d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 2011) (“This Court may grant a
stay of execution only if the moving party shows that: (1) he has a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits . . .”). Accordingly, his request is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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