UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4744
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff − Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER WEAH BLIDEE,
Defendant − Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (3:04−cr−00329−MR−DCK−2)
Argued: September 23, 2011 Decided: October 31, 2011
Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion,
in which Judges Motz and Keenan joined.
ARGUED: Erin Kimberly Taylor, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy
Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Claire J. Rauscher,
Executive Director, Ann L. Hester, Assistant Federal Defender,
FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
Christopher Weah Blidee challenges the district court’s
revocation of his supervised release. He argues that the
district court failed to comply with due process when it ruled
that he was in violation of the conditions of his supervised
release. Alternatively, Blidee contests the reasonableness of
the sentence imposed by the district court upon revocation. We
conclude that the revocation hearing comported with due process
and the sentence was not plainly unreasonable. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
A.
A citizen of Liberia, Blidee entered the United States as a
refugee in 1994. He subsequently adjusted his status to that of
a lawful permanent resident. On December 15, 2004, a grand jury
returned an indictment charging Blidee with several counts
arising out of his participation in a scheme to defraud
financial institutions. Pursuant to a pretrial agreement,
Blidee pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit
offenses against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
513, 1028, 1029, 1343, and 1344. The district judge sentenced
2
Blidee to a 30-month term of imprisonment followed by 3 years of
supervised release.
The district court entered judgment on April 19, 2006. It
provided Blidee with binding conditions of supervised release.
Two conditions are particularly relevant to this appeal. First,
Blidee was ordered to “answer truthfully all inquiries by the
probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation
officer.” J.A. 20. Second, the district court appended a
special condition regarding Blidee’s immigration status:
In accordance with established procedures provided by
the Immigration and Naturalization [sic] Act, . . .
the defendant, upon release from imprisonment, is to
be surrendered to a duly-authorized immigration
official for deportation. As a further condition of
supervised release, if ordered deported, the defendant
shall remain outside the United States. Should
deportation not occur, the defendant shall report
within 72 hours of release from the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons or the Immigrations [sic] and
Customs Enforcement Agency to the probation office in
the district to which defendant is released.
Id.
Soon after the entry of judgment, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Blidee,
charging that he was removable for having been convicted of an
aggravated felony. Blidee was finally ordered removed to
Liberia in 2008.
Blidee completed his term of imprisonment on August 1,
2008. He was released and immediately placed in the custody of
3
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), in accordance
with the terms of his removal order. Over the next six months,
ICE officials attempted to remove Blidee to Liberia. A variety
of logistical impediments, owing mostly to the Liberian
Embassy’s intransigence, prevented successful removal. ICE
agents ultimately concluded that Blidee’s removal was not
imminent, and they released him from custody on March 3, 2009.
ICE agents also provided Blidee with an order of supervision
upon his release from their custody, which ordered him to self-
remove from the United States.
After his release from ICE custody, Blidee met with his
probation officer, Timothy Goodman. Goodman reviewed Blidee’s
conditions of supervised release at their first meeting on March
10. Goodman stressed to Blidee that he must “stay in touch with
ICE as they had directed him to and . . . compl[y] with any and
all directives from the ICE officials.” Id. 30. Goodman
informed Blidee that he must follow both his instructions and
the directives of ICE officials. As Goodman testified at the
revocation hearing, “I made sure that [Blidee] understood from
the moment he came to our office that my expectation of him was
to comply with any and all directives and regulations of ICE.”
Id. 38. To that end, Goodman confirmed that Blidee understood
that he must self-remove pursuant to ICE orders.
4
Over the next year, Blidee failed time and again to comply
with ICE deadlines to self-remove. His supervising ICE
detention and removal officer, Erin North, first ordered him to
leave the United States no later than July 7. After he failed
to self-remove, North instructed him to report to her on October
6 with tickets to depart the United States. Blidee met with her
on October 6, but he failed to produce the tickets. North gave
him another three months to leave the country, ordering him to
finalize travel plans and meet with her on January 6, 2010.
Blidee brought tickets for departure to Ghana to the January 6
meeting. He explained to North that, though a Liberian citizen,
he spoke the language of Ghana and would be able to enter the
country. North testified that Blidee’s affirmation about his
ability to enter Ghana satisfied ICE requirements, because
countries often have arrangements allowing citizens reciprocal
entry. North gave Blidee another extension, directing him to
leave the country by March 31. Blidee was set for a March 29
departure from the United States to Ghana.
Blidee again failed to comply with ICE orders, refusing to
follow through with the planned March 29 self-removal. He
arrived at Goodman’s office on March 29 and explained that he
did not want to leave his wife and kids in the United States.
Blidee then called North, first telling her that his flight had
been canceled but later admitting that he had simply refused to
5
leave the United States. North informed Blidee that he had
violated the conditions of his release from ICE custody. ICE
would consider him a fugitive if he failed to leave the country
within seven days.
Seven days passed, and Blidee remained in the United
States. Blidee was now officially in violation of an ICE
condition of supervision. Goodman reasoned that Blidee was
similarly in violation of his instructions, because he had
directed Blidee to comply with all ICE orders. Blidee was
obligated to follow Goodman’s instructions pursuant to the
conditions of his supervised release, so Goodman now believed
that Blidee had violated the terms of his supervised release.
On April 19, Goodman filed a Petition for Warrant for
Offender Under Supervision, in which he sought revocation of
Blidee’s supervised release. Goodman wrote that Blidee had
violated conditions mandating that he follow the instructions of
his probation officer, tell the truth to his probation officer,
and remain outside the United States if removed. 1 That same day,
officers secured a warrant for Blidee’s arrest for violating the
conditions of his supervised release.
1
At the revocation hearing, the government abandoned
Goodman’s position that Blidee had violated the condition
directing him to remain outside the United States if removed.
6
B.
At the revocation hearing, Blidee argued that the district
court lacked authority to revoke his supervised release.
Because the conditions of supervised release failed to expressly
require his self-removal, Blidee maintained that revoking his
supervised release for failure to depart the United States would
violate his due process rights.
Rejecting Blidee’s contentions, the district court
concluded that he had failed to follow the lawful instructions
of his probation officer in violation of his conditions of
supervised release. The district court reasoned that Goodman’s
authority “extend[ed] to the ministerial act of . . . ordering
[Blidee] to follow all directives and orders of immigration
authorities and abid[e] by all of such directives and orders.”
J.A. 125. When Blidee failed to heed Goodman’s instructions to
follow ICE orders to self-remove, he thus violated the
conditions of his supervised release, stated the court. The
conditions of supervised release plainly mandated Blidee’s
compliance with directions given by his probation officer,
according to the district court, so Blidee had received adequate
notice that failing to self-remove would violate the terms of
his supervised release.
As an alternative basis for revocation, the district court
credited Goodman’s testimony that Blidee had violated the
7
condition requiring him to “answer truthfully all inquiries by
the probation officer,” id. 20. Goodman had ordered Blidee to
present his passport and birth certificate to him. The court
found that Blidee had lied to Goodman when he told him that he
did not possess his original passport.
Having determined that Blidee had violated the conditions
of supervised release, the district court turned to framing an
appropriate sentence. The court first found that Blidee had
committed a grade C violation, which did not mandate revocation
of his supervised release. It further calculated a Guidelines
range of 3–9 months’ imprisonment, with a maximum term of 2
years. Blidee and the government agreed with these sentencing
calculations.
After establishing the sentencing possibilities, the court
heard argument from Blidee and the government. Blidee requested
a below-Guidelines sentence of time served. Such a sentence was
appropriate, argued Blidee, because he would be placed
indefinitely in ICE custody upon his release from prison.
According to Blidee, the prospect of ICE detention rendered an
additional prison term superfluous.
The government countered that Blidee should receive a 9-
month prison term, at the top of the Guidelines range. It
reasoned that Blidee’s actions had evinced a “deliberate effort
. . . to subvert the laws of this country,” and a 9-month
8
sentence would give him incentive to comply with future ICE
directives. Id. 133. 2
Noting that the case was difficult, the district court
sympathized with Blidee’s situation--“that you’ve gone through
this trying to make the best decision that you can for your
family and I believe you’re sincere in doing that.” Id. 135.
“But in some respects,” the court continued, “I feel that you’ve
been somewhat misguided in making that decision because in
choosing the path that you have, you have in some respects
[flouted] the law, and that has consequences.” Id. The court
acknowledged that not all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors
applied to revocation proceedings. It stressed that it must
impose a sentence that comports with important interests in
deterrence--one that deters both Blidee and other potential
defendants from committing similar criminal conduct.
Declaring that Blidee had shown “a certain disregard for
the law . . . that requires that I impose a sentence that sends
that message [that will deter Blidee and others],” the court
revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 7 months’
imprisonment followed by 29 months of supervised release. J.A.
2
The government agreed to request a time-served sentence so
long as Blidee stipulated to self-removing. If Blidee promised
to purchase airline tickets within thirty days of the hearing
and to depart the United States by July 31, the government
agreed to release his ICE detainer and remove him from custody.
Blidee refused this offer, however.
9
136. The court further ordered that Blidee be released to ICE
custody for removal after the expiration of his sentence and
that he comply with all future ICE directives, including
mandates to self-remove.
Blidee now appeals both the revocation of his supervised
release and the sentence.
II.
Blidee first contends that the district court’s revocation
of his supervised release violated his right to due process.
According to Blidee, the conditions of supervised release did
not provide him with adequate notice that failing to follow ICE
orders to self-remove would constitute a violation. He thus
maintains that the district court’s decision to revoke his
supervised release, grounded in his failure to self-remove,
deprived him of liberty in violation of the right to notice
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Reviewing Blidee’s due process claim de novo, 3 United States
v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 2000), we find his
3
The government challenges the propriety of de novo review.
It argues that Blidee failed to raise a due process claim before
the district court and insists that our review must be for plain
error. We disagree. Blidee consistently maintained to the
district court that he lacked adequate notice that failure to
self-remove would expose him to possible revocation of his
supervised release. This is sufficient to preserve his due
(Continued)
10
argument unavailing. The conditions of supervised release
plainly required Blidee to comply with the directions issued by
his probation officer. When Goodman ordered him to follow ICE’s
mandate to self-remove, Blidee received adequate notice that his
failure to depart the United States would render him in
violation of the conditions of his supervised release.
Revocation of Blidee’s supervised release for failure to self-
remove thus comported with due process. 4
Defendants facing the prospect of supervised release
revocation are afforded protections enshrined in the Due Process
Clause. United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir.
1992). As in other contexts, due process at the revocation
stage ordinarily encompasses notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Cf. Mora v. City of Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 230 (4th
Cir. 2008); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b). We have not had
occasion to expound with precision the due process rights
secured to defendants charged with violating their conditions of
supervised release, but federal legislation illuminates the
process argument. See United States v. Robinson, 460 F.3d 550,
557 (4th Cir. 2006).
4
Because we hold that Blidee violated his conditions of
supervised release by failing to self-remove, we need not
address the district court’s alternative ruling that Blidee’s
misrepresentations about his passport status similarly
authorized revocation.
11
inquiry. Congress has mandated that a probation officer
“provide the defendant with a written statement that sets forth
all the conditions to which the term of supervised release is
subject, and that is sufficiently clear and specific to serve as
a guide for the defendant’s conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(f).
We readily conclude that the district court afforded Blidee
adequate notice that failure to follow ICE orders to self-remove
would violate the conditions of his supervised release. The
conditions mandated that Blidee “answer truthfully all inquiries
by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the
probation officer.” J.A. 20. At their very first meeting,
Goodman ensured that Blidee understood that he must follow ICE
directives to self-remove. Time and again, Goodman told Blidee
that his “expectation of him was to comply with any and all
directives and regulations of ICE.” Id. 38. When Blidee failed
finally to comply with ICE orders to self-remove by April 5,
2010, he necessarily neglected to follow Goodman’s instructions.
And because he failed to “follow the instructions of the
probation officer,” id. 20, Blidee violated the conditions of
his supervised release. Revocation was therefore entirely
appropriate and wholly consonant with our notions of due
process.
The record belies Blidee’s contentions that his immigration
status is a matter wholly independent from his compliance with
12
the terms of supervised release. From the outset, Goodman
plainly told Blidee that his obligations to ICE were subsumed
under his conditions of supervised release. Indeed, even before
Blidee was released from prison, the conditions of supervised
release notified him that he must follow ICE orders. An
additional condition was appended to Blidee’s judgment, stating
that, “upon release from imprisonment,” he was “to be
surrendered to a duly-authorized immigration official for
deportation.” Id. This condition moreover provided that, “if
ordered deported, the defendant shall remain outside the United
States.” Id. From the date of judgment, then, Blidee was on
notice that he must comply with ICE directives as a condition of
his supervised release. 5
5
In addition to his due process argument, Blidee contends
that the district court abused its discretion by finding his
violations willful. Because he made a good-faith attempt to
depart from the United States, Blidee insists that his failure
to do so was not willful and cannot support a conclusion that he
violated the conditions of his supervised release. Although
endeavoring to meet an obligation of supervised release in good
faith may be sufficient to resist revocation, at the very least
it requires “earnestness and effort” to satisfy that condition.
United States v. Taylor, 321 F.2d 339, 341–42 (4th Cir. 1963).
Here, Blidee failed even to board the plane to Ghana, let alone
seek entry to the country. A desire to stay with his family,
not some external bar, precluded his departing the United
States. This militates against a conclusion that he tried in
good faith to secure his removal.
13
III.
Blidee next challenges the procedural reasonableness of the
district court’s sentence. He asserts that the district court
erred by failing to address his argument for a time-served
sentence. We find that the district court adequately responded
to Blidee’s request for a below-Guidelines sentence and affirm.
We have confirmed, post-Booker, that “revocation sentences
should be reviewed to determine whether they are ‘plainly
unreasonable’ with regard to those § 3553(a) factors applicable
to supervised release revocation sentences.” United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 & n.6 (4th Cir. 2006). “In
determining whether a sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first
decide whether the sentence is unreasonable,” generally using
the same reasonableness determinations that we employ on direct
review of an original postconviction sentence. Id. at 438–39.
We are mindful, however, that not all of the § 3553(a) factors
properly apply in the revocation context. Id. If a revocation
sentence is not unreasonable, the inquiry ends there. Id. at
439. Only if we conclude that a revocation sentence is
unreasonable need we evaluate whether it is plainly
unreasonable, using the same standards that guide our plain-
error analysis. Id.
“ ‘[A] deferential appellate posture’ ” characterizes our
review of revocation sentences. Id. (quoting United States v.
14
Salinas, 365 F.3d 582, 588 (7th Cir. 2004)). Indeed, the
district court “need not be as detailed or specific when
imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a
post-conviction sentence.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d
544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). At bottom, “[w]e may be hard-pressed
to find any explanation for within-range, revocation sentences
insufficient given the amount of deference we afford district
courts when imposing these sentences.” Id. Deference is not
unlimited, however, and “a district court may not simply impose
[a] sentence without giving any indication of its reasons for
doing so.” Id. And as is the case at the initial
postconviction sentencing proceeding, “ ‘[w]here the defendant or
prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a
different sentence’ than that set forth in the advisory
Guidelines, a district judge should address the party’s
arguments and ‘explain why he has rejected those arguments.’ ”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007)).
Context often clarifies a district court’s reasons for rejecting
a particular argument and imposing a certain sentence.
Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547.
We conclude that the district court sufficiently responded
to Blidee’s request for a time-served sentence and the sentence
imposed was not unreasonable. Blidee’s request, grounded in his
15
contention that he would be detained by ICE even if released
from incarceration, obligated the district court to respond.
See Carter, 564 F.3d at 328. Though he did not expressly
restate and reject Blidee’s argument, the record demonstrates
that the district judge considered the argument and found it
unavailing. Blidee’s request was premised on an asserted lack
of distinction between his being held in prison custody and his
being detained by ICE. The district judge disagreed, however,
determining that incarceration provided a deterrent effect that
ICE detention did not. He sought to craft a sentence that
deterred both Blidee and other potential defendants from
ignoring ICE directives. According to the district judge,
Blidee had shown a “certain disregard for the law . . . that
requires that I impose a sentence that sends that message [that
will deter Blidee and others].” J.A. 136. The district court’s
emphasis on deterrence--that it is promoted to a greater extent
by incarceration than through ICE detention--convinces us that
he adequately considered and rejected Blidee’s argument for a
time-served sentence.
IV.
The revocation of Blidee’s supervised release comported
with due process. Moreover, the sentence imposed upon
16
revocation was not plainly unreasonable. We therefore affirm
the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED
17