FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 1, 2011
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 10-3087
CLINTON A.D. KNIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. NO. 07-CR-10143-03-JTM)
Howard Pincus, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Raymond P. Moore, Federal
Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Office of the Federal Public Defender,
Denver, Colorado, for Appellant.
James A. Brown, Assistant United States Attorney (Barry R. Grissom, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney,
Topeka, Kansas, for Appellee.
Before MURPHY, EBEL, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
Clinton Knight was convicted on charges of racketeering and drug
possession arising from his membership in a Wichita, Kansas street gang. He
argues the district court plainly erred by (1) improperly instructing the jury on the
pattern of racketeering element under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO); and (2) failing to provide a jury instruction for
constructive possession on the drug possession charges. We conclude the district
court did not plainly err in its instructions to the jury.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we therefore AFFIRM
Knight’s conviction.
I. Background
Knight was a leader of a neighborhood group of the Crips, a large street
gang in Wichita. The gang leaders, including Knight, provided crack cocaine and
marijuana for younger gang members to sell. As part of the drug operation,
Knight and another gang leader maintained a house where Crips sold drugs.
Knight’s co-conspirator owned the house and rented it to different gang members;
Knight occasionally distributed drugs to other Crips at the house. In 2004,
Wichita police officers searched the house and discovered 14 grams of crack
cocaine. A young gang member who was in the house when the police arrived
testified that the cocaine was the remnants of an ounce of crack he had purchased
from Knight.
A week after searching this first house, Wichita police searched a second
drug house maintained by Knight and two other gang leaders. This house was
used by fellow Crips to cook and sell drugs. Knight was accused of providing
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drugs to younger gang members for resale out of the premises. In connection
with the search, police discovered cocaine, marijuana, beakers, scales, and
ammunition. They also discovered an address label for the house with Knight’s
name on it.
The government charged Knight and other gang members in a multi-count
indictment, and after trial the jury convicted Knight of (1) racketeering, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c); (2) conspiracy to participate in a RICO enterprise, id. § 1962(d);
(3) conspiracy to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846; (4)
possession with intent to distribute 14 grams of cocaine base, id. § 841(a)(1); and
(5) maintaining the first drug house, id. § 856(a)(1). He was acquitted of
conspiring to distribute crack cocaine and maintaining the second drug house.
The district court sentenced Knight to 210 months’ imprisonment.
II. Discussion
Knight argues the district court’s jury instructions were erroneous.
Specifically, he contends the court (1) incorrectly instructed the jury regarding
the “pattern of racketeering” element in the racketeering charges and (2)
improperly failed to instruct the jury on the definition of “constructive
possession.”
Because Knight did not object to any of the jury instructions at trial, we
review only for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Poe, 556
F.3d 1113, 1128 (10th Cir. 2009). Under plain error review, we may not reverse
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unless we find “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.
If all three conditions are met, [we] may then exercise [] discretion to notice a
forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings.” United States v. Balderama-
Iribe, 490 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). Knight bears the
burden of demonstrating plain error. Id.
In assessing the appropriateness of jury instructions, we read and evaluate
them in their entirety. Specifically,
[w]e assess whether the instructions, examined in light of the
record as a whole, fairly, adequately, and correctly state the
governing law and provide the jury with an ample understanding
of the applicable principles of law and factual issues confronting
them. The proper inquiry is not whether the instruction could
have been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so apply it.
United States v. Jones, 468 F.3d 704, 710 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations, quotation
marks, and alterations omitted).
With these general principles in mind, we turn to Knight’s arguments.
A. Pattern of Racketeering Jury Instruction
“RICO [is] an aggressive initiative [designed] to supplement old remedies
and develop new methods for fighting crime.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 498 (1985). Targeting criminal enterprises engaged in repeated illegal
conduct, Congress made it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in . . . interstate . . . commerce, to conduct or
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participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c).
RICO is a powerful statute but also a confounding one. Because of RICO’s
broad text and scope, courts have found it challenging to interpret the statute so
as to capture racketeers—those who engage in a pattern of continued criminal
activity—without also subjecting garden-variety fraud or criminal conduct to the
statute’s severe penal and monetary sanctions. Therefore, given RICO’s varied
civil and criminal applications, it is important that courts precisely instruct juries
as to all elements of a RICO violation.
A racketeering violation has five basic elements. The district court,
without objection from Knight, properly instructed the jury that to establish a
RICO violation, the government must prove:
(1) the existence of “an enterprise,” (2) which was “engaged in
activities affecting interstate or foreign commerce,” (3) which the
defendant was “associated with or employed by,” (4) that he
“knowingly . . . conduct[ed] . . . a pattern of racketeering
activity,” and (5) he “knowingly conducted, or participated
directly or indirectly in the conduct of, the enterprise through
that pattern of racketeering activity.”
R., Vol. III at 16 (Jury Instruction 15) (emphasis added).
To flesh out the fourth element—the “pattern of racketeering activity”
requirement—the court instructed:
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The fourth element that the government must prove . . . is that
the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.
* * *
To prove that the acts of racketeering are related, the government
must prove that the acts had the same or similar purposes, results,
participants, victims, or methods of commission, or that they are
otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are
not isolated events. Racketeering acts are related where
defendant was enabled to commit the racketeering act solely by
virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in or
control over its affairs, or by evidence that the defendant’s
position in the enterprise facilitated his commission of the
racketeering act, or by evidence that the racketeering act
benefitted the enterprise, or by evidence that the racketeering act
was authorized by the enterprise or by evidence the racketeering
act promoted or furthered the purposes of the enterprise.
R., Vol. III at 30, 31–32 (Jury Instruction 19) (emphasis added).
Although he did not object at trial, Knight now contends this instruction is
plainly erroneous. He argues the district court improperly expanded the
definition of “pattern,” and in so doing, effectively merged RICO’s fourth
element (“pattern”) with its fifth element (“participation”).
The leading Supreme Court case addressing the “enigmatic term” of
“pattern of racketeering activity” is H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
492 U.S. 229, 250 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). In H.J. Inc., the Supreme Court
was called on to explain how multiple predicate acts interact with each other, and
with the activities of a RICO enterprise, so as to constitute a pattern of illegal
activity. After observing Congress “had a fairly flexible concept of a pattern in
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mind,” the Court found the “term pattern itself requires the showing of a
relationship between the predicates and of the threat of continuing activity,” so
that it is “continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern.” Id.
at 239 (some emphasis and punctuation marks omitted). A prosecutor “must show
that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a
threat of continued criminal activity.” Id. Although the two “constituents of
RICO’s pattern requirement”—continuity and relatedness—are analytically
distinct, “in practice their proof will often overlap.” Id.
At issue here is the “relatedness” aspect of RICO’s pattern requirement.
Attempting to offer guidance on RICO relatedness, H.J. Inc. arrived at a working
definition by borrowing from a parallel statue, the Dangerous Special Offender
Sentencing Act (Title X). Title X—like RICO, a provision of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970—defines a “pattern” with some specificity:
[C]riminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts
that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants,
victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated
by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. 1
Id. at 240; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e). With this understanding of relatedness,
the Court went on to explain that racketeering acts establish a threat of continued
racketeering activity if they extend “over a substantial period of time” or
“project[] into the future with a threat of repetition.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241,
1
H.J. Inc. did not clarify what other “distinguishing characteristics” could
be used to identify a pattern.
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242. In other words, RICO acts are continuous if they are attributable to a “long-
term association that exists for criminal purposes” or are “part of an ongoing
entity’s regular way of doing business.” Id. at 242, 243.
We have applied these concepts in various circumstances, and we have
particularly approved of the language from H.J. Inc. and Title X as applied to
related racketeering acts. 2 See, e.g., Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 761 (10th Cir.
2010); Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorporation, Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1555 (10th Cir.
1992). Our Tenth Circuit pattern jury instruction adopts verbatim the language
from H.J. Inc. See 10th Cir. Crim. Pattern Jury Instructions No. 2.74.5.
Accordingly, instructing the jury using only the H.J. Inc. language is the
conventional approach, and unsurprisingly, most jurisdictions adopt the H.J. Inc.
language when explaining what constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity. See,
e.g., United States v. Brandao, 539 F.3d 44, 55 (1st Cir. 2008); Heller Fin., Inc.
v. Grammco Computer Sales, Inc., 71 F.3d 518, 524 (5th Cir. 1996); United States
2
At oral argument, and to a limited extent in his briefs, Knight relied on
United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other
grounds by United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011 (10th Cir. 2009). This
reliance is misplaced. Although Smith applies the H.J. Inc. definition of
relatedness, it does not suggest that definition is exclusive. Id. at 1269. And,
although Knight is correct that Smith suggests the government must prove, as an
independent element, “a nexus . . . between the racketeering activity and the
enterprise,” this requirement alone does not mean that Knight’s Instruction 19 is
plainly improper. See id. at 1272. As the Third Circuit explained in United
States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 2003), “proof used to establish the
existence of an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity may in particular
cases coalesce,” and in any case, Instruction 19 did not eliminate the requirement
that the jury find relatedness among predicate racketeering acts.
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v. Bingham, 653 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 2011); see also, e.g., David B. Smith &
Terrance G. Reed, Civil RICO § 4.03 (2011) (identifying the H.J. Inc. relatedness
formulation as the standard definition).
And, even while accepting the general H.J. Inc. framework, some circuits
have taken a more expansive view of RICO relatedness. In United States v.
Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25, 57 (2d Cir. 2008), for example, the Second Circuit applied
the H.J. Inc. language but acknowledged its “residual clause— ‘otherwise . . .
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics’—is open to ‘a range of different
ordering principles.’” Under this language, “[w]here the government presents
evidence from which it could permissibly be inferred that the criminal acts have
some rational common denominator or fit into a particular order or arrangement,
the question of whether the acts are related is one of fact for the jury.” Id.
Similarly, in United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 304 (3d Cir. 2003),
the Third Circuit held that the government may establish a pattern of racketeering
“by showing either (1) the defendant is enabled to commit the predicate offenses
solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in or control over
the affairs of the enterprise or (2) the predicate offenses are related to the affairs
of the enterprise.” Explaining that “proof used to establish the existence of an
enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity may in particular cases coalesce,”
the court noted that “separately performed, functionally diverse and directly
unrelated predicate acts and offenses will form a pattern [of racketeering] under
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RICO, as long as they all have been undertaken in furtherance of one or another
varied purposes of a common organized criminal enterprise.” Id. at 286, 292 n.7
(quotations omitted).
Along these lines, in United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 543, 554 (6th Cir.
2000), the Sixth Circuit held that “[RICO] predicate acts do not necessarily need
to be directly interrelated; they must, however, be connected to the affairs and
operations of the criminal enterprise.” The court observed: “[t]he business of a
criminal enterprise is crime [and its] crimes form a pattern defined by the
purposes of the enterprise.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Given the widespread adoption of Title X’s language, Knight does not take
issue with the first part of Instruction 19, which is taken directly from H.J. Inc.
But he contends the latter portion of the instruction (italicized in the excerpt
above) inappropriately expands the notion of a pattern of racketeering activity.
He argues this portion is legally unsupportable because, in deviating from the H.J.
Inc. framework, the instruction improperly shifts the jury’s focus from the
relationship among criminal acts—an aspect of RICO’s fourth element—to how
the acts are related to the affairs of the RICO enterprise—RICO’s fifth element,
which was covered in Instruction 21. The upshot, according to Knight, is that the
jury could have found a pattern of racketeering without ascertaining any
functional relationship among the racketeering acts themselves—a result
irreconcilable with the idea of a pattern of criminal behavior.
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Knight is correct to point out that Instruction 19’s latter portion parallels
Instruction 21, which reads:
The . . . final element that the government must prove . . . is that
a defendant . . . conducted or participated in the conduct of the
enterprise through th[e] pattern of racketeering activity.
* * *
[T]he government must also prove that there is some meaningful
connection between the defendant’s illegal acts and the affairs of
the enterprise. To satisfy this part of the element, the
government must establish either (1) that the defendant’s position
in the enterprise facilitated his commission of those illegal acts
and that the racketeering acts had some impact or effect on the
enterprise, or (2) that the acts were in some way related to the
affairs of the enterprise, or (3) that the defendant was able to
commit the acts by virtue of his position or involvement in the
affairs of the enterprise.
R., Vol. III at 34.
These two instructions—designed to address separate RICO elements—
contain obvious similarities. Knight says these similarities irreparably tainted his
conviction and require reversal.
We disagree. While not without some force, Knight’s argument fails under
the plain error standard. First, as a whole, the jury instructions did not mislead
the jury, and H.J. Inc. itself does not preclude courts from issuing additional
explanatory language regarding the concept of relatedness. Indeed, neither
Supreme Court nor Tenth Circuit law suggests the H.J. Inc. definition is the
exclusive text for assessing relatedness, or that it was flatly improper for the
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district court to include explanatory language regarding a defendant’s relationship
with the RICO enterprise.
Second, and consistent with the other circuits, although H.J. Inc.’s
language is not entirely clear, it allows at least some flexibility in describing
racketeering patterns. To some extent, the Supreme Court left it to lower courts
to define the precise contours of RICO’s pattern-of-conduct requirement. As the
Court explained: “Congress intended to take a flexible approach [to establishing a
pattern of racketeering], and envisaged that a pattern might be demonstrated by
reference to a range of different ordering principles or relationships between
predicates, within the expansive bounds set.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238
(emphasis added). And when summarizing its reasoning, the Court firmly
disavowed any suggestion it was setting forth an unbending test for relatedness:
“[T]he precise methods by which relatedness . . . may be proved[] cannot be fixed
in advance with such clarity that it will always be apparent whether in a particular
case a ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ exists. The development of these
concepts must await future cases, absent a decision by Congress to revisit RICO
to provide clearer guidance as to the Act’s intended scope.” Id. at 243.
Accordingly, H.J. Inc.’s discussion leads to an inescapable conclusion: district
courts are free to reasonably flesh out Title X’s characterization of patterns of
criminal conduct.
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Third, a close reading of Instruction 19 reveals that under H.J. Inc. and
ordinary principles of statutory construction, the district court’s approach was not
plainly wrong. As an initial matter, Instruction 19—which provides that “[t]o
prove that the acts of racketeering are related, the government must prove” that
acts are related in precisely the manner set out in Title X—reveals the district
court expressly required the jury to find relatedness in accordance with the
standard set forth in H.J. Inc. R., Vol. III at 31 (emphasis added). We assume
the jury followed this command. The second part of the instruction does not
negate this requirement. Rather, when read in context, it illustrates how Knight
might have exploited the RICO enterprise to engage in narcotics trafficking
through a pattern of ongoing criminal acts. As it considered Instruction 19, the
jury would have already concluded that Knight engaged in criminal activity
through the Crips gang—an organized drug conspiracy—and, given that, the jury
could have found that the various drug crimes furthered the gang’s objectives.
Although it is true that the latter part of Instruction 19 adds content to, and
likely expands, Title X’s definition of relatedness, its emphasis on the interplay
between relatedness and the defendant’s participation in the criminal enterprise is
not contrary to settled law. And, even though Instructions 19 and 21 are similar,
when read in context, they are not sufficiently redundant such that we can only
conclude the purported error was plain.
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Finally, as the government points out, the H.J. Inc. standard, as recited in
Instruction 19, provides that predicate acts may form a pattern of criminal
conduct if they “otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics.”
H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240 (emphasis added); see also id. at 238 (“It is not the
number of predicates but the relationship that they bear to each other or to some
external organizing principle that renders [criminal acts] ‘ordered’ or ‘arranged.’”
(emphasis added)). No relevant authority suggests the category of “distinguishing
characteristics” may not include a significant and ongoing relationship between
the defendant, the criminal acts, and the RICO enterprise. The pattern here
consists of a series of drug crimes, overseen by Knight and others, that
maintained and funded the operation of the gang.
Ultimately, however, detailed analysis of Instruction 19’s language is
unnecessary. Because neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit has
mandated a single test to determine whether predicate RICO acts are related—and
because multiple circuits have diverged from a narrow view of H.J. Inc.—any
purported error in the district court’s instruction was not plain. United States v.
Story, 635 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[F]or an error to be contrary to
well-settled law, either the Supreme Court or this court must have addressed the
issue.”); United States v. Goode, 483 F.3d 676, 681 (10th Cir. 2007) (to show
plain error, a defendant must establish that an error, if it occurred, was “clear or
obvious under current law”). Indeed, “[w]hen the law is unsettled,” as it is here,
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“the decision to instruct one way or the other does not constitute plain error.”
Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1141 (10th Cir. 1999).
Having said all this, the more prudent course for district courts is to
continue to adhere to the Tenth Circuit pattern jury instructions when defining the
RICO elements. If a court relies on H.J. Inc.’s residual language—“or otherwise
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics,” 492 U.S. at 240—it should say so
expressly, and it should explain carefully how the jury should apply the residual
clause to the facts of a particular case.
Although we find no plain error, we also doubt any error would have
affected Knight’s substantial rights. All conceivable predicate acts—including
the marijuana conspiracy and maintaining the first drug house—were related by a
common purpose (to earn money through the sale of illegal drugs) and a common
method (the sale of drugs to younger gang members for resale). Even a strict
reading of H.J. Inc. reveals that relatedness can be established solely on the basis
of these characteristics.
For these reasons, Knight has not met his burden under the plain error
standard.
B. Constructive Possession Instruction
Knight also contends the district court committed plain error by failing to
instruct the jury on the definition of constructive possession. This claim likewise
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fails because Knight has not demonstrated any error that was plainly contrary to
established law or affected his substantial rights.
Knight’s charge for possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute was
based on the discovery of 14 grams of crack cocaine in the first drug house. In
Jury Instruction 27, the district court directed the jury to find Knight guilty if (1)
he knowingly or intentionally possessed crack cocaine, (2) he possessed the
cocaine with intent to distribute, and (3) the weight of the controlled substance
was at least the amount charged. The same jury instruction defined possession
with intent to distribute as “to possess with intent to deliver or transfer possession
of a controlled substance to another person, with or without any financial interest
in the transaction.” R., Vol. III at 38–39. Knight did not ask the court to instruct
the jury on constructive possession, and the court never issued such an
instruction. A constructive possession instruction, had it been given, would have
explained that possession may be actual or constructive, and that “[c]onstructive
possession exists where the defendant has the power to exercise control or
dominion over the [drugs].” United States v. Ramirez, 479 F.3d 1229, 1250 (10th
Cir. 2007) (quotations, citation, and alteration omitted). In other words,
constructive possession does not require proof of actual physical custody—only
the defendant’s ability (but not necessarily the sole ability) to guide the destiny of
the drugs, which can be exercised by control of or influence over others. Mere
proof of joint or common ownership, occupation, or control of the premises is not
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enough; the government must also show “some connection or nexus individually
linking the defendant to the contraband.” United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207,
1212 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).
Knight now contends this omission was plainly erroneous because without
a firm definition of constructive possession, the jury was “left . . . to its own
devices in deciding what, apart from actual physical custody, amounted to
possession” and therefore was free “to convict on a theory that would not suffice
to meet the legal test of possession.” Aplt. Br. at 49–50. According to Knight,
the jury could have found possession on the mere basis that Knight jointly
controlled a drug house where drugs were sold—a fact insufficient to support a
conviction for possession with intent to distribute. See United States v.
McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1291 (10th Cir. 2000) (where there is joint occupancy,
“mere control or dominion over the place in which the contraband is found is not
enough to establish constructive possession”).
Even if one accepts the premise of Knight’s argument, he has not met his
burden under the plain error standard. Although Knight points to several cases in
which courts distinguish between actual and constructive possession, he does not
identify any case—much less a Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court decision—
holding that failure to provide a constructive possession instruction is erroneous.
Absent such authority, any claim of error was not plain. See Story, 635 F.3d at
1248.
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Moreover, Knight’s substantial rights were not affected by the alleged
error. At trial, a gang member testified unequivocally that Knight personally sold
him cocaine—a statement sufficient, without more, to convict on the possession
count. That testimony establishes a nexus between Knight and the drugs found at
the first drug house. Knight attempts to rebut this testimony, urging us to
presume that “the jury could easily have been dubious of [the witness’s] account.”
Aplt. Br. at 56. But we cannot reassess credibility on plain error review.
Accordingly, Knight has not satisfied the second and third prongs of plain
error review. 3
III. Conclusion
We AFFIRM Knight’s conviction.
3
Because we find that Instruction 27 was not plainly erroneous, we need
not consider Knight’s contention that failure to provide a constructive possession
instruction invalidated his RICO convictions.
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