United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued October 6, 2011 Decided November 4, 2011
No. 10-3024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLEE
v.
PATRICK C. DAVID,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:93-cr-00306-1)
Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued
the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J.
Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.
Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C.
Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III and John
P. Mannarino, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.
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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
WILLIAMS.
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: In 1993 appellant
Patrick C. David was convicted of several drug and firearm
offenses relating to his possession of 427 grams of crack
cocaine. In 1997, after his conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1) was overturned in light of Bailey v. United States,
516 U.S. 137 (1995), he was resentenced—to 188 months in
prison. In 2008 he filed a motion under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2), which authorizes district courts to reduce
sentences when the Sentencing Commission has amended the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”) to reduce the
applicable sentencing range for an offense and has made the
amendment retroactive. In this case David invoked the
Sentencing Commission’s reductions in the offense level (and
thus the sentencing range) for certain crack cocaine offenses.
The district court denied David’s motion, noting on the record
a host of facts about David’s criminal record and his
disciplinary infractions in prison. David appeals, arguing that
the district court failed to determine the extent of the
reduction for which he was eligible before denying his
motion. In particular, he believes that the court may have
underestimated the permissible reduction in the sentencing
range, and that this hypothetical underestimate might have
played a role in the court’s refusal to make any reduction at
all. Although we agree with David that a motion under
§ 3582(c)(2) requires the court first to compute the sentence
reduction available, we find that the record here establishes
that it did so.
* * *
Section 3582(c)(2) allows the court, “upon motion of the
defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,” to reduce
a sentence in cases where the applicable guideline range has
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been reduced. In responding to such a motion, the district
court must engage in a “two-step inquiry.” Dillon v. United
States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2691 (2010). The court must first
“determine the prisoner’s eligibility for a sentence
modification and the extent of the reduction authorized.” Id.;
see USSG § 1B1.10(b). Only then may the court consider the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to decide “whether the
authorized reduction is warranted, either in whole or in part.”
Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2691. Dillon thus structures the district
court’s decision so that it first resolves the range of its legal
authority, and then looks to a broad array of factors that may
influence its discretion within that range.
David contends that the district court never met its
obligation to determine the extent of the sentence reduction
for which he was eligible. He faults the court for not
explicitly stating that he was eligible for a 37-month
reduction, particularly in light of two probation office
memoranda submitted to the court that confused both David’s
original sentencing range and the new range to which his
sentence could have been reduced.
Although David’s sentencing history was complex, we
find no trace of the probation office’s confusion in the court’s
ruling. He had been sentenced in 1994 for possession with
intent to distribute cocaine base, and the court correctly noted
that this implied an offense level of 33; given his criminal
history category of II (which has never changed), the court
observed that that level entailed a range of 151 to 188 months.
See Mem. & Order, United States v. David, No. 93-306, at 1-2
(D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2010) (“District Court Decision”). Thus the
court clearly understood the range resulting from offense level
33 for someone with David’s criminal history. With an
additional mandatory and consecutive five years added for use
of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1), the total 1994 sentence was 211 months. Id.
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On appeal we vacated David’s five-year sentence under
§ 924(c)(1). United States v. David, 96 F.3d 1477, 1482 (D.C.
Cir. 1996). As removal of that sentence brought related gun
possession enhancements under USSG § 2D1.1(b) into play,
we remanded to the district court for application of those
enhancements. See United States v. Rhodes, 106 F.3d 429,
432-33 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding no constitutional or
statutory bar to such a procedure). Resentencing David in
1997, the district court added two offense levels, yielding a
level of 35. The court here correctly observed that offense
level 35 entailed a range of 188 to 235 months and that David
had been resentenced, at the lower end of that range, to 188
months. District Court Decision at 2.
Finally, the court observed that the Sentencing
Commission’s 2007 amendment for crack cocaine provided
for a “two level reduction.” Id.
In short, the court expressed a clear understanding (1) that
the 1997 188-month sentence had been at level 35, with a 188
to 235 month range, (2) that offense level 33 implied a 151 to
188 month range, and (3) that David was eligible for a two-
level reduction in offense level. David in effect asks us to
believe that the court, having handled all these numbers
completely accurately, either failed to do the simple arithmetic
of subtracting two from 35 and getting 33, or that somehow
after making that subtraction it had forgotten its statement,
about 12 lines higher on the same page, that level 33 entailed
a range of 151 to 188 months. We cannot believe that.
Of course the district court could have averted any risk of
appellate (or defendant) doubt by expressly stating the
maximum reduction permitted by § 3582(c)(2). As we have
said, “Justice is better served through clarity on the record.”
In re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 488, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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But where, as here, the court’s ruling reflects an accurate
grasp of all the relevant information as to offense levels and
sentencing ranges, as discussed above, we are confident in
inferring that the district court performed the basic arithmetic
needed to understand its authority to grant a reduction of up to
37 months. Unlike the situation in United States v. Lawson,
494 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2007), where we could not be sure
of the “starting point” for the court’s application of the
§ 3553(a) factors, id. at 1058, here we have adequate grounds
for inferring that the court knew that point exactly. The court
fulfilled its obligation to determine the extent of the reduction
authorized. We thus have no basis for thinking that a
misunderstood starting or ending point could have skewed its
exercise of discretion.
* * *
The decision of the district court is
Affirmed.