FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH November 8, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
MARK TUCKEL,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
v. No. 10-1353
MAJOR GROVER; STEVE KEYS,
Defendants–Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 1:10-CV-00215-KLM-MEH)
Bill C. Berger, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Jennifer Susan Huss, (John W. Suthers, Attorney General, with her on the brief) Office of
the Attorney General for the State of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-
Appellees.
Before LUCERO, MATHESON, Circuit Judges, and FREUDENTHAL, District
Judge.*
*
The Honorable Nancy D. Freudenthal, District Judge of the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
Mark Tuckel, an inmate in state prison in Crowley, Colorado, filed a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 lawsuit against two prison officials. In his suit, Tuckel averred that he was beaten
in retaliation for submitting a complaint through the prison grievance system. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Tuckel
had failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We hold that a plaintiff with an objectively reasonable
fear of retaliation from prison officials may show that administrative remedies were
unavailable to him and thereby be excused from exhausting such remedies. Because
there are disputed issues of fact about the availability of administrative remedies to
Tuckel, we reverse and remand.
I
Tuckel held a job in vehicle maintenance while serving a sentence at the Arkansas
Valley Correction Facility (“AVCF”). Unsatisfied with his position, Tuckel allegedly
struck a deal with Scott Grover, a prison official. Under the claimed agreement, Grover
would see that Tuckel was transferred to a vocational program if Tuckel completed a
welding project. Upon completion of the project, however, Grover denied the existence
of the agreement. Tuckel subsequently filed a complaint through the prison grievance
system.
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After filing his grievance, Tuckel was approached by several inmates and
informed that Scott Keys, who managed a program at the prison, told them that his
grievance had resulted in their loss of incentive pay. At the apparent recommendation of
Grover and other officials, the inmates proceeded to assault Tuckel, causing severe
damage to his eye. Rather than bringing another grievance, Tuckel filed a § 1983 claim
in district court, alleging violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights.1
Invoking the PLRA, defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that
Tuckel failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Despite Tuckel’s protests that he
did not exhaust because he feared further retaliation, the district court granted the
defendants’ motion. Tuckel now appeals.
II
“We review summary judgment decisions de novo, applying the same legal
standard as the district court.” Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d 1244, 1253 (10th Cir. 2010)
(quotation omitted). In our analysis, we must view evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. McCarty v. Gilchrist, 646 F.3d 1281, 1284 (10th Cir. 2011).
“Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 1285 (quotation omitted).
The district court granted summary judgment against Tuckel based solely on its
1
Although Tuckel specifically alleged only an Eighth Amendment violation in his
complaint, the magistrate judge, in recognition of Tuckel's pro se status, determined that
his allegations also implicated a First Amendment retaliation claim.
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determination that the PLRA requires exhaustion regardless of a prisoner’s legitimate
fear of retaliation. There is no dispute as to whether Tuckel exhausted the remedies
provided in the Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”) regulations; he concedes
that he did not. We are thus faced squarely with the task of interpreting the PLRA, and
specifically, the scope of its exhaustion provision.
A
Any exercise in statutory interpretation must begin with an examination of the
plain language at issue. United States v. Sprenger, 625 F.3d 1305, 1307 (10th Cir. 2010).
Congress enacted the PLRA to reduce the “disruptive tide of frivolous prisoner
litigation.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 97 (2006). To achieve this end, the statute
includes an “invigorated” exhaustion provision, which provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section
1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies
as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is
mandatory. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84. But we need not determine whether an exception
to this requirement is appropriate here. Instead, we must decide if the exhaustion
requirement, by its own terms, supports the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
We hold that it does not, and join three of our sibling circuits in concluding that
intimidation or threats by prison officials can render an administrative remedy
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unavailable under the PLRA’s exhaustion provision.
B
The plain language of the PLRA requires that prisoners exhaust only available
remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought . . . until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” (emphasis added)). It follows
that if an administrative remedy is not available, then an inmate cannot be required to
exhaust it. Because the statute does not explicitly define the term “available,” we must
adopt its ordinary meaning. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009).
To be “available,” a remedy must be “capable of use for the accomplishment of a
purpose.” See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737 (2001) (citing Webster’s Third New
Int’l Dictionary 150 (1993)).
Our circuit has previously recognized that an administrative remedy is not
“available” under the PLRA if “prison officials prevent, thwart, or hinder a prisoner’s
efforts to avail himself of [the] administrative remedy.” Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245,
1250 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir.
2002) (holding that a prison official’s failure to respond to a grievance within prescribed
time limit renders an administrative remedy unavailable). Based on this principle, we
have obligated district courts “to ensure that any defects in exhaustion [are] not procured
from the action or inaction of prison officials.” Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d
1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007).
In light of our precedent, we find it difficult to accept the proposition that an
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administrative remedy is available in any meaningful sense if its use will result in serious
retaliation and bodily harm. We therefore conclude that when a prison official inhibits an
inmate from utilizing an administrative process through threats or intimidation, that
process can no longer be said to be “available.”
In so holding, we join the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. See Turner v.
Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1085 (11th Cir. 2008); Kaba v. Step, 458 F.3d 678, 683-86 (7th
Cir. 2006); Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Verbanik
v. Harlow, No. 10-2522, 2011 WL 3488979, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 11, 2011) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (holding the same in a non-precedential opinion). Faced with claims
similar to Tuckel’s, these courts have uniformly held that “some threats disrupt the
operation and frustrate the purposes of the administrative remedies process enough that
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement does not allow them.” Turner, 541 F.3d at 1085; see
also, Kaba, 458 F.3d at 686 (“The attack itself may have transformed the remedies from
available to unavailable.”); Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 688 (“[S]ome circumstances may
render seemingly accessible remedies, in fact, unavailable.”). We agree that this is the
most logical reading of the statute.
Although we need not reach beyond the statute’s text, we note that our
interpretation is faithful to the underlying purposes of the PLRA. As the Eleventh Circuit
explained in Turner, when “an inmate forgoes administrative remedies because prison
officials have made it irrational for him to pursue them, the inmate loses a benefit that
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Congress intended to bestow on him.”2 541 F.3d at 1077. Without venturing into the
realm of guesswork, we are confident that Congress did not intend the exhaustion
requirement to summarily prevent inmates from vindicating their constitutional rights.
See Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1937 (2011) (“Courts should presume that . . .
Congress did not leave prisoners without a remedy for violations of their constitutional
rights.”).
C
Having established that threats or intimidation by prison officials can render an
administrative remedy unavailable, we must consider the showing necessary to defeat a
failure-to-exhaust defense. Our out of circuit colleagues have adopted somewhat
differing standards with respect to the showing a plaintiff must make to establish that
remedies are unavailable. The Second Circuit was the first to address this issue, and
determined that the test “must be an objective one.” Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 688.
Specifically, the court considered whether a “similarly situated individual of ordinary
firmness” would consider administrative remedies to be available. 3 Id. A similar test
2
The Turner court further reasoned that allowing inmates faced with threats to
bring suit in court would promote accountability among prison officials and deter abusive
behavior. See 541 F.3d at 1085. We agree that accountability and deterrence may be
positive side effects of our decision, but absent evidence that such effects were
contemplated by Congress in passing the PLRA, we base our interpretation solely on the
statute’s plain text.
3
The Second Circuit also announced a theory of estoppel to prevent abusive
prison officials from asserting exhaustion as an affirmative defense and a catch-all
Continued . . .
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seems to have been adopted by the Seventh Circuit, albeit implicitly. Kaba, 458 F.3d at
684 (“While we have not laid out a particular test for deciding when administrative
remedies become unavailable, the Second Circuit has opted for an objective test . . . .”).
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit settled on a clear two-prong analysis in Turner. 541 F.3d at
1085. Under this analysis, a court must determine if the plaintiff was subjectively
deterred in addition to the objective inquiry utilized by the other circuits. Id.
After considering these various tests, we conclude that the Eleventh Circuit’s
analysis in Turner serves as the best model. See Turner, 541 F.3d at 1085. Accordingly,
we hold that an inmate must make two showings: (1) that the threat or intimidation
actually did deter the plaintiff inmate from lodging a grievance or pursuing a particular
part of the prison administrative process; and (2) that the threat or intimidation would
deter a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude from lodging a grievance or
pursuing the part of the prison administrative process that the inmate failed to exhaust.
The first showing is subjective; the inmate must show that he was actually
deterred. The second is an objective one, requiring the district court to consider the
context of the alleged threat or intimidation. For example, a threat that was allegedly
“special circumstances” exception to the PLRA exhaustion requirement. See Hemphill,
380 F.3d at 686. We have previously considered the applicability of estoppel in the
PLRA framework, and reserved the issue for another day. See Jernigan, 304 F.3d at
1033. Confronted with it once more, we again conclude it is unnecessary to decide the
issue. Our determination that the district court erred in granting summary judgment is
unaffected by Tuckel’s ability to estop the defendants from setting up an exhaustion
defense. Similarly, we need not address the existence of a “special circumstances”
exception in this case.
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made years prior to the inmate’s suit may fail to render administrative remedies
unavailable. The same is true if an inmate is no longer held in the prison in which he
experienced retaliatory violence. This objective element ensures that inmates cannot
easily circumvent the exhaustion requirement, and provides district courts with a means
of quickly filtering out frivolous claims. Only threats that are sufficiently serious and
retaliatory acts that are severe enough to deter a reasonable inmate will result in an
administrative remedy becoming unavailable for PLRA purposes.
As a result, not all—or even most—First Amendment retaliation claims involving
the grievance process will be exempt from exhaustion. Such claims do, however, add an
additional layer of complexity. The merits of a First Amendment retaliation claim, such
as the one brought by Tuckel, may overlap with the objective prong of our test. See
Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) (requiring a plaintiff
asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim to show, inter alia, “that the defendant’s
actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary
firmness from continuing to engage in that activity”). Nevertheless, demonstrating that
an official objectively chilled an inmate from relying on administrative remedies presents
a significant challenge in any context. As such, there is little incentive for an inmate to
assert baseless retaliation claims rather than simply utilizing a grievance procedure.
Failure to exhaust under the PLRA is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 212 (2007). Defendants thus bear the burden of asserting and proving that the
plaintiff did not utilize administrative remedies. Id. Once a defendant proves that a
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plaintiff failed to exhaust, however, the onus falls on the plaintiff to show that remedies
were unavailable to him as a result of intimidation by prison officials. Plaintiffs should
be afforded an opportunity to counter the exhaustion defense in this manner regardless of
whether the issue is asserted by defendants or raised by the court sua sponte. See
Aquilar-Avellaveda, 478 F.3d at 1225.
D
In reaching our conclusion, we necessarily reject the defendants’ arguments that
our holding conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision in Woodford. In that case, the
Supreme Court confirmed that an inmate must comply with the procedural rules dictated
by an administrative grievance system. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 102-03. Defendants point
to language in Woodford indicating that exhaustion under the PLRA “is no longer left to
the discretion of the district court.” 548 U.S. at 85. But this language does not support
the defendants’ position. Throughout Woodford, the Court is careful to acknowledge that
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies only to “available” remedies. Id. at 84. Our
holding concerns when remedies are available; it does not give discretion to fabricate
exceptions to the requirement that inmates exhaust available remedies. The Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits apparently reached similar conclusions in Turner and Kaba, both of
which were decided after Woodford.
Defendants’ argument that Tuckel should have filed an emergency grievance prior
to bringing suit also lacks merit. Under CDOC regulations, an inmate may file an
emergency grievance when irreparable harm is imminent. Colo. Dept. Corrections
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Admin. Reg. 850-04(IV)(I)(1). Once filed, an emergency grievance bypasses the normal
channels of review and may immediately be forwarded to the warden or other head
administrative official within the prison. Id. Defendants contend that the existence of
this procedure should allay any fear of retaliation inmates might have about using the
regular grievance procedures. We disagree.
An inmate who has been threatened or beaten for using administrative procedures
has no reason to expect that an emergency grievance procedure, by virtue of being
expedited, is somehow different and will not result in retaliation. If anything, an
expedited procedure could be construed as hastening the retaliation an inmate might
suffer. Nor does the potential that an emergency grievance will be forwarded to the
warden necessarily ensure that an inmate will not be harmed. In some instances,4 a
warden may refuse or be unable to protect a prisoner from retaliation by lower prison
officials. Further, even with an emergency procedure in place, it is unclear where an
inmate faced with threats by the warden or other ranking prison official can turn for
redress.
We are thus not persuaded that the CDOC emergency procedure eliminates an
inmate’s fear of retaliation. In reaching this determination, we once more align ourselves
with the other circuits that have contemplated this issue. See Turner, 541 F.3d at 1083-84
4
The plaintiff in Kaba was attacked in his cell after he specifically informed his
prison’s warden of the threats made against him. 458 F.3d at 682-83.
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(rejecting the argument that the plaintiff “should have filed an emergency grievance”);
see also Kaba, 458 F.3d at 681-82 (acknowledging that there was a special grievance
procedure in place, but according it no consideration in the analysis).
III
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the
basis of exhaustion before Tuckel had a meaningful opportunity to gather evidence
concerning his alleged fear of retaliation. As a result, the record on appeal does not
reveal whether Tuckel can make an adequate showing that the alleged intimidation by
defendants rendered administrative remedies unavailable to him.
Given the sparse record and the disputed factual issues concerning the objective
reasonableness of Tuckel’s fear of retaliation, the judgment of the district court is
VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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