10-5075-ag
Muriqi v. Holder
BIA
Hom, IJ
A089 009 170
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
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IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 22nd day of November, two thousand eleven.
PRESENT:
JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
DENNY CHIN,
Circuit Judges.
_______________________________________
ENVER MURIQI,
Petitioner,
v. 10-5075-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Joshua Bardavid, New York, N.Y.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General; Jamie M. Dowd, Senior
Litigation Counsel; Yanal Yousef,
Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Enver Muriqi, a native of the former Yugoslavia and a
citizen of Kosovo, seeks review of a November 30, 2010 order
of the BIA, affirming the June 4, 2009 decision of an
Immigration Judge denying his applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Enver Muriqi, No. A089 009
170 (B.I.A. Nov. 30, 2010), aff’g No. A089 009 170 (Immig.
Ct. N.Y. City June 4, 2009). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we review the
IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA decision. See Xue Hong
Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.
2005). The applicable standards of review are well-
established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v.
Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
The agency reasonably concluded that Muriqi failed to
satisfy his burden of proof with regard to establishing his
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eligibility for asylum. As to past persecution, the agency
reasonably concluded that Muriqi did not meet his burden of
showing that he suffered attacks at the hands of either
state actors or private actors that “the government [was
either unable] or unwilling to control,” Ivanishvili v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir. 2006). In
particular, Muriqi provided no corroborating evidence to
support his assertion that Albanian extremist elements
controlled the local police forces. This lack of
corroboration is especially relevant in light of the fact
that Muriqi asserts he was physically attacked, threatened,
and harassed on the basis of his membership in the
Democratic League of Kosovo (“DLK”) -- the political party
that Muriqi concedes “had political control of Kosovo”
during the period in which he alleged these events occurred.
The agency also reasonably determined that Muriqi
failed to establish a well-founded fear of future
persecution. As the agency found, the U.S. Department of
State’s 2008 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for
Kosovo indicates that “there were no reports of politically
motivated attacks and threats against Kosovo Albanian
political figures,” and that “individuals generally could
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criticize authorities publicly or privately without
reprisal.” Although Muriqi presented some evidence of
political and sectarian violence in Kosovo, this evidence
relates to the protests that occurred immediately prior to
Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia, and
therefore did not conflict with the agency’s finding that
the newly-independent Kosovar regime generally respects the
political rights and freedoms of its citizens. Moreover,
the agency reasonably accorded diminished weight to an
expert affidavit relied on by Muriqi. While the affidavit
provides a general overview of Kosovo’s socio-political
infrastructure and discussed shortcomings in Kosovo’s
criminal justice system, it did not provide a particularized
analysis of the specific dangers that Muriqi might encounter
in present-day Kosovo because of his membership in the DLK.
See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342
(2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the weight afforded to the
applicant’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely
within the discretion of the immigration judge).
Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in
denying Muriqi’s application for humanitarian asylum. As
discussed above, Muriqi did not meet his burden of
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establishing a well-founded fear or future persecution, and
so cannot show that he “may suffer . . . serious harm” if
removed. See Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir.
2010) (internal citation omitted). Moreover, Muriqi
provided no evidence of any “long-lasting physical or mental
effects” resulting from the attacks and harassment he
allegedly suffered in Kosovo. See Jalloh v. Gonzales, 498
F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 2007).
Finally, because Muriqi failed to meet his burden of
proving his eligibility for asylum, he necessarily also
failed to meet the higher burden for withholding of removal,
as his applications for both forms of relief were based on
the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d
148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion
for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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