UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4368
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL ANTHONY DARBY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Orangeburg. Margaret B. Seymour, District
Judge. (5:07-cr-01253-MBS-1)
Argued: September 21, 2011 Decided: November 29, 2011
Before DUNCAN and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and Damon J. KEITH,
Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: William Michael Duncan, AUSTIN & ROGERS, PA, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. John David Rowell, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Michael Darby contests the sufficiency of
the evidence leading to his conviction on one count of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or
more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and one count of possession with
intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B). Darby also
challenges the resulting 292-month sentenced imposed by the
district court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
A.
On October 17, 2007, Michael Darby and codefendant
Melvin Wright were both indicted in Columbia, South Carolina on
charges of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and
to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more
of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(A) (“Count One”), and possession with intent to
distribute and distribution of five grams or more of cocaine
base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B),
841(b)(1)(C) (“Count Two”). Count One of the indictment alleges
that the conspiracy begins “at least in the middle to late part
of 2003.” The charges largely stem from a controlled purchase of
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crack cocaine whereby Darby’s ex-girlfriend, Keesha Williams,
agreed to act under the advisement of the Orangeburg Department
of Public Safety and purchase crack cocaine from Darby while
employing audio and video recording devices.
On November 30, 2006, unbeknownst to Michael Darby,
Keesha Williams called Lieutenant Samuel Jenkins of the
Orangeburg Department of Public Safety explaining that she could
“help him bring down Michael Darby” by getting Darby to sell her
narcotics. Williams agreed to have her communications with
Darby recorded. In one recorded phone conversation, Williams
began by inquiring if the receiver was Darby and Darby replied
affirmatively. Williams continued by inquiring if she could
purchase an “ounce” for her cousin. Darby replied, “I probably
could get it to him, but I don’t want to meet him.” Darby
established the purchase price for the ounce of cocaine to be
$800.
The next day, on December 1, 2006, Williams drove to
Darby’s apartment with audio and video recording devices
installed in her car. Upon arriving at Darby’s apartment, Darby
informed Williams that he could not sell Williams the cocaine at
that time because he had to still “cook it up.” Darby explained
that he only had “salt,” or powder form of cocaine, and not
“hard,” the crack cocaine that Williams sought to purchase.
Darby informed Williams that the transaction would take place at
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codefendant Melvin Wright’s residence and that the cost would
increase to $850. Though Darby’s face is not captured in the
video, his voice is identified in an audio recording. Williams
drove to Wright’s residence after obtaining an additional $50 to
cover the price increase of the crack cocaine. After Williams
arrived at Wright’s house, she witnessed Darby arrive and enter
Wright’s house without speaking. Wright actually conducted the
drug sale by handing Williams crack cocaine through the window.
Shortly after the transaction between Williams and Wright,
Williams called Darby at the behest of Lt. Jenkins to inquire
why Darby did not personally deliver the crack cocaine to her
and instead chose to involve Wright. Darby replied that Wright
makes all of his transactions. Williams gave the crack cocaine
to Lt. Jenkins. Williams underwent a comprehensive “strip”
search both before she drove to Darby’s apartment on December 1,
2006 and after she handed the drugs over to Lt. Jenkins.
The Government established the foregoing facts through
the testimony of Keesha Williams. The government also produced
several audio and video recordings. An audio recording revealed
the initial phone conversation between Williams and Darby about
the drug sale. A video recording from the camera installed in
Williams’s car captured the drug transaction between Williams
and Wright. A chemical analysis established that Williams
purchased 23.97 grams of crack cocaine.
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The Government also called Joe Moultrie, a cooperating
federal inmate, to testify about his prior drug dealings with
Darby. Moultrie testified that he was a supplier for Darby and
began supplying him with crack cocaine in 2002 when he sold
Darby 28 grams of crack cocaine for $900. According to
Moultrie, he supplied Darby with at least 28 grams of crack
cocaine or more at least once or twice a month until Moultrie’s
arrest in 2004. Moultrie further testified that, by agreement,
he would supply Darby with the crack cocaine and Darby would pay
him later. In total, Moultrie estimated that he sold Darby five
kilograms during his time supplying Darby with cocaine.
The Government also called another cooperating federal
inmate and former drug dealer, Stacy Shannon, to testify
pursuant to a written plea agreement in which he had received a
sentence reduction. Shannon testified that he began dealing
narcotics with Darby in 2003 when Darby came to him and
requested to buy four and a half ounces of crack cocaine. He
further testified that shortly thereafter, Darby began
purchasing between 135 grams and two kilograms of cocaine powder
from him. Shannon testified that Wright would often accompany
Darby when Shannon conducted drug transactions with Darby.
Shannon estimated that he supplied Darby with at least 200
kilograms of cocaine out of the 500 kilograms of cocaine he
received while dealing cocaine.
5
Special Agent Stacy Brown with the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives also testified for the
Government. Special Agent Brown provided the controlled funds
for the transaction and testified that he was present on
December 1, 2006 for the controlled purchase and the subsequent
arrest of Darby. He further testified that after he advised
Darby of his Miranda rights, Darby voluntarily made the
statement that he was purchasing kilogram and half-kilogram
quantities from a supplier in Mexico every two weeks for four
months. Special Agent Brown testified that Darby also stated
that he had purchased approximately 5 kilograms in total over
the course of the four months he purchased cocaine from this
supplier.
B.
On December 19, 2008, a jury found Darby guilty of
both the conspiracy charge (Count One) and the distribution
charge (Count Two). The same jury found Wright not guilty on
the conspiracy charge and guilty on the distribution charge.
Darby filed a motion for acquittal on December 24, 2008,
claiming that Wright’s acquittal on the conspiracy charge leaves
insufficient evidence that Darby conspired with anybody. He
further claimed that insufficient evidence existed to support a
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guilty verdict on Count Two. The district court denied the
motion in an order filed April 20, 2009.
On January 4, 2010, the district court sentenced Darby
to 292 months in prison. The 292 months was within the
sentencing guidelines and based upon the court finding that
Darby was responsible for at least 200 kilograms of cocaine
throughout the conspiracy, putting him at a base offense level
of 38 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1). The court also applied
a firearm enhancement of two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1(b)(1). During sentencing, Darby submitted a motion to
undergo a psychiatric evaluation to determine whether a lesser
sentence would serve the goals of sentencing in Darby’s case.
Darby requested an authorization of $3,500.00 in funds for the
evaluation. The court instead authorized $1,600. When new
counsel was appointed for Darby, Darby submitted a supplemental
motion requesting $3,500 for an evaluation. The court denied
the motion. This appeal followed.
II.
Darby appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion for acquittal and his 292 month sentence. Darby contends
that the guilty verdict on Counts One and Two was not supported
by substantial evidence. As to Count One, Darby argues that
there was insufficient evidence that he conspired to distribute
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crack cocaine with anybody other than Wright, and Wright’s
acquittal on the conspiracy count creates insufficient evidence
that he conspired with Wright. As to Count Two, Darby argues
generally that there is insubstantial evidence that Darby is
guilty of possession with intent to distribute and distribution
of five grams or more of cocaine base.
Darby further challenges his sentence as being
unreasonable and in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Specifically, Darby contests the district court’s: (1) finding
that Darby distributed at least 200 kilograms of cocaine; (2)
application of the firearm enhancement; and (3) refusal to grant
additional funds for a psychiatric evaluation. We discuss each
argument in turn.
A.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for
acquittal de novo. United States v. Green, 599 U.S. 360, 267
(4th Cir. 2010). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a conviction, we assess whether a rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979). We must uphold the jury’s verdict if there is
substantial evidence to support the verdict when viewing the
8
evidence most favorable to the Government. Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Beidler, 110
F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is
“evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94
F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996)(en banc)(citation omitted). A
reviewing court does not assess the credibility of witnesses,
but rather assumes “that the jury resolved all contradictions in
testimony in favor of the Government.” Green, 599 F.3d at 367
(quoting United States v. United Med. & Surgical Supply Corp.,
989 F.2d 1390, 1402 (4th Cir. 1993).
1.
As a preliminary matter, we reject the notion that
Darby’s conviction should be vacated on the conspiracy charge
merely because his co-conspirator Melvin Wright was acquitted on
the same charge. It is well established that an acquittal of
the appellant’s alleged co-conspirator does not necessitate that
the appellant’s conviction be vacated. See United States v.
Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984)(holding that a defendant cannot
challenge his conviction merely because it is inconsistent with
jury’s verdict of acquittal on another count); United States v.
Collins, 412 F.3d 515, 519-20 (4th Cir. 2005)(refusing to
9
overturn a conspiracy conviction merely because a co-conspirator
was acquitted by the same jury); United States v. Thomas, 900
F.3d 37, 40 (4th Cir. 2002)(holding that an acquittal of sole
co-conspirator does not require reversal of defendant’s
conviction); see also United States v. Andrews, 850 F.3d 1557,
1561 (11th Cir. 1988)(en banc)(“Consistent verdicts are
unrequired in joint trials for conspiracy: where all but one of
the charged conspirators are acquitted, the verdict against the
one can stand.”); United States v. Vales-Valencia, 823 F.3d 381,
382 (9th Cir. 1987) (“the acquittal of all conspirators but one
does not necessarily indicate that the jury found no agreement
to act”). Thus, a jury can acquit Wright and still find that a
conspiracy existed between Darby and Wright.
Darby seems to argue more precisely that given
Wright’s acquittal, the totality of the evidence does not
substantially show that Darby conspired with either Wright or
anyone else. We disagree. To prove a conspiracy to possess
cocaine base with intent to distribute, the Government must
establish that:(1) an agreement to possess cocaine with intent
to distribute existed between two or more persons; (2) the
defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily became a part of this conspiracy. See
United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1984).
Viewing the evidence most favorably to the Government, we find
10
that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for
the conspiracy charge.
The evidence presented through Keesha Williams’s
testimony established an agreement by Darby to possess cocaine
with the intent to distribute. In one recorded conversation
between Williams and Darby, he agrees to sell Williams an
“ounce” for her cousin, commenting that Darby could get the
cocaine to him, but did not want to meet Williams’s cousin.
When Williams drove to meet Darby on the night of the controlled
purchase, Darby instructed Williams to meet him at Wright’s
residence to buy the crack cocaine. This arrangement of selling
illegal drugs at Wright’s residence where the cocaine had to be
“cooked up” at the very least evinces an agreement between Darby
and Wright. Darby’s presence at Wright’s residence after his
conversation with Williams corroborates this agreement and
further establishes that he knowingly and voluntarily became a
part in this conspiracy. Darby then told Williams, after the
controlled purchase, that he used Wright to make all his
purchases. This is patent evidence that a conspiracy existed to
distribute drugs between Darby and Wright.
Notwithstanding the substantial evidence of a
conspiracy established by Williams’s testimony, Shannon provided
further evidence of such a conspiracy. Shannon testified that
he sold a total of 200 kilograms of cocaine to Darby, who agreed
11
to pay Shannon for the cocaine after he sold it. This agreement
between Shannon and Darby is also sufficient evidence to
establish a conspiracy. Shannon’s testimony that Wright would
often accompany Darby during his drug transactions is
circumstantial evidence that a conspiracy existed between Wright
and Darby. Moreover, Moultrie’s testimony that he supplied
Darby with cocaine establishes a conspiratorial agreement
between Darby and Moultrie.
Since we find that there was sufficient evidence from
which a reasonable juror could find that Darby was engaged in a
conspiracy between two or more persons, we briefly address the
charge in Count One that the conspiracy involved a distribution
of 500 grams or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more with
cocaine base. It is sufficient to note that Shannon’s testimony
that Darby received 200 kilograms of cocaine, Moultrie’s
testimony that he sold Darby five kilograms of cocaine, and
Darby’s own statement that he purchased five kilograms of
cocaine from a supplier in Mexico all establish that at least
500 grams of cocaine and 50 grams of cocaine base was intended
to be distributed throughout the conspiracy. We therefore find
that the evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict as
to Count One.
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2.
Darby’s contention that there is insufficient evidence
to convict him on Count Two is equally unavailing. Darby
asserts that there is little direct evidence linking him to the
distribution of the crack cocaine because that the video
recording does not show him exchanging crack cocaine for money
and there were no phone records admitted to confirm that
Williams was in fact talking to Darby. Darby argues that his
conviction on Count Two is almost entirely based on what he
believes to be a biased witness--Keesha Williams.
Williams’s testimony against Darby is sufficient to
uphold his conviction on Count Two. First, there is no
requirement that the prosecution prove its case by direct
evidence. Although there may not be a wealth of the direct and
red-handed evidence that Darby would like to see, the proper
standard is whether there exists substantial evidence--direct or
circumstantial--for a rational juror to support a guilty
verdict. In this case, there was a controlled purchase in which
Darby was present at the scene of the transaction after
responding to an offer to purchase drugs for a price that he set
over a recorded phone conversation. Williams and Special Agent
Brown both testified that Darby was present at the controlled
purchase where Williams purchased 23 grams of crack cocaine.
The fact that Wright handed the cocaine to Williams at the
13
behest of Darby does not absolve Darby from the charge of Count
Two. Darby’s own statement to Special Agent Brown that he
purchased approximately 5 kilograms from his supplier over the
preceding four months coupled with the evidence that Darby
actively sold crack cocaine, as evidenced by the December 1,
2006 purchase, is sufficient to uphold Count Two.
Darby’s argument discounting Williams’s testimony and
undermining the credibility of other prosecutorial witnesses
gains no traction here. As discussed above, a reviewing court
does not assess the credibility of witnesses, but rather assumes
that the jury resolved issues of credibility in favor of the
Government.
B.
Darby challenges the district court’s finding at
sentencing which holds him accountable for the distribution of
200 kilograms of cocaine with 5 kilograms of cocaine base
throughout the conspiracy charged in Count One. This finding
was necessary for the court to apply a base offense level of 38
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(C)(1).
1.
This court reviews a district court’s calculation of
drugs attributable to a defendant for clear error. United
14
States v. Kiulin, 360 F.3d 456, 461 (4th Cir. 2004). The
sentencing guidelines advise the court that in a scenario “where
there is not drug seizure or the amount seized does not reflect
the scale of the offense, the court shall approximate the
quantity of the controlled substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1,
Application Notes 12. We find that there is sufficient evidence
in the record to support the district court finding that Darby
was responsible for 200 kilograms of powder cocaine and 5
kilograms of cocaine base.
The 23.8 grams seized from Williams after the
controlled purchase does not reflect the scale of Darby’s
conspiracy to distribute cocaine, so the district court was
within its discretion to approximate the amount of cocaine for
sentencing purposes. In determining the amount of cocaine to
attribute to Darby, the district court properly relied upon the
testimony of Shannon and Moultrie. Shannon testified that he
supplied Darby a total of 200 kilograms of powder cocaine.
Moultrie testified that he had sold Darby a total of 5 kilograms
of cocaine base to Darby. We decline to hold that the district
court clearly erred in relying on these two independent bases to
approximate the quantity of cocaine for which Darby was
responsible.
15
2.
Darby also contests the district court’s application
of the firearm enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1),
which increased the defendant’s offense level by two levels. We
review a district court’s application of a firearm enhancement
under this provision for clear error. United States v. Manigan,
592 F.3d 621, 626 (4th Cir. 2010).
The firearm enhancement is proper when “the weapon was
possessed in connection with drug activity that was part of the
same course of conduct or common scheme as the offense of
conviction.” Id. at 628-29 (internal citations omitted). The
Government must prove the facts needed to support a sentencing
enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. The enhancement
“should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is
clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the
offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, Application Note 3.
To support the firearm enhancement, the Government
relied on assertions in the presentence investigation report
(“PSR”) and Darby’s statement to Special Agent Brown. The PSR
reflected that upon Darby’s arrest at his residence on November
8, 2007, agents found 3 firearms, including a .45 caliber pistol
Darby admittedly retrieved from his nightstand when the agents
entered his home to execute a search warrant. The Government
proffered that 400 grams of powder cocaine was found in Darby’s
16
master bedroom and 471 grams of powder cocaine was found in
total. Further, agents found 39.4 grams of crack cocaine, a set
of digital scales, body armor, and $5,611.00 in U.S. currency at
Darby’s residence. We find that the Government met the
preponderance of evidence standard in arguing that the guns,
cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and body armor all indicate that
Darby used the guns to protect himself and the drugs, which in
turn shows that the weapons were used in connection to the
charged offense. We therefore hold that there was no clear
error on part of the district court in applying the firearm
enhancement.
3.
Finally, Darby challenges the district court’s refusal
to pay the $3,500 fee requested by Darby to pay for the
psychiatrist of his choice. The court originally approved a
payment of $1,600 for Darby to hire a psychiatrist, but did not
approve the extra $1,900 that Darby argued was necessary to
obtain his preferred psychiatrist. He argues that had the court
granted his request, his preferred psychiatrist’s evaluation
would have assisted in determining mitigation factors. Darby
contends that the district court ultimately abused its
discretion by denying Darby $1,900. We disagree.
17
We can find no case law, nor does Darby cite any, that
stands for the proposition that a district court must approve
the exact amount of funds that a defendant requests to enable
him to hire the psychiatrist of his choice for the purpose of
exploring mitigating factors during the sentencing phase of
trial. Had this request been submitted to determine whether
Darby was competent to stand trial, then we would inquire
whether there was reasonable cause to believe that Darby was
suffering from a mental defect which rendered him unable to
understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 4241(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2007). However, this is not the case. Darby’s argument, aside
from having no basis in law, is highly speculative. He does not
assert his incompetency either during the trial or after.
Rather, he claims that an evaluation may have produced an
opinion that would cause the district court to depart downward
from the advisory guidelines. The only consideration that Darby
points to is Darby’s age and lack of a prior record. This is not
enough to find that the court abused its discretion. Moreover,
the court considered Darby’s lack of a prior record in assigning
him a Criminal History Category of I. The court ultimately
imposed a sentence that was on the lower end of the advisory
sentencing guidelines.
18
We find it important to highlight that the district
court did grant Darby funds to procure a psychiatric evaluation.
However minimal the approved funds may have been, Darby does not
argue that the funds granted would be insufficient to hire a
psychiatrist to conduct an evaluation--only that it was
insufficient to hire his preferred psychiatrist.
We find that the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Darby’s motion for additional funds for the purposes of
a psychiatric evaluation. We further find that the sentence
rendered by the district court was not an abuse of discretion as
it was not only within the advisory sentencing guidelines, it
was also at the lower end of those guidelines.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the district court.
AFFIRMED
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