FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 12, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 11-1200
v. (D.C. No. 94-CR-00231-LTB-1)
(D. Colo.)
TIMOTHY NELSON REEVES,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Timothy Nelson Reeves challenges the district court’s revocation of his
supervised release and modification of the terms of his pending supervised release
based on vindictive prosecution and failure to rule on his objections, respectively.
United States v. Reeves, No. 94-cr-00231 (D. Colo. Apr. 25, 2011); 1 R. 102-05.
Mr. Reeves received an additional ten months of imprisonment to be followed by
twenty-six months of supervised release, including a condition that he participate
in a sex offender treatment program. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we affirm.
Background
Mr. Reeves was convicted in 1994 of mailing a threatening communication
based upon sexual demands made in a letter to a woman he did not know. 18
U.S.C. § 876; 4 R. 3. He served eighteen months for that conviction, consecutive
to sentences for other state crimes, and then started a three-year term of
supervised release on February 12, 2009. Id. at 3-4. On August 3, 2010, while on
supervised release, Mr. Reeves admitted to Colorado authorities that he had left
sexually explicit voicemail messages with a woman he did not know, in violation
of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-111. 1 R. 74. He was charged with, and ultimately
convicted of, a misdemeanor in state court for that offense. Prior to that, Mr.
Reeves’ probation officer, Garret Pfalmer, learned of Mr. Reeves’ admission and
initially filed a petition to modify conditions of release. 1 R. 5-6. In that
petition, Mr. Pfalmer asked the court to order Mr. Reeves to complete a sex
offender evaluation and, if recommended by the evaluator, to modify Mr. Reeves’
conditions of release to include mandatory sex offender treatment. Id.
The district court ordered Mr. Reeves to undergo an evaluation and,
following the recommendation of the evaluator, held a hearing at which Mr.
Reeves was ordered to undergo sex offender treatment as one of his conditions of
release. 1 R. 11-12; 3 R. 3; 2 R. 28-35. At that hearing, counsel for Mr. Reeves
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indicated that the terms of treatment were unclear, and that he would need to see
the proposed treatment contract before he could advise Mr. Reeves to agree. Id.
Once Mr. Pfalmer provided that contract—the terms of which he described as
non-negotiable 1—counsel for Mr. Reeves filed several objections to various
contractual provisions. 1 R. 16-72. Before the district court could hold a
hearing on Mr. Reeves’ objections, however, Mr. Pfalmer filed a petition for
revocation of supervised release. 1 R. 73-74. The district court ultimately
revoked Mr. Reeves’ supervised release as noted above. 1 R. 102-05.
On appeal, Mr. Reeves argues vindictive prosecution—namely, that Mr.
Pfalmer filed the revocation petition because Mr. Reeves challenged what he
believed to be unconstitutional provisions of the treatment contract. Aplt. Br. 29-
34; Aplt. Rep. Br. 1-12. Mr. Reeves also argues that the district court erred in
failing to consider his objections to that treatment contract, as he likely will be
required to sign the same contract when he is released from his current term of
incarceration. Aplt. Br. 34-35; Aplt. Rep. Br. 12-14.
1
Mr. Pfalmer specifically explained, before providing the contract to Mr.
Reeves: “The [treatment agency] would have a standardized treatment contract
that any and all individuals that would enter treatment services would sign into
and agree to.” 2 R. 34. Counsel for the government, at the revocation hearing,
also reiterated: “[I]t is clear, in my perception, that the defendant wants to
renegotiate a contract that essentially is not renegotiable.” 2 R. 60.
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Discussion
A. Vindictive Prosecution
Mr. Reeves argues that the district court erred by failing to find vindictive
prosecution on the part of Mr. Pfalmer. This is not a traditional vindictive
prosecution case: vindictiveness and retaliation claims generally involve a
prosecutor or a judge. For example, a judge may not sentence a defendant more
harshly following a successful appeal without providing “articulated reasons
based on objective information,” and a prosecutor may not file felony charges
“when a convicted misdemeanant exercises his statutory appellate right to trial de
novo.” United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1040 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969); Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21, 27-29 (1974)). We have not found a reported case in which the
prosecutorial vindictiveness calculus was applied to a probation officer. 2
We need not resolve this important question, however. Assuming—without
2
This case involves the actions of a federal probation officer in 2010 and
2011. Mr. Reeves cited cases relating to state parole boards, which are
fundamentally different than the federal probation department. See Nulph v.
Cook, 333 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (body at issue was the Oregon State Board
of Parole, a state entity which had authority to dictate sentence terms); Thompson
v. Armontrout, 808 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1986) (same for the Missouri Parole Board,
and the Eighth Circuit expressly refused to decide the present issue). Mr. Reeves
does provide one citation involving parole at the federal level, but it, too, is
distinguishable. See Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1988) (body at
issue was the United States Parole Commission, which at that time—23 years
ago—had authority to impose penalties for disciplinary infractions). The question
whether vindictive prosecution applies to probation officers apparently remains
open, both in this circuit and generally.
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deciding—that vindictive prosecution could apply to a probation officer, Mr.
Reeves has failed to establish vindictive prosecution in this case. In evaluating a
claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness, we “must determine whether the [party at
issue] engaged in conduct that would not have occurred but for [its] desire to
punish the defendant for exercising a specific legal right.” United States v.
Sarracino, 340 F.3d 1148, 1178 (10th Cir. 2003). We review factual findings
relating to vindictive prosecution for clear error, and legal determinations de
novo. Raymer, 941 F.2d at 1039. Mr. Reeves has the burden of proof, and must
“establish either (1) actual vindictiveness, or (2) a realistic likelihood of
vindictiveness which will give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness.” Id. at
1040. If Mr. Reeves establishes either, the government must then “justify its
decision with legitimate, articulable, objective reasons.” Id.
1. Presumption of Vindictiveness
A prosecuting authority may not punish a defendant for exercising a
specific legal right, and an inference that the prosecution has done so may lead to
a presumption of vindictiveness. Sarracino, 340 F.3d at 1178. Mr. Reeves’ claim
of vindictiveness rests entirely on pre-trial (or, here, “pre-hearing”) conduct, for
which the Supreme Court generally has refused to allow a presumption of
vindictiveness. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 384 (1982). Mr.
Reeves argues that the chain of events in this case—Mr. Pfalmer attempts to
modify supervised release, Mr. Reeves asserts his constitutional rights in arguing
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against some of the proposed modifications, and Mr. Pfalmer files for
revocation—allows for an inference of vindictiveness.
We disagree. It is well-settled that an initial charging decision does not
freeze future conduct. Sarracino, 340 F.3d at 1177. “[T]he presumption is
without application when a prosecutor offers a defendant a chance to plead guilty
or face more serious charges, provided the prosecutor has probable cause on the
more serious charges and the defendant is free to accept or reject the offer.”
Raymer, 941 F.2d at 1040 (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-64
(1978)). Neither does the presumption apply “when a defendant declines to plead
guilty to misdemeanor charges in order to exercise his right to a jury trial, and a
different prosecutor obtains a felony indictment.” Id. (citing United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382-84 (1982)).
Mr. Reeves’ experience was more akin to a failed plea negotiation than
prosecutorial vindictiveness. As Mr. Reeves notes in his brief, Mr. Pfalmer could
have moved to revoke supervised release immediately upon learning of the new
offense. Aplt. Br. 6 (“Commission of the new offense was a Grade C violation of
Mr. Reeves’ conditions of supervised release and provided a clear basis for
revocation.”). Instead, Mr. Pfalmer pursued a sex offense specific evaluation, and
the evaluator recommended sex offender treatment. Before presenting the
treatment contract to Mr. Reeves, Mr. Pfalmer made clear that the contract was,
for practical purposes, non-negotiable. Mr. Reeves objected to the contract, and
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Mr. Pfalmer decided to instead pursue revocation. Given the need for a response
in this case, we cannot find that the district court clearly erred in concluding that
Mr. Pfalmer did not act vindictively.
Mr. Reeves argues that his claim of vindictiveness is further supported by
the fact that he always explained that he was willing to undergo sex offender
treatment, regardless of the outcome of his objections, but first wished to explain
his concerns to the district court. This fact, he argues, further supports the
inference that Mr. Pfalmer was motivated only by vindictiveness. We disagree.
Particularly given the Supreme Court’s reluctance to expand the presumption of
vindictiveness in a pre-trial setting, we find no error.
2. Actual Vindictiveness
Mr. Reeves alternatively argues that Mr. Pfalmer’s statement—that the
decision to file for revocation was “based on” Mr. Reeves’
objections—establishes actual vindictiveness. Again, we think Mr. Reeves’
experience was more akin to a failed plea negotiation. “Not only is a presumption
of vindictiveness inapplicable to the ‘give-and-take’ of plea negotiations, but
even a showing of actual vindictiveness does not necessarily warrant dismissal”
of a charge. Sarracino, 340 F.3d at 1177. Our cases make clear that a prosecutor
has full discretion to file additional charges—even relying on the same
evidence—“based on” a defendant’s decision to go to trial. Id. at 1178.
Recognizing that “the decision to prosecute may not be intentionally based upon .
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. . the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights,” id. (citing Wayte
v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)), we disagree that Mr. Pfalmer’s use of
“based on” necessarily implies retaliation based on the exercise of any right. On
this record, the district court could have concluded that Mr. Pfalmer retaliated
against Mr. Reeves for exercising his constitutional rights. But it also could have
concluded—as it did—that Mr. Pfalmer’s “motivation was one for public safety
and protection of the public, given the nature of the charge” at issue. 2 R. 76.
Implicit in that finding is the conclusion that Mr. Pfalmer’s use of “based on” was
not retaliatory, but simply evinced by the conclusion that Mr. Reeves’ challenges
to the proposed modifications made such modifications unworkable. Given those
options, the district court did not clearly err by finding that Mr. Pfalmer did not
vindictively prosecute Mr. Reeves. 3
B. Objections to Pending Conditions of Release
Mr. Reeves also argues that the district court erred by refusing to consider
his specific objections to the proposed treatment contract, as he likely will have to
sign that same contract as a condition of his supervised release. Here again, an
3
Mr. Reeves also notes that Mr. Pfalmer expressly reserved the right to
file a revocation petition, but only in the event that Mr. Reeves was convicted on
the Colorado state charges. Aplt. Rep. Br. 4. Mr. Reeves argues that Mr.
Pfalmer’s filing for revocation prior to the eventual Colorado conviction further
supports his claim of vindictiveness. Id. As the gravamen of this opinion makes
clear, however, Mr. Pfalmer had discretion to file for revocation at any time; his
decision to first attempt modification did not foreclose his other options, even if
he only expressed one of those options.
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important distinction must be made: Mr. Reeves objected to the terms of the
treatment contract, but not to the imposition of mandatory sex offender treatment
generally. The court imposed only mandatory sex offender treatment, not the
specific contract to which Mr. Reeves objected, and we therefore find that this
argument is not yet ripe for consideration. Mr. Reeves, as a result of being
incarcerated, is not subject to that contract now, and necessarily would not have
been for ten months following the district court’s revocation due to his sentence.
Perhaps he will be presented with that contract when his incarceration ends, but
this is not assured; in the meantime, we cannot say that the district court erred by
failing to render what would amount to an advisory opinion on the
constitutionality of that document. 4 Mr. Reeves is free to challenge the proposed
treatment contract if and when he is presented with it following his incarceration.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2).
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
4
The court specifically required Mr. Reeves to “participate in and
successfully complete an approved program of sex offender evaluation and
treatment . . . . The defendant shall comply with the rules and restrictions
specified by the treatment agency.” 1 R. 105. Until it is clear to which agency
Mr. Reeves will be assigned, as well as what contract that agency will present,
any challenge to a potential requirement cannot be ripe.
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