UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4487
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANA NIDA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver,
Jr., District Judge. (2:10-cr-00046-1)
Submitted: November 28, 2011 Decided: December 14, 2011
Before SHEDD, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Barry P. Beck, POWER, BECK, & MATZUREFF, Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States
Attorney, John L. File, Assistant United States Attorney,
Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dana Nida was convicted, following a jury trial, of
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, distribution
of cocaine base, possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
offense, and felon in possession of a firearm. He appeals,
arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress his custodial statement. We affirm.
Surveilling narcotics officers having developed
probable cause to believe that Nida was using and selling crack
cocaine in his residence, they attempted to arrest him when he
stepped outside. When he retreated into the residence, the
detectives forcibly entered the residence and placed Nida under
arrest. Nida had initially refused to speak to the police as
they approached and before he retreated into the residence.
After Nida was arrested, he was taken to the police
station and advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Nida signed a waiver of these
rights, acknowledging his understanding of them and his
willingness to speak with the arresting officer. During the
interview that followed, Nida admitted that he had purchased
cocaine, cooked some powder cocaine into crack cocaine, traded
crack for Hydrocodone pills, and possessed a firearm. At no
time during this interview did Nida state that he no longer
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wished to speak with the officer or otherwise give any
indication that he did not want to answer the officer’s
questions. Under these circumstances, even assuming that Nida
validly invoked his right to silence before he was physically
apprehended after retreating into his residence, we conclude
that the district court did not err in denying the motion to
suppress. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106 (1975)
(providing factors to consider in determining whether an accused
has waived the right to remain silent, which he previously
asserted).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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