UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1344
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
NANCY A. RUSH,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley,
District Judge. (1:10-cv-00006-IMK)
Submitted: November 23, 2011 Decided: December 15, 2011
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gregory H. Schillace, SCHILLACE LAW OFFICE, Clarksburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United
States Attorney, Alan G. McGonigal, Assistant United States
Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Nancy A. Rush appeals from the district court’s order
awarding summary judgment to the United States in its action to
collect on student loans that Rush executed. See United States
v. Rush, No. 1:10-cv-00006-IMK (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 22, 2011).
Rush contends that issues of material fact remain such that a
reasonable jury could conclude that she repaid the loans.
Specifically, while she does not recall receiving documentation
that she had satisfied the loan obligations, she “assum[es]” and
“guess[es]” that she repaid the loans prior to the alleged
default. She also contends that a former employee of the
originating bank attested that she had never been in default
during his employment; that the originating bank approved other
loans to her, which would not have occurred had she defaulted;
and that the guaranty agency’s cessation of garnishment efforts
evidences her repayment of the loans.
Rush’s contentions are not persuasive. The United
States has submitted documents certified by the United States
Department of Education and other evidence showing her default.
In the face of these records, Rush’s unsubstantiated and
equivocal assertion that she repaid the loans does not create an
issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). The former employee’s statement
does not justify reversal because he left the bank before the
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default and would not know whether Rush defaulted. So too with
respect to Rush’s other loans, as the record indicates that they
were executed before the default. Finally, the guaranty
agency’s cessation of garnishment efforts does not create an
issue of material fact. Undisputed evidence shows that the
agency ceased collection activities not because Rush had repaid
the loans, but because it assigned the loans to the Department
of Education. Subsequently, the Department undertook its own
collection efforts.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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