UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4411
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SONIER CHAVIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas David
Schroeder, District Judge. (1:10-cr-00332-TDS-19)
Submitted: December 20, 2011 Decided: December 23, 2011
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Eugene E. Lester, III, SHARPLESS & STAVOLA, PA, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra Jane Hairston, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sonier Chavis appeals his conviction and fifty-two
month sentence after pleading guilty pursuant to a written plea
agreement to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana in
violation of 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(A) (West 1999 & Supp.
2011). Chavis’ counsel filed an Anders * brief asserting that
there are no meritorious arguments for appeal. The Government
declined to file a brief. Chavis was informed of his right to
submit a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
Because Chavis did not seek to withdraw his guilty
plea in the district court or otherwise preserve any alleged
error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1) by
timely objection, review of his plea is for plain error. United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2002). To establish
plain error, Chavis “must show: (1) an error was made; (2) the
error is plain; and (3) the error affects substantial rights.”
United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir.
2009). The district court found that Chavis was competent to
plead guilty and that the plea was entered into knowingly and
voluntarily. The court fully explained Chavis’ rights before
accepting his plea. Chavis accepted the factual summary of the
*
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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offense offered by the Government. After reviewing the record,
we conclude that the district court did not commit plain error
in accepting Chavis’ guilty plea.
Turning to Chavis’ sentence, this court’s review is
for both procedural and substantive reasonableness, applying the
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). First, the court must determine whether the
district court correctly calculated Chavis’ advisory Sentencing
Guidelines ranges, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
factors, analyzed the arguments presented by the parties, and
sufficiently explained the selected sentences. United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). If a sentence is
free of significant procedural error, the court will review the
substantive reasonableness of that sentence. United States v.
Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). We presume that a
sentence within the properly-calculated Guidelines range is
substantively reasonable. United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178,
193 (4th Cir. 2007).
We conclude that the district court correctly
calculated the advisory Guidelines range, considered the
sentencing factors in § 3553(a), and sufficiently explained its
selected sentence. The sentence is therefore procedurally
reasonable. The district court imposed its sentence after
considering the § 3553(a) factors, the arguments of the parties,
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and the Government’s motion for a downward departure based on
Chavis’ substantial assistance. Chavis offers no argument that
the sentence is unreasonable, or any rebuttal of the presumption
that the sentence is reasonable. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51;
Pauley, 511 F.3d at 468. We therefore conclude that the
sentence is substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. The
court requires that counsel inform Chavis, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Chavis so requests but counsel believes any
such petition to be frivolous, counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on Chavis. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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